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RETALIATORY RICO AND THE PUZZLE OF
FRAUDULENT CLAIMING
Nora Freeman Engstrom*
Over the past century, the allegation that the tort liability system incentivizes
legal extortion and is chock-full of fraudulent claims has dominated public
discussion and prompted lawmakers to ever-more-creatively curtail individuals’ incentives and opportunities to seek redress. Unsatisfied with these conventional efforts, in recent years, at least a dozen corporate defendants have
“discovered” a new fraud-fighting tool. They’ve started filing retaliatory RICO
suits against plaintiffs and their lawyers and experts, alleging that the initiation of certain nonmeritorious litigation constitutes racketeering activity—
while tort reform advocates have applauded these efforts and exhorted more
“courageous” companies to follow suit.
Curiously, though, all of this has taken place against a virtual empirical void.
Is the tort liability system actually brimming with fraudulent claims? No one
knows. There has been no serious attempt to analyze when, how often, or
under what conditions fraudulent claiming proliferates. Similarly, tort reformers support RICO’s use because, they say, conventional mechanisms to deter
fraud fall short. But are conventional mechanisms insufficient? Hard to say, as
there is no comprehensive inventory of the myriad formal and informal mechanisms already in use; nor do we have even a vague sense of how those mechanisms actually operate. Further, though courts have started to green-light
retaliatory RICO actions, no one has carefully analyzed whether these suits
are, on balance, beneficial. Indeed, few have so much as surfaced relevant
risks. Addressing these questions, this Article attempts to bring overdue attention to a problem central to the tort system’s operation and integrity.
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Introduction
Plaintiffs’ lawyers have long been assailed for bringing spurious suits. In
the late nineteenth century, railroad executives complained about bogus
claims for railway injuries, ginned up, they said, by “[d]isreputable lawyers,”
alongside their “rascally confederates in the medical profession.”1 In the
1950s, a prominent physician complained in the Saturday Evening Post that
all medical malpractice suits amounted to “legalized blackmail” and insisted
that the prime objective of plaintiffs’ attorneys in such cases was to “aid in
1. Clark Bell, The Duty and Responsibility of the Attending Physician in Cases of Railway
Surgery, 14 Medico-Legal J. 7, 12 (1896–97); see also Notes and News, 40 Railway Age 567,
569 (1905) (discussing the 1905 founding of the Alliance Against Accident Fraud, an organization “to protect and defend its members against fraudulent claims . . . [and] to collect and
disseminate information . . . concerning fake claims, shyster lawyers, unprincipled physicians,
ambulance chasers, false witnesses and others engaged in such practices”).
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the holdup and run with the loot.”2 And, in the early 1990s, Peter Huber
penned a popular book lamenting the “legions of case-hardened lawyers”
intent on asserting patently false claims.3
There is at least a grain of truth to some of these dark assertions. To be
sure, the doctor above was wrong—if you’re looking for fraudulent claims,
medical malpractice litigation is probably the last place to look.4 And, it is
also true, and bears emphasis, that evidence suggests most suits within the
tort liability system are genuine and meritorious.5 Yet, it’s just as true that
the tort system, writ large, has more than its share of specious activity. Various headline-grabbing mass torts—including cases such as fen-phen, asbestos, silica, and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill—have drawn many with
dodgy entitlements to relief. And the auto accident system—responsible for
the majority of all tort claims and three-quarters of all injury damage
payouts—is, in certain segments, awash with those whose claims are feigned
or built.6
These bogus claims are costly. They account for billions of dollars of
losses per year.7 They clog courts, making it harder for those with meritorious claims to obtain justice in a timely manner. They increase insurance
premiums, and these hikes ultimately induce some individuals and entities

2. Milton Silverman, Medicine’s Legal Nightmare: Doctors in Court, Saturday Evening
Post, Apr. 18, 1959, at 31.
3. Peter W. Huber, Galileo’s Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom 4–5
(1991); see also Walter K. Olson, The Litigation Explosion: What Happened When
America Unleashed the Lawsuit 270 (1991) (accusing plaintiffs’ lawyers of blithely peddling junk science and “savor[ing]” even their patently undeserved wins).
4. For why, see infra note 176 and accompanying text. Even Victor Schwartz, the American Tort Reform Association’s longtime general counsel, has conceded: “There is no question
that it is very rare that frivolous suits are brought against doctors. They are too expensive to
bring.” Nick Anderson & Edwin Chen, The Race for the White House: Bush Pushes Stance
Against ‘Junk Lawsuits’, L.A. Times, Oct. 22, 2004, at A20.
5. See infra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
6. Nora Freeman Engstrom, An Alternative Explanation for No-Fault’s “Demise,” 61
DePaul L. Rev. 303, 303 (2012) (providing auto statistics). For fraud and “buildup” in this
sphere, see infra notes 81–84 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Stephen Carroll et al., The Costs of Excess Medical Claims for
Automobile Personal Injuries 23 (1995) (estimating that in 1993 fabricated and exaggerated auto claims cost auto insurers “an additional $9–13 billion”); Ins. Research Council,
Fraud and Buildup in Auto Injury Insurance Claims 5 (2008) [hereinafter Ins. Research Council, Fraud 2008] (“IRC estimates of the amount of total excess payment from
fraud and buildup [in the auto accident sector] in 2007 ranged from $4.8 billion to $6.8
billion . . . .”).
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to go “bare.”8 And, they drain the coffers of corporate and individual defendants, diverting funds from those with valid entitlements and pressing
financial need.9
Aside from these practical considerations, fraudulent claiming imposes
other costs, too. Suspicion of fraud sows distrust between plaintiffs and their
institutional adversaries—almost certainly inducing some to “fight fire with
fire.”10 Misdiagnoses, often at the heart of fraudulent filings, sometimes
dupe innocent plaintiffs, causing some to think, erroneously, that they are
terribly sick.11 Finally and perhaps worst of all, fraudulent claims—and persistent beliefs about the prevalence of such claims—color the public’s perception of civil litigation.12 This, in turn, causes judges and jurors to view
future plaintiffs skeptically, tarnishes the reputation of the plaintiffs’ bar,
and reduces injury victims’ interest in, and willingness to enter, the legal
fray.13
Moreover, when it comes to the operation, integrity, and stability of the
tort liability system, responses to the fraud problem are similarly consequential, with implications that are, if anything, more profound. Like the
angry doctor above, defendants have long used the specter of fraudulent
filings to justify broad efforts to clamp down on litigation more generally.
Persuaded by this advocacy, judges and policymakers have radically overhauled the civil justice system—to erect heightened pleading standards, impose certificate-of-merit requirements, create professional screening panels,
curtail the admission of expert testimony, liberalize restrictions on removal,
8. See Stephen Carroll & Allan Abrahamse, The Frequency of Excess Auto Personal Injury
Claims, 3 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 228, 228–29 (2001) (suggesting that feigned and built auto
claims contribute to the high cost of insurance, which provides “an incentive to drive uninsured, thus exacerbating the uninsured-motorist problem”).
9. See David Egilman, Letter to the Editor, Asbestos Screenings, 42 Am. J. Indus. Med.
163 (2002) (lamenting that, as a result of dubious screenings for asbestos-related injury, “compensation dollars are now unnecessarily diverted from real victims of asbestos exposure”).
10. See Bell, supra note 1, at 13.
11. See In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 636 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (discussing the incalculable harm that likely befell many of the 10,000 misdiagnosed plaintiffs).
12. See Deborah L. Rhode et al., Legal Ethics 830 (6th ed. 2013) (asserting that
“inadequate checks on fraudulent or other non-meritorious claims” constitute one of the four
“most commonly cited problems” plaguing the civil justice system); David M. Engel, The Oven
Bird’s Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal Injuries in an American Community, 18 Law &
Soc’y Rev. 551, 552 (1984) (“The popular culture is full of tales of feigned or exaggerated
physical harms, of spurious whiplash suits, ambulance-chasing lawyers, and exorbitant claims
for compensation.”); Valerie P. Hans & Juliet Dee, Whiplash: Who’s To Blame?, 68 Brook. L.
Rev. 1093, 1097 (2003) (reporting a widespread perception “that fraud among claimants is
rampant”).
13. For evidence of jurors’ skepticism, see Valerie P. Hans & Nicole Vadino, Whipped by
Whiplash? The Challenge of Jury Communication in Lawsuits Involving Connective Tissue Injury,
67 Tenn. L. Rev. 569, 584 (2000). For tarnished reputations, see Ken Dornstein, Accidentally, on Purpose: The Making of a Personal Injury Underworld in America 239
(1996). For how “prevailing legal lore” discourages claiming, see William Haltom &
Michael McCann, Distorting the Law: Politics, Media, and the Litigation Crisis 9
(2004).
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impose medical-criteria controls, limit class actions, and enhance Rule 11—
all, in part, under the guise of smoking out fraudulent suits.14
Now, with potentially far-reaching implications, corporate heavyweights
are sharpening a new tool to tamp down on fraudulent claiming: what I call
“retaliatory RICO.” In recent years, more than a dozen corporate defendants
have filed such actions against plaintiffs, their lawyers, and their experts to
retaliate for the initiation of a wide range of allegedly bogus litigation, concerning matters as varied as asbestos injury, environmental devastation,
workplace accidents, car wrecks, a motel fire, and elephant abuse.15 Embracing this development, Tiger Joyce, the president of the American Tort Reform Association (ATRA)—and arguably the tort reform movement’s most
14. See Hans & Dee, supra note 12, at 1108 (“Some major corporations, along with
insurance companies, have pointed to the high cost of fraudulent claims and supposedly frivolous litigation to support their civil justice reform efforts, which are aimed at limiting their
legal liabilities. These efforts have succeeded in many state courts.”); Robert E. Hoyt et al., The
Effectiveness of State Legislation in Mitigating Moral Hazard: Evidence from Automobile Insurance, 49 J.L. & Econ. 427, 428 (2006) (observing that “tort reforms have been promoted as
important elements in the fight against insurance fraud”); Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of
Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 286, 364 (2013) (tracing the “dramatic procedural shifts
[that] have occurred” based on assertions concerning the prevalence of extortive litigation).
15. See infra Part III; see also, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 224 F.3d 425
(5th Cir. 2000) (personal injury); Zenith Ins. Co. v. Eisenberg, No. 94-55983, 1996 WL 588467
(9th Cir. Oct. 11, 1996) (workers’ compensation); Garlock Sealing Techs., LLC v. Shein, No.
3:14-cv-137, 2015 WL 5155362 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 2, 2015) (asbestos injury); Garlock Sealing
Techs., LLC v. Simon Greenstone Panatier Bartlett, Prof’l Corp., No. 3:14-cv-116, 2015 WL
5148732 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 2, 2015) (asbestos injury); Garlock Sealing Techs., LLC v. Belluck &
Fox, LLP, No. 3:14-cv-118, 2015 WL 1022279 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 9, 2015) (asbestos injury);
Garlock Sealing Techs., LLC v. Waters & Kraus, LLP, No. 3:14-cv-130, 2015 WL 1022291
(W.D.N.C. Mar. 9, 2015) (asbestos injury); Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (overseas environmental devastation), aff’d, No. 14-0826(L), 2016 WL
4173988 (2d Cir. Aug. 8, 2016); Nat’l Serv. Indus. v. Segarra, No. 3:09-cv-083-HTW-LRA,
2012 WL 931975 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 19, 2012) (asbestos injury); Curtis & Assocs. v. Law Offices
of David M. Bushman, 758 F. Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (legal malpractice claims), aff’d
sub nom. Curtis v. Law Offices of David M. Bushman, 443 F. App’x 582 (2d Cir. 2011); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Makris, No. CIV.A. 01-5351, 2003 WL 924615 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 4,
2003) (automobile claims); G-I Holdings, Inc. v. Baron & Budd, 238 F. Supp. 2d 521 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (asbestos injury); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Abrams, No. 96 C 6365, 2000 WL
574466 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2000) (automobile accident); Tribune Co. v. Purcigliotti, 869 F.
Supp. 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (workers’ compensation), aff’d sub nom. Tribune Co. v. Abiola, 66
F.3d 12 (2d Cir. 1995); Raymark Indus., Inc. v. Stemple, No. 88-1014-K, 1990 WL 72588 (D.
Kan. May 30, 1990) (asbestos injury); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rosenfield, 683 F.
Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (automobile claims); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Plaza Oldsmobile
Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1452 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (automobile claims); Complaint, Winters v. Jones,
No. 2:16-cv-09020-JMV-JBC (D.N.J. filed Dec. 5, 2016) (consumer class actions); Complaint,
John Crane Inc. v. Shein Law Ctr., Ltd., No. 1:16-cv-5913 (N.D. Ill. filed June 6, 2016), 2016
WL 3251230 (asbestos injury); Complaint, John Crane Inc. v. Simon Greenstone Panatier
Bartlett, No. 1:16-cv-5918 (N.D. Ill. filed June 6, 2016), 2016 WL 3251232 (asbestos injury);
Don J. DeBenedictis, $2-Million Civil RICO Suit Brought Against Accident Fraud Operation,
L.A. Daily J., Mar. 2, 1984, at 16 (describing a RICO suit, Allstate Insurance Co. v. Revere, No.
98-55200, 2000 WL 1876657 (9th Cir. Dec. 26, 2000) (hearing case on appeal), against numerous lawyers and others for allegedly staging auto accidents); Mark Thompson, RICO Suit
Against Lawyers, Doctors Allowed, L.A. Daily J., Apr. 22, 1986, § 2, at 1 (describing the RICO
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visible champion—has prominently called for further use of this fraudfighting tool: “Only when fraudsters face significant risk and multimilliondollar consequences for their actions,” he has warned, “will their costly
abuse of our civil justice system diminish.”16
This is all more than a passing curiosity. For one, RICO itself is a heavyweight—in the words of one court, “the litigation equivalent of a thermonuclear device.”17 Enacted in 1970 to combat organized crime, it grants
plaintiffs unobstructed access to federal courts and provides for treble damages, attorneys’ fees, and, perhaps most tantalizing of all, the ability to brand
the defendant a racketeer.18 (Penalties under the much-ballyhooed Rule 11
seem almost quaint by comparison.) Corporate defendants’ use of RICO
also comes with sizable risks: retaliatory RICO suits threaten to upset the
delicate federal-state balance, limit court access, squander scarce judicial resources, exacerbate courthouse incivility, erode the finality of judgments,
suit titled Interinsurance Exchange v. Delug, No. 84-8651 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 1984), which alleged that dozens of lawyers and doctors in Los Angeles participated in a scheme to file over
1,000 fraudulent auto accident claims). To be sure, RICO suits against lawyers are not entirely
new. Like many others, lawyers have been targeted by RICO filings for decades. What is relatively new, however, is RICO’s retaliatory use. For discussion of early RICO activity involving
lawyers, see Paul D. Cooper & Kay Rice, The Statutory Liability of Attorneys Under RICO, 53
Ins. Couns. J. 549 (1986).
16. Tiger Joyce, Opinion, Companies Find a New Way to Fight Fraudulent Lawsuits,
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (Oct. 17, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/Op-Ed/
2013/10/17/Companies-find-a-new-way-to-fight-fraudulent-lawsuits/stories/201310170333
[https://perma.cc/J79E-HQN5] [hereinafter Joyce, New Way] (extolling this “new model for
punishing those who audaciously perpetrate this kind of costly fraud on our courts”); see also
Tiger Joyce, Commentary, How Business Can Fight Fraudulent Lawsuits, Wall St. J. (Mar. 6,
2014, 7:28 PM) (on file with the Michigan Law Review). Others are also on record embracing
the tactic. See, e.g., Ctr. For Legal Policy at the Manhattan Inst., Trial Lawyers, Inc.:
Asbestos, A Report on the Asbestos Litigation Industry 25 (2008), http://www.man
hattan-institute.org/pdf/TLI-ASBESTOS.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4NN-XLR6] (stating that,
when confronted with fraud, “corporate defendants should fight back, as CSX [a transportation company] has done in West Virginia”); Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, U.S.
Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform, Lawsuit Ecosystem II: New Trends, Targets and
Players 117–23 (2014), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/evolving.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G4V4-RUWA] (hailing defendants for “fighting back”); Paul M. Barrett,
Chevron’s RICO Victory Provides a Model for Other Companies, BloombergBusinessweek
(Mar. 5, 2014, 12:05 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-03-05/chevronsrico-victory-provides-a-model-for-other-companies [https://perma.cc/43C5-J349] (quoting
Darren McKinney of ATRA saying “[w]e hope [Chevron’s RICO victory] will encourage other
defendant companies that have been victimized by fraudulent lawsuits to fight back with
RICO suits of their own”).
17. Katzman v. Victoria’s Secret Catalogue, 167 F.R.D. 649, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d
mem., No. 96-7929, 1997 WL 259746 (2d Cir. May 13, 1997) (quoting Miranda v. Ponce Fed.
Bank, 948 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1991)).
18. See John J. Hamill et al., RICO: A Guide to Civil RICO Litigation in Federal
Courts § 1, at 1 (2014), https://jenner.com/system/assets/publications/12740/original/Civil_
RICO_2014.pdf?1393971640 [https://perma.cc/22NK-PM3E]. RICO’s damage multiplier
might be particularly alluring these days, as the Supreme Court has clamped down on punitive
damages. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); BMW of
N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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and ultimately, skew the civil justice system further in favor of well-heeled
players.19
Beyond that, retaliatory RICO’s rise offers an occasion to assess carefully
and systematically the fraud problem that plagues the tort liability system,
perhaps for the first time. The problem of fraud is undeniably significant.
And there’s no question that fraudulent claiming (alongside its close cousin,
“frivolous claiming”) has been relentlessly trotted out to justify broad-brush
attacks on the tort system’s core. Yet, we know astonishingly little about the
problem we’re all seemingly so eager to address.20 We lack an agreed-upon
vocabulary to describe the conduct at issue. We do not know, even vaguely,
where, when, how often, or under what conditions, such conduct proliferates.21 Further, though tort reform advocates have embraced RICO because,
they say, conventional fraud deterrence mechanisms are insufficient, we do
not have anything approaching a comprehensive inventory of the formal and
informal mechanisms that already exist in a fraud-fighter’s arsenal, descriptions of how those mechanisms operate, or even a rudimentary sense of how
those mechanisms fare.22 Lastly, though a few courts have started to green-

19. The American Association for Justice (AAJ) identified some of these concerns in a
2014 brief in the CSX case, explored infra. See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Association
for Justice in Support of Defendants-Appellants and Reversal at 21–28, CSX Transp., Inc. v.
Peirce, No. 13-2235, (4th Cir. Mar. 3, 2014) 2014 WL 882782 [hereinafter AAJ Brief]. For how
the civil justice system is being slanted in favor of defendants, see Miller, supra note 14, at
357–59, 364. See also Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Tort Reform, Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, and Access to Justice (2015).
20. While some have explored the problem in particular silos (bemoaning fraud in asbestos litigation, the workers’ compensation system, or the auto accident realm, for example),
vanishingly few have stepped back to analyze the problem across the tort law landscape. See
Lester Brickman, On the Theory Class’s Theories of Asbestos Litigation: The Disconnect Between
Scholarship and Reality, 31 Pepp. L. Rev. 33, 166–70 (2004) (describing specious tort claims as
“the proverbial 800 pound gorilla” that “has corrupted the civil justice system” but of which
“there is simply no acknowledgement” by scholars); Lester Brickman, The Use of Litigation
Screenings in Mass Torts: A Formula for Fraud?, 61 SMU L. Rev. 1221, 1227 n.21 (2008) [hereinafter Brickman, Screenings] (observing that “the subject of mass tort fraud is studiously
avoided by most tort scholars”); Gary T. Schwartz, Waste, Fraud, and Abuse in Workers’ Compensation: The Recent California Experience, 52 Md. L. Rev. 983, 1011–12 (1993) (“I know of
no major law review articles in the modern era that have dealt with the problems of waste,
fraud, and abuse in . . . tort law itself. Modern torts scholars, it seems, either do not regard the
problems as real ones—or . . . do not regard them as congenial for purposes of their own
research efforts.”).
21. In the words of Arthur Miller: “We never have defined either abusive litigation behavior or frivolous lawsuits; we never have measured the frequency of either; we do not know
who is guilty of such conduct or which side of the litigation is more prone to commit such
conduct . . . .” Miller, supra note 14, at 361; see also Carroll & Abrahamse, supra note 8, at 229
(“Empirical estimates of the extent of excess claiming across the nation are not available.”).
22. For example, ATRA’s Tiger Joyce has insisted that RICO suits are warranted because
“authorities largely seem to ignore fraud perpetrated by the lawsuit industry,” and public
officials “won’t act to investigate and punish the obvious corruption and fraud in our civil
courts.” Joyce, New Way, supra note 16.
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light retaliatory RICO actions, there has yet to be sustained scholarly analysis addressing whether use of this new mechanism is on balance beneficial—
or even surfacing relevant risks.23
To bridge these gaps, this Article unfolds in five parts. Part I begins the
inquiry by bounding, categorizing, and mapping the fraud concept. As such,
it defines what constitutes a fraudulent claim and distinguishes between
“fraudulent” and “frivolous” litigation. It then offers a typology of five distinct types of fraudulent-claiming behavior and, drawing on that typology,
identifies where fraud is most apt to be found.
Part II pivots to RICO. It first traces RICO’s creation in the 1970s, its
explosion in the 1980s, and its more recent retrenchment. Then it considers
the matter directly at hand, chronicling two recent, prominent, and successful attempts by corporate entities to assert retaliatory RICO claims against
plaintiffs and their lawyers and allies. With more than a trace of irony, this
Part shows that civil RICO, once dubbed the “darling of the plaintiffs’ bar,”
is now poised to become its foe.24
Part III puts RICO’s recent utilization in context by identifying and
evaluating conventional methods to deter and punish fraudulent suits. Thus,
Part III assembles in one place the myriad formal and informal fraud-fighting tools already available and offers an initial assessment of those tools’
weaknesses and strengths. This exercise yields three important insights. The
first is that the past decade has witnessed a surge in anti-fraud activity. Over
the last ten or fifteen years, private insurers, legislators, trust administrators,
fraud bureaus, criminal prosecutors, and state and federal judges have all
stepped up fraud-fighting efforts—seemingly, to positive effect.25 Second,
the exercise reveals that most fraud-fighting mechanisms only operate once a
lawsuit is actually initiated. Thus, to the extent gaps do exist in the current,
sprawling, multi-faceted regulatory regime, they are far more likely to exist
when it comes to unfiled, as opposed to filed, claims. Third, Part III’s inventory highlights that courts have, for centuries, struggled with how to strike a
sensible balance between tolerating abusive actions and going too far in the
opposite direction, which would, inevitably, chill meritorious litigation,
dampen zealous advocacy, and compromise the finality of judgments. Thus
far in weighing these countervailing risks, courts have proceeded cautiously;
they have penalized the initiation of litigation only infrequently and in truly
exceptional circumstances. This suggests that, for better or worse, permitting
23. But cf. H. Robert Fiebach, A Chilling of the Adversary System: An Attorney’s Exposure
to Liability from Opposing Parties or Counsel, 61 Temp. L. Rev. 1301, 1315–20 (1988) (describing the “[m]enace of RICO [c]laims to the [a]dversary [s]ystem”); Briana Rosenbaum, The
RICO Trend in Class Action Warfare, 102 Iowa L. Rev. 165 (2016) (critiquing this new trend).
24. Andrew B. Weissman, Moss Makes RICO Statute the Darling of Plaintiffs’ Bar, Legal
Times, Dec. 19, 1983, at 10.
25. Here and throughout, when I discuss “success” in fighting fraud, I am speaking narrowly about whether the particular fraud-fighting mechanism curtails fraudulent filings. I am
not implying that the mechanism is, on balance, beneficial. For further context, see infra notes
243–249 and accompanying text.
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a free-wheeling retaliatory RICO action would represent a stark departure
from past practice.
Part IV then hones in on three potential problems with retaliatory
RICO’s rise, at times drawing on our past experience strengthening Rule 11
for empirical support. The first is distortion: retaliatory RICO suits threaten
to distort conventional state and federal fraud-fighting mechanisms. The
second is overdeterrence: because it’s a “sledge-hammer,” RICO is bound to
overdeter and chill the initiation—and affect the litigation—of valid, as well
as spurious, claims.26 The third involves collateral consequences: even if retaliatory RICO suits do successfully reduce litigation fraud, that benefit will
come at a very high cost.
Finally, Part V offers a prescriptive contribution. Parts I through IV of
this Article identify where fraud is most likely to be found, where gaps in the
current regulatory architecture are most likely to exist, and also where retaliatory RICO’s use is apt to be particularly problematic. Drawing on these
insights, Part V concludes that, though civil RICO may well have a role to
play in deterring fraudulent filings, its use ought to be guided by the touchstones of restraint and equality. In terms of restraint, RICO may be profitably
used if the conduct at issue involves a large, far-flung, and orchestrated
scheme. But the statute should not be used to penalize the initiation of any
single lawsuit, no matter how unjustified that suit may be. Interestingly, in
most retaliatory RICO cases decided thus far, courts have, with only a few
exceptions, hewed to this line. Part V suggests that courts ought to continue
to exhibit this restraint and resist calls to expand the statute, no matter how
loud or insistent those calls become.
Meanwhile, in terms of equality, courts should ensure that, if RICO is
sharpened into a weapon to combat litigation fraud, there is not an asymmetric armament. If plaintiffs can fall within the statute’s crosshairs for their
egregious conduct while manufacturing claims, defendants ought to fall
within the statute’s crosshairs when they behave egregiously while seeking to
defeat or diminish a plaintiff’s valid claim to relief. What is good for the
goose, in other words, is good for the gander, too.
I. Defining the “Fraudulent Claim”
Before examining the pockets of fraud within the tort liability system, it
is essential to recognize that, despite the persistence and resonance of claims
to the contrary, there is no evidence that the tort system as a whole is beset
with fraudulent, abusive, or vexatious litigation. Indeed, according to a recent study by the Federal Judicial Center, 85 percent of U.S. district court
judges believe that “groundless litigation” is either “no problem” or is a

26. Larry E. Parrish, RICO Civil Remedies: An Untapped Resource for Insurers, 49 Ins.
Couns. J. 337, 349 (1982) (describing RICO as a “sledge-hammer”).
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small or very small problem. Only 3 percent of judges believe that it is a
large or very large problem.27
Further, though fraudulent claiming is, admittedly, wickedly difficult to
quantify, the limited available evidence generally supports judges’ assessments.28 The best studies indicate that most tort lawsuits are meritorious.29
Further, when nonmeritorious tort lawsuits are filed, they are often abandoned soon after discovery.30 This suggests that litigants file suit not to dupe
the system or to obtain unjustified paydays, but rather, to gain access to
material bearing on the defendant’s culpability. Once that material is in
hand, more often than not, litigants make sensible and appropriate judgments as to whether or not to proceed.
That said, some pockets of fraudulent claiming activity do exist—and
this claiming activity must be better defined, identified, and understood.
The remainder of Part I thus bounds, categorizes, and maps the fraud concept. Specifically, Section A bounds the analysis by defining fraud and distinguishing between the fraudulent—and the merely frivolous—claim. With
fraud defined, Section B categorizes the fraud concept by breaking fraud
down into five distinct types. Then, Section C draws on this typology to
map where fraud is most likely to exist—and, just as importantly, not exist—across the contemporary tort liability system.

27. David Rauma & Thomas E. Willging, Report of a Survey of United States
District Judges’ Experiences and Views Concerning Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 3–4 (2005).
28. Fraud is difficult to gauge, in part, because “the very essence of fraud is concealment.” Fla. Ins. Research Ctr., Univ. of Fla., Automobile Insurance Fraud Study 24
(1990). In addition, the vast majority of lawsuits settle (often confidentially), and settlements
often mask evidence of fraud. For scholars’ dogged attempts to overcome these obstacles, see
infra note 40.
29. In the medical malpractice context, for example, the best evidence suggests that the
majority of filed medical malpractice claims (defined merely as written demands for compensation) involve both a bona fide error and a verifiable injury. David M. Studdert et al., Claims,
Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354 New Eng. J. Med.
2024, 2024 (2006). Even Lester Brickman, an outspoken critic of the contemporary tort system, acknowledges that only “a minute fraction” of filed tort claims are “totally without any
legal or factual basis.” Lester Brickman, Lawyer Barons: What Their Contingency Fees
Really Cost America 121 (2011); accord Herbert M. Kritzer, Let’s Make a Deal: Understanding the Negotiation Process in Ordinary Litigation 75 (1991) (“[T]here is no
evidence to support contentions that large numbers of [frivolous] cases actually lead to
litigation.”).
30. See David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort Reform: It’s the Incentives, Stupid, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1085, 1103 (2006) (“Empirical studies do not
support the inference that plaintiffs’ attorneys file lawsuits they know are weak. The studies
find that ‘drops’ occur when cases thought to be strong initially turn out to be weak once
discovery is performed.”).
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A. Bounding the Concept: Distinguishing “Fraud” from “Frivolity”
I begin by distinguishing between the “fraudulent” and the simply “frivolous” claim. Itself a notoriously slippery and elusive concept,31 the “frivolous claim” label has been attached to a range of litigation that runs the
gamut from suits with a negative expected value (i.e., suits in which the
expected trial award is insufficient to cover the plaintiff’s litigation costs),32
to suits initiated without adequate prefiling investigation,33 to suits that are
objectively unlikely to succeed,34 to those suits that are spectacularly farfetched.35
For present purposes, I need not parse these various definitions. But I
do need to draw a clear line between the constellation of claims that may be
considered “frivolous” and the smaller constellation of claims properly considered “fraudulent.” As I define it, a claim is “fraudulent” if the plaintiff or
his or her lawyer has actual or constructive knowledge that some material
element of the claim is not as it is portrayed.36 Thus, a claim might be a long
31. Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11 Sanctions: Case Law, Perspectives and Preventative Measures 244–45 (Richard G. Johnson ed., 3d ed. 2004) (“No workable test for frivolousness has been articulated, although courts and judges have tried.”); Robert G. Bone,
Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 519, 520 (1997) (“We have no . . . common
agreement on what constitutes a ‘frivolous suit.’ ”); id. at 596 (“Frivolous litigation . . . is
difficult to define and almost impossible to observe, and it defies all attempts at simple
explanation.”).
32. Eric Rasmusen, Predictable and Unpredictable Error in Tort Awards: The Effect of
Plaintiff Self-Selection and Signaling, 15 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 323, 337 (1995) (defining frivolous suits as those where “the expected value of the court award is less than the plaintiff’s
transaction costs of obtaining the award”).
33. Bone, supra note 31, at 532 (suggesting that a suit is “frivolous” if, inter alia, a “plaintiff files without conducting a reasonable prefiling investigation”).
34. Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 163, 185–86 (2000) (“For most litigants . . . a frivolous case is simply a case in which the
plaintiff has a low probability of prevailing at trial.”).
35. Adopting this last definition, Judge Frank Easterbrook has explained that “something
is frivolous only when (a) we have decided the very point, and recently, against the person
reasserting it, or (b) 99 of 100 practicing lawyers would be 99% sure that the position is
untenable, and the other 1% would be 60% sure it’s untenable.” Sanford Levinson, Frivolous
Cases: Do Lawyers Really Know Anything at All?, 24 Osgoode Hall L.J. 353, 375 (1987) (quoting Easterbrook).
36. Below, I say a lot about the “what” of fraudulent claiming while saying relatively little
about the “who”—that is, whether lawyers, clients, or both are responsible. This lack of specificity is intentional, for when it comes to who bears the blame, there is great variation. In some
instances, the lawyer displays the requisite mens rea (i.e., the lawyer has actual or constructive
knowledge that some material element of the claim is not as it is portrayed), while the client
does not. See, e.g., In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 636 (S.D. Tex. 2005)
(recognizing that, in the Silica litigation, many misdiagnosed plaintiffs were themselves victimized, as they were wrongly led to believe they had “a life-threatening condition”); James F.
McCarty, Judge Becomes National Legal Star Bars Firm from Court over Deceit, Plain Dealer
(Cleveland), Jan. 25, 2007, at B1 (noting that, though fraudulent claims were filed seeking
compensation for Harry Kananian’s asbestos injury, “there was no evidence Kananian or his
family was aware of their lawyers’ deceit”). In other instances, meanwhile, only the client may
know that the claim is unjustified. (That may have been true, for example, in the case of
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shot. It might induce head shakes and eye rolls. It might reflexively and
properly trigger dismissal. But if no material aspect of the claim is fabricated
or manufactured, the claim is not fraudulent. Obfuscation, fabrication, and
deceit are the sine qua non of fraudulent litigation.37
B. Categorizing Fraud: A Typology of Fraud’s Five Types
Under the “fraud” umbrella, claiming activity can then be further broken down into five types. These include: (1) injury exaggeration, (2) injury
fabrication, (3) obstacle avoidance, (4) the wholly manufactured claim, and
(5) oversubscription.
To be sure, these categories are neither perfect nor pristine: the lines
dividing the five ideal types sometimes blur. Some cases occupy multiple
categories (e.g., a plaintiff might both exaggerate an injury and also fabricate
evidence concerning the defendant’s culpability for that exaggerated injury).
And even with the benefit of hindsight, some cases resist clear categorization, either as to whether they are fraudulent at all or, if they are, what kind
of fraud they exhibit. But despite this conceptual blurriness, the categorization scheme helps us to identify, sort, and begin to assess the fraud problem
in the tort litigation system. Below, Table 1 identifies the five types of fraud,
offering examples of each.

Richard Swimm, discussed below.) Finally, on some occasions, both the lawyer and the client
are in on the scheme. See, e.g., Feld Entm’t Inc. v. Am. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals, 873 F. Supp. 2d 288, 300–02 (D.D.C. 2012) (suggesting that both plaintiffs and
plaintiffs’ counsel were engaged in obfuscation). Sidestepping this complication, for current
purposes, I define a claim as “fraudulent” if the plaintiff or his or her lawyer has actual or
constructive knowledge that some material element of the claim is not as it is portrayed.
37. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.0(d) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2016) (“ ‘Fraud’ or
‘fraudulent’ denotes conduct that . . . has a purpose to deceive.”); Jay M. Feinman, Delay,
Deny, Defend: Why Insurance Companies Don’t Pay Claims and What You Can Do
About It 168 (2010) (offering the Coalition Against Insurance Fraud’s definition of fraud as
“when someone intentionally deceives another about an insurance matter to receive money or
other benefits not rightfully theirs”); Fraud, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“A
knowing misrepresentation or knowing concealment of a material fact made to induce another
to act to his or her detriment.”); William C. Lesch & Bruce Byars, Consumer Insurance Fraud in
the US Property-Casualty Industry, 15 J. Fin. Crime 411, 412 (2008) (offering the Insurance
Information Institute’s definition of insurance fraud as “a deliberate deception perpetrated
against or by an insurance company or agent for the purpose of financial gain”).
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Table 1
Fraud Types, Characteristics, and Examples
Type

Characteristics

Example(s)

Injury Exaggeration

Plaintiff tacks request for excess

-Medical buildup in the auto accident

compensation onto otherwise meritorious

context

claim

-Plaintiff intentionally malingers, accruing
excessive lost wages

Injury Fabrication

Obstacle Avoidance

Plaintiff seeks compensation for a nonexistent

-Plaintiff seeks compensation for whiplash

or preexisting injury, following a bona fide

reportedly suffered in car wreck even

accident involving the at-fault defendant

though the plaintiff’s neck is fine

Plaintiff uses falsehoods to overcome legal

-American Society for the Prevention of

impediments to recovery

Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Entertainment,
Inc., which involved deception regarding
whether a plaintiff satisfied Article III’s
standing requirements
-Plaintiff lies about an injury’s onset to fit a
claim within a statute of limitations

Wholly manufactured

Plaintiff seeks compensation, though the

-Plaintiff stages an auto accident

claim

plaintiff and/or the plaintiff’s attorney knows the

-Plaintiff stages a slip-and-fall accident

plaintiff has no valid entitlement to relief
Oversubscription

A settlement fund, defendant, or trust is
overrun by those without a valid entitlement to
relief. This is a creature of mass torts
Oversubscription often comes in one of three
forms:
-Deliberate Misdiagnosis

-Fen-Phen, Silica, and Asbestos

-Defendant Manipulation

-Baron & Budd Memorandum

-Double Dipping

-Plaintiff seeks relief from multiple funds,
using contradictory theories or while
deliberately concealing duplicate payments

The first fraud category is injury exaggeration. Sometimes called “padding” or “medical buildup,” injury exaggeration involves the submission of a
meritorious claim for a bona fide injury that deliberately tacks on a demand
for excess compensation, typically by inflating claimed medical expenses. A
paradigmatic example would be an auto accident victim who has suffered
whiplash and, to treat her genuine neck pain, visits a physical therapist
twelve times, rather than six times, in order to inflate her claimed economic
loss. In our example, these six extra visits obviously benefit the therapist
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(who profits from the extra treatment). But they benefit the accident victim
too, given the collateral source rule (in those states where it still exists38) and
because, in the rough-and-tumble world of claims adjustment, a claimant’s
medical bills are typically used as a rough benchmark from which to calculate her noneconomic damages. As such, the higher the medical bills, the
higher the plaintiff’s ultimate reward.39
A number of researchers have assessed the prevalence of injury exaggeration using several different methodologies. Unfortunately, though, the one
thing these studies prove for certain is that (like fraud, more generally), injury exaggeration is a remarkably difficult thing to quantify; each methodology is susceptible to criticism.40 But even with that caveat, two findings stand
out. First, the studies consistently indicate that, particularly in the auto accident realm, injury exaggeration imposes substantial costs. Most notably, the
Insurance Research Council (IRC)—which periodically gathers and publishes data from American auto insurers—estimates that a whopping 20 percent of all paid third-party, bodily injury auto accident claims involve the
deliberate inflation of damages.41 Second, the studies also consistently indicate that injury exaggeration is the most prevalent form of litigation abuse.
38. The collateral source rule bars the admission of evidence showing that a plaintiff’s
losses have been fully or partially compensated by another source, such as the plaintiff’s health
insurance. As a consequence, in the absence of subrogation, the rule may allow a plaintiff to be
compensated twice. The rule has been under fire in recent years and has been abrogated or
modified in many states. For context, see Collateral Source Rule Reform, Am. Tort Reform
Ass’n, http://www.atra.org/issues/collateral-source-rule-reform [https://perma.cc/FX8S-J8KB]
(collecting enactments).
39. For more on this dynamic, see Engstrom, supra note 6, at 343. No-fault laws with
monetary thresholds create an extra incentive to pad claims, because the higher the medical
bills, the better the chance of piercing the threshold, permitting entrance into the traditional
tort system. See id. at 342–44. If neither the claimant nor her lawyer is aware of the overtreatment, then the claim is not “exaggerated” for current purposes.
40. Some develop estimates by having knowledgeable adjusters evaluate claims files. See,
e.g., Fla. Ins. Research Ctr., supra note 28, at 25–30; Ins. Research Council, Fraud 2008,
supra note 7, at 7; Ins. Research Council, Fraud and Buildup in Auto Injury Claims:
Pushing the Limits of the Auto Insurance System (1996) [hereinafter Ins. Research
Council, Fraud 1996]. But while these studies tell us a great deal about suspected fraud, they
do not tell us for sure whether the claim is actually exaggerated. Others draw estimates by
considering suspicious jurisdictional variations, e.g., J. David Cummins & Sharon Tennyson,
The Tort System “Lottery” and Insurance Fraud: Theory and Evidence from Automobile Insurance
5–6 (Wharton Sch. Fin. Insts. Ctr., Univ. of Pa., Working Paper 94-05, 1993), http://
fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/94/9405.pdf [https://perma.cc/AG9X-WPRW], by examining the ratio of bodily injury claims to property damage claims over time, e.g., Hoyt et al.,
supra note 14, at 428, or by evaluating the ratio of “hard” to “soft” injuries, e.g., Carroll &
Abrahamse, supra note 8, at 235. But these studies cannot rule out that some jurisdictional or
temporal variation arises innocently. At the opposite end of the spectrum, some measure fraud
by counting fraud convictions. E.g., Richard A. Derrig & Valerie Zicko, Prosecuting Insurance
Fraud—A Case Study of the Massachusetts Experience in the 1990s, 5 Risk Mgmt. & Ins. Rev.
77, 77 (2002). But that seems destined to underestimate fraud’s prevalence, probably dramatically. Further clouding the analysis, many estimates are generated by insurers or insurerfunded organizations, and insurers have an incentive to overstate fraud’s prevalence, since high
levels of fraud may justify frequent claim denials. See Feinman, supra note 37, at 170.
41. Ins. Research Council, Fraud 2008, supra note 7, at 2, 14.
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It is far more prevalent, researchers agree, than injury fabrication or the
outright manufacture of claims.42
Second, rather than merely exaggerating an injury (as above), a plaintiff
may engage in injury fabrication. Injury fabrication refers to the submission
of claims for nonexistent or preexisting injuries following a bona fide accident at the hands of an at-fault defendant. In the auto accident context, it
appears that injury fabrication is again quite common, particularly among
those seeking damages for so-called soft-tissue injuries (typically sprains,
strains, contusions, and whiplash). Indeed, a 2001 study of auto claiming
behavior concluded that nearly half (42 percent) of soft-tissue-injury claims
(defined narrowly as sprains and strains to the neck and back) were for
nonexistent or preexistent injuries.43 Note that in both of these first two
fraud types, the defendant may well be at fault, and the law may well entitle
the plaintiff to relief. Only the damages are manipulated.
The third fraud category is obstacle avoidance. Obstacle avoiders are
those who may have sustained an injury at the hands of an at-fault defendant but, facing technical obstacles under the formal law, take duplicitous
steps to eliminate, minimize, or circumvent those obstacles. For this, American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Entertainment,
Inc.,44 described in some detail in Part II below, is a paradigmatic example.
In Feld, the defendants may well have violated the applicable statute. But,
owing to restraints imposed by Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife and its progeny, the plaintiffs had trouble satisfying Article III’s standing requirement.45
It was in their haste to satisfy that requirement that they took a series of
questionable steps. Another example might be a plaintiff, eager to fit her
claim into a two-year statute of limitations, who “misremembers” when exactly she initially fell ill. Or another might be a patron who slips and sustains
an injury on the defendant’s premises, but later, in an effort to satisfy demanding constructive-notice requirements, offers fabricated testimony concerning what the state of the dangerous condition was.
There are no reliable estimates concerning the prevalence of obstacle
avoidance. Indeed, the closest thing we have to empirical evidence is a nonscientific test conducted back in 1980 by The American Lawyer magazine.46
In that experiment, a journalist posing as an accident victim in a slip-andfall case approached thirteen New York City lawyers purporting to seek representation. As the journalist described her “case” to the lawyers, she made it
clear she had tripped outside a construction zone on a city sidewalk, though
42. Sharon Tennyson & Pau Salsas-Forn, Claims Auditing in Automobile Insurance: Fraud
Detection and Deterrence Objectives, 69 J. Risk & Ins. 289, 289–90 (2002) (reporting that all
relevant studies conclude that “the vast majority of suspicious claims involved potential
buildup” rather than the outright manufacture of claims).
43. Carroll & Abrahamse, supra note 8, at 247–48 (offering this “conservative” estimate
for both tort and dollar-threshold no-fault states—though recall, for reasons described supra
at note 40, this estimate may over- or under-estimate fraud’s prevalence).
44. 677 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d, 659 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
45. Id. (citing 504 U.S. 555 (1992)).
46. Jane Berentson, Integrity Test, Am. Law., May 1980, at 15.
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the statute of limitations against the city had run. Picking up on this, the
majority of lawyers declined the representation, correctly insisting: “You
have no one to sue.”47 Dispiritingly, though, plenty of attorneys did offer to
help. In fact, a solid minority (five of the thirteen), made it clear that they
would represent the journalist, using deceit to overcome legal impediments.
“All you have to do,” said one, “is shade the facts a bit.”48 This test might
suggest that lots of lawyers are willing to fib to overcome technical obstacles.
But of course, the study’s tiny sample size, old age, and limited geographic
reach substantially impair its generalizability. Further, even if we could theoretically say that many lawyers are willing to engage in obstacle avoidance,
that does not necessarily imply that many lawyers actually embrace the
tactic.
A fourth fraud type is the wholly manufactured claim. Here, a plaintiff
seeks compensation though either she or her attorney knows she has no
valid entitlement to relief. Examples might be a plaintiff who sues a drug
company for causing her impairment, though she never actually ingested the
drug at issue—or an employee who files a workers’ compensation claim,
although she was hurt at home, rather than on the job. The case of Richard
Mark Swimm of Greensboro, North Carolina, provides another exemplar.
Before his 1982 criminal prosecution, Swimm apparently made something
of a living by drinking sodas in supermarkets and convenience stores, spitting the soda on the floor, and then “slipping” on the mess he’d created.49
Further examples are claimants who stage or deliberately cause auto accidents (such as by the so-called “swoop-and-squat”), claimants who seek
compensation though they were not actually involved in the collision at
hand (“jump-ins”), and claimants who simply make the whole thing up
(“paper accidents”).50 Though stories of manufactured claims are certainly
colorful, by most accounts, these claims are rare.51 In the auto accident context, for example, studies suggest that wholly manufactured claims account
47. Id. at 16. Or, “[n]o lawyer is going to help you if he knows you’re lying.” Id.
48. Id. at 17.
49. Dornstein, supra note 13, at 267.
50. Ins. Research Council, Fraud 1996, supra note 40, at 14 (describing the “swoopand-squat”); Melanie Campbell, OIFP Civil Enforcement Actions Pack a One-Two Punch in the
Fight on Fraud, N.J. Ins. Fraud, Mar. 2004, at 48 (describing “jump-ins”), http://www.nj.gov/
oag/insurancefraud/report/oifp-ar-2003-complete_rv10.24.12.pdf [https://perma.cc/LEX4T3N6]; Mark Thompson, Highway Robbery, Cal. Law., May 1991, at 28 (describing “paper
accidents”).
51. To be fair, a provocative 2011 study casts some doubt on the scarcity of manufactured claims. Art Hinshaw & Jess K. Alberts, Doing the Right Thing: An Empirical Study of
Attorney Negotiation Ethics, 16 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 95 (2011). In this study, 734 lawyers
were presented with a hypothetical negotiation scenario, where they were told that they represented a client who believed his ex-girlfriend had infected him with the “DONS virus,” a
fictitious, allegedly fatal disease, transmitted via sexual contact. Id. at 116. The client (at least
initially) believed he was infected because he took two DONS home tests, both of which were
positive. Id. Moments before the start of a negotiation with the ex-girlfriend and her attorney,
however, the client revealed to the lawyer that the two positive tests were, in fact, false positives. Yet the client asked the lawyer to push ahead, to try to secure compensation for the
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for roughly 3 percent of paid claims and 13 percent of claims that are ultimately denied.52
A fifth and final type of fraud, commonly dubbed oversubscription, is a
creature of the mass tort universe.53 Oversubscription refers to the phenomenon where, following a mass tort, some excess claimants flock to the
scene—whether entirely on their own volition or as a result of recruitment
by shady lawyers and claims brokers. Here, typically, the underlying lawsuit
was found or conceded to be meritorious, and some claimants are genuinely
entitled to relief. Yet, sensing a payday, extra claimants come forward with
their hands out, and it is the tacked-on claimants’ entitlement to relief that
fairly generates skepticism. Beyond that, as Table 1 indicates, oversubscription often takes one of three forms: misdiagnosis, defendant manipulation,
or double dipping. The most familiar type of oversubscription, “misdiagnosis,” refers to diagnoses that are deliberately fabricated or distorted. “Defendant manipulation” refers to filing claims against a defendant who is not
liable when the actual tortfeasor is a less attractive target. Finally, “double
dipping” refers to the initiation, and deliberate concealment, of inconsistent
claims against multiple tortfeasors.
No empirical study quantifies oversubscription’s prevalence, but it appears that it has plagued many, and perhaps most, of the nation’s most
prominent mass torts.54 For instance, oversubscription became a problem in
the 1981 Hyatt Skywalk collapse case where, according to Francis McGovern,
“more people filed claims than there were people who could have possibly
been in virtually every hotel in Kansas City.”55 Oversubscription was also at
play in the recent BP Deepwater Horizon class action settlement. There, capitalizing on the settlement’s objective but flexible definition of a compensable claim, some imaginative plaintiffs’ lawyers advertised to local businesses
that they could “be compensated for losses that are unrelated to the spill.”56
phantom infection, and to “refrain from revealing the fact that he does not have the disease
during the negotiation.” Id. at 116–17. Of course, to acquiescence to the client’s demand
would make the lawyer complicit in pursuing a “wholly manufactured” claim. The study’s
authors reported, however, that 19 percent of surveyed lawyers (142 respondents) said they
would do just that, while another 19 percent (140 respondents) were not sure how they would
respond. Id. at 118. As noted, the study is provocative—and it certainly casts a shadow on
lawyers’ negotiation ethics. However, the study stops far short of showing that actual claims,
initiated by real clients, in the real world, are in fact frequently manufactured or feigned.
52. Ins. Research Council, Fraud 2008, supra note 7, at 9–10; Ins. Research Council, Fraud 1996, supra note 40, at 18 fig.3-1.
53. For more on oversubscription, see generally S. Todd Brown, Specious Claims and
Global Settlements, 42 U. Mem. L. Rev. 559 (2012).
54. See generally Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L.
Rev. 659, 688 (1989) (“[M]ature mass torts generate an overabundance of plaintiffs . . . including a substantial number of false positive claims.”).
55. Francis E. McGovern, Looking to the Future of Mass Torts: A Comment on Schuck and
Siliciano, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1022, 1024 (1995).
56. Philip Sherwell, Louisiana Makes a Dash for BP’s Cash, Daily Telegraph (London),
Aug. 3, 2013, at 20 (quoting a solicitation letter by lawyer Kevin McLean); see also Scott Pelley,
BP Cries Foul in Massive Oil Spill Settlement, CBS News (May 4, 2014), http://
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Oversubscription played at least some part in the first-responder litigation
initiated in the wake of September 11th.57 And, oversubscription involving
misdiagnosis notoriously swamped the 2005 Silica MDL, where transferee
Judge Janis Graham Jack concluded that the medical diagnoses underlying
the claims of roughly 10,000 plaintiffs were “manufactured for money.”58
In the early 2000s, the fen-phen litigation, in which thousands of plaintiffs claimed to have sustained heart damage after taking the diet-drug combination of fenfluramine and phentermine, was the target of similar
shenanigans. There, the lead plaintiffs’ lawyer for the fen-phen class alleged
that a stunning 70 percent of class claimants had diagnoses for severe heartvalve damage that were “medically unfounded and unjustified because the
claimant doesn’t have the condition.”59 A Duke University cardiologist called
in to review claimants’ echocardiograms concluded: “Thousands of people
have been defrauded into believing that they have valvular heart disease
when in fact they do not.”60 And, the federal judge overseeing the litigation

www.cbsnews.com/news/over-a-barrel-bp-oil-spill-settlement-60-minutes [https://perma.cc/
VT9C-8KUT] (rebroadcast Sept. 7, 2014). Under the agreement, a business qualified for compensation if its revenue dropped in the months after the spill and then subsequently rebounded. Susan Beck, How BP Decided to Fight the Deepwater Settlement, Am. Law. (Feb. 27,
2014) (on file with the Michigan Law Review). Before that, the Gulf Coast Claims Facility
(GCCF)—the no-fault fund created in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon spill—also saw a
“substantial” number of fraudulent filings. According to Kenneth Feinberg, the GCCF’s administrator, the GCCF determined that roughly 18,000 individual applications (out of 1.1
million filed) appeared fraudulent; of those, 4,000 were so suspicious that the GCCF referred
the claimants to the Department of Justice for criminal investigation. Jay Weaver, Fraud Pollutes BP Oil-Spill Compensation Fund for Gulf Coast Victims from Florida to Louisiana, Miami
Herald (Aug. 19, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://www.miamiherald.com/latest-news/article1942087.html [https://perma.cc/SBE9-484D]. Federal officials followed up and ultimately
brought numerous indictments. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Disaster Fraud Task
Force: Report to the Attorney General for Fiscal Year 2011 (2011) (summarizing disaster-related fraud investigations and prosecutions).
57. NYC Sees Fraud in Some 9/11 Health Claims, CBS News (Feb. 17, 2010, 7:50 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/nyc-sees-fraud-in-some-9-11-health-claims [https://perma.cc/
4TTP-BB9Q] (reporting on “several instances in which . . . people who claimed to have been
sickened by World Trade Center ash were already ill before the attacks”).
58. In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 635–36 (S.D. Tex. 2005); id. at 632
(concluding that the silicosis “epidemic” was “largely the result of misdiagnosis”).
59. Robert Lenzner & Michael Maiello, The $22 Billion Gold Rush, Forbes (Mar. 24,
2006, 8:20 PM), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2006/0410/086.html [https://perma.cc/2K4WML6G] (quoting class counsel Michael Fishbein); see also Alison Frankel, Still Ticking: Mistaken Assumptions, Greedy Lawyers, and Suggestions of Fraud Have Made Fen-Phen a Disaster of
a Mass Tort, Am. Law., Mar. 2005, at 91 (calling fen-phen “a veritable catalogue of ignominy”).
60. Lenzner & Maiello, supra note 59 (quoting Dr. Joseph Kisslo). For more on Kisslo’s
involvement and conclusions, see Emilie Lounsberry, Federal Authorities Targeting Fraud in
Fen-Phen Claims, Philly.com (Sept. 18, 2005), http://articles.philly.com/2005-09-18/news/
25428608_1_fen-phen-pondimin-heart-valve-disease [https://perma.cc/NM69-D6EB].
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wryly noted that one physician—who reviewed more than 10,000 echocardiograms to make relevant diagnoses—had “a mass production operation that
would have been the envy of Henry Ford.”61
Meanwhile, asbestos litigation—described in more detail in Part II—has
put all three types of oversubscription on vivid display. Misdiagnosis has
been a recurring problem, both in litigated claims and claims resolved via
mass settlements.62 Misdiagnoses have also repeatedly bedeviled asbestos
trusts. For example, the Johns-Manville trust, which was created following
the company’s 1982 bankruptcy, has been perpetually strapped for cash and
overrun by claims that rely for documentation on the opinions of a small
cohort of radiologists and pulmonologists who have offered qualifying diagnoses under highly suspicious circumstances.63
At the same time, some other asbestos claimants have engaged in defendant manipulation, as some defendants (typically those who have not yet
declared bankruptcy) make far more appealing targets than others.64 One
notorious example of apparent defendant manipulation is found in the
61. In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig.,
236 F. Supp. 2d 445, 455 n.11, 457 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (describing Dr. Linda Crouse); Reed Abelson & Jonathan D. Glater, Tough Questions Are Raised on Fen-Phen Compensation, N.Y. Times
(Oct. 7, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/07/business/tough-questions-are-raised-onfen-phen-compensation.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
The fen-phen Trust, created to pay class members’ claims, ultimately initiated a RICO claim
against Dr. Crouse alleging that she “intentionally defrauded the Trust by certifying that
thousands of claimants had serious valvular heart disease (‘VHD’) when she had no reasonable
basis for certifying that they did or, even worse, knew that they did not.” Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint at 1, Castle v. Crouse,
No. Civ.A. 03-5252 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2003), 2003 WL 24851754. According to the Trust, this
misconduct caused it to “pay out millions of dollars to persons who never had VHD.” Id.
62. See, e.g., Raymark Indus., Inc. v. Stemple, No. 88-1014-K,1990 WL 72588, at *1–2,
*11 (D. Kan. May 30, 1990) (concluding that the procedures that supported some 6000 tire
workers’ claims reflected “indifference” as to “professional standards” and amounted to a
“professional farce!” that made “a mockery of the practices of law and medicine!”); Joseph N.
Gitlin et al., Comparison of “B” Readers’ Interpretations of Chest Radiographs for Asbestos Related Changes, 11 Acad. Radiology 843, 843 (2004) (considering 492 x-rays and finding that,
while B Readers hired by plaintiffs’ counsel found asbestos-related lung abnormalities in 95.9
percent of the sample, independent B Readers found abnormalities in 4.5 percent of the sample, a difference “too great to be attributed to interobserver variability”); R. B. Reger et al.,
Cases of Alleged Asbestos-Related Disease: A Radiologic Re-Evaluation, 32 J. Occupational
Med. 1088, 1088–89 (1990) (reviewing 439 filed asbestos claims and finding that, at most, 3.6
percent of claimants actually had conditions consistent with asbestos exposure).
63. See ABA Comm’n on Asbestos Litigation, Report to the House of Delegates 8
(2003) (reporting that 49.6 percent of the “tens of thousands of non-malignancy claims” received by the Trust were the work of “just ten doctors” and that certain physicians’ diagnoses
“failed independent review more than 50% of the time”); Stephen J. Carroll et al., The
Abuse of Medical Diagnostic Practices in Mass Litigation: The Case of Silica 17
(2009) (noting that the now-discredited Dr. Ray Harron—whose work will be discussed at
length in Part II—had, by 2005, “submitted documents in support of at least 53,724” of the
Manville Trust claimants).
64. See Patrick M. Hanlon & Elizabeth Runyan Geise, Commentary, Asbestos Reform—
Past and Future, Mealey’s Litig. Rep.: Asbestos, Apr. 4, 2007, at 3 (bemoaning the “rampant
fraud and misrepresentation in . . . product identification testimony”).
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Baron & Budd memorandum entitled “Preparing for Your Deposition.” A
twenty-page document that ignited a firestorm when it was inadvertently
produced, the memo coaches clients to “remember” contact with asbestos
from only certain manufacturers. Among other instructions, the memo exhorts clients:
* Do NOT mention product names that are not listed on your Work
History Sheets. The defense attorneys will jump at a chance to blame your
asbestos exposure on companies that were not sued in your case.
....
* You must be able to pronounce the product names correctly and
know WHICH products are pipecovering, WHICH are insulating cements
and WHICH are plastic cements, for instance. Many of the product names
sound very similar to each other . . . but they might be different products
entirely! Have a family member quiz you until you know ALL the product
names listed on your Work History Sheets by heart.
....
* You may be asked how you are able to recall so many product names.
The best answer is to say that you recall seeing the names on the containers
or on the product itself. The more you thought about it, the more you
remembered!
....
* Keep in mind that these [defense] attorneys are very young and
WERE NOT PRESENT at the jobsites you worked at. They have NO
RECORDS to tell them what products were used on a particular job, even
if they act like they do.65

Another, perhaps less vivid, example came to the fore in a 2014 bankruptcy opinion concerning Garlock, a producer of asbestos-containing gaskets. In a withering opinion, Bankruptcy Judge George Hodges noted that,
though “Garlock was a relatively small player in the asbestos tort system,”
the company had been named as a defendant in 20,000 mesothelioma cases
before its resources ran dry.66 Why? The court chalked up Garlock’s outsized
liability to the fact that “the last ten years of its participation in the tort
system was infected by the manipulation of exposure evidence by plaintiffs
and their lawyers,” who aimed their fire at (the then-solvent) Garlock rather
than the actually culpable (but bankrupt and therefore far less appealing)
tortfeasors.67
65. S. Rep. No. 108-118, Attach. B, at 109–31 (2003). Once the memo came to light,
Baron & Budd lawyers denied knowledge of its use, and a paralegal signed an affidavit in
which she took sole responsibility for its contents. The firm also stressed its honesty and
emphasized that the memo had to be considered in context. Roger C. Cramton, Lawyer Ethics
on the Lunar Landscape of Asbestos Litigation, 31 Pepp. L. Rev. 175, 187–88 (2004). The Baron
& Budd firm apparently represented more than 12,000 asbestos claimants. See Roger Parloff,
The $200 Billion Miscarriage of Justice Asbestos Lawyers Are Pitting Plaintiffs Who Aren’t Sick
Against Companies That Never Made the Stuff—and Extracting Billions for Themselves, Fortune (Mar. 4, 2002), http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2002/03/
04/319093/index.htm [https://perma.cc/CA2Z-MUFA].
66. In re Garlock Sealing Techs., LLC., 504 B.R. 71, 82 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2014).
67. Id.
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Finally, double dipping has also bedeviled the asbestos ecosystem.68
Some double dippers (some 6,000, in fact) sought funds from both silica and
asbestos manufacturers and therefore claimed (in separate filings) that they
were suffering from silicosis or, alternatively, asbestosis, despite the fact that
the two diseases have different sources of exposure, on x-rays look “vastly
different,” and are very rarely found in the same individual.69 (Indeed, in her
famous Silica opinion, Judge Jack concluded that finding a person genuinely
suffering from both maladies was rarer than hitting “a hole-in-one.”70)
Others have double dipped by seeking funds from both the tort system
and from one of the roughly sixty asbestos bankruptcy trusts.71 For example,
in the midst of the Garlock litigation (described above), the court permitted
the company to engage in full discovery of fifteen randomly selected
claims.72 This discovery revealed that each claim contained suspicious exposure evidence, which served to inflate Garlock’s share of responsibility for
plaintiffs’ injuries.73 Specifically, prior to settling with Garlock, “on average
plaintiffs disclosed only about 2 exposures to [bankrupt] companies’ products, but after settling with Garlock [plaintiffs] made claims against about 19
such companies’ Trusts.”74 A second example came to light recently in Delaware in the case In re Asbestos Litigation.75 There, the weekend before the
68. It bears emphasis that, as a matter of law, it is perfectly reasonable for a plaintiff to
assert claims against multiple tortfeasors. This is particularly true in the asbestos context,
where many manufacturers’ products often contribute to a given plaintiff’s impairment. (Asbestosis, in particular, is a cumulative disease.) It is neither reasonable nor ethical, however,
for the plaintiff to lie about these payments, to submit irreconcilably different exposure information to different funds, or to seek to recover more than full compensation for a single
injury.
The extent of double dipping is a matter of debate. Some suggest that it is quite common,
while others insist that any improprieties are isolated and anomalous. See, e.g., Elihu Inselbuch
& Andrew J. Sackett, Commentary, A Critique of RAND’s Three Reports on Asbestos Trusts and
Asbestos Litigation, Mealey’s Asbestos Bankr. Rep., Sept. 2015, at 2–3; The Double-Dipping
Legal Scam, Wall St. J. (Dec. 25, 2014, 2:31 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-doubledipping-legal-scam-1419535915 (on file with the Michigan Law Review). Interestingly, the
GAO conducted a 2011 study of asbestos trusts and, as part of the study, interviewed trust
officials that had conducted audits. According to the GAO, none of these officials “indicated
that these audits had identified cases of fraud.” U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO11-819, Asbestos Injury Compensation: The Role and Administration of Asbestos
Trusts 23 (2011) [hereinafter GAO, Trust Study]. That finding may indicate that double
dipping is indeed very rare, but it is far from definitive, as it may say more about audits’ rigor,
than about the actual level of impropriety.
69. In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 595, 603, 628–29 (S.D. Tex. 2005);
id. at 628 (“[A]t least 6,000 MDL Plaintiffs previously made asbestosis claims.”).
70. Id. at 603.
71. GAO, Trust Study, supra note 68, at 3. This double dipping has been facilitated by
the fact that defendants traditionally had trouble obtaining trust filings because these filings
have been characterized as confidential settlement material. See id. at 26. As noted infra at
notes 72–80, that view is fading, and this material is increasingly accessible.
72. In re Garlock, 504 B.R. at 85.
73. Id. at 82.
74. Id. at 84 (emphasis added).
75. No. 09C-11-217-ASB, 2011 WL 7652979 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 28, 2011).
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trial against one asbestos defendant was set to start, it was revealed that the
plaintiffs, June and Arthur Montgomery, had previously submitted claims to
twenty asbestos trusts and had pocketed “significant sums” therefrom, even
while steadfastly withholding that information from the instant defendant.
Indeed, at a pretrial conference held just days before the revelations, plaintiffs’ counsel assured the court that no such claims had been filed.76
Kananian v. Lorillard Tobacco Co.77 provides a third exemplar. There, Harry
Kananian’s estate sought damages from Lorillard Tobacco Co. contending
that Kananian was exposed to asbestos as a smoker of Lorillard’s Kent cigarettes in the 1950s, when asbestos was used in the brand’s filters.78 Kananian
subsequently contracted mesothelioma (a telltale sign of asbestos exposure)
and died.79 A problem arose, however, when it was revealed that Kananian’s
estate had also filed claims with a number of asbestos trusts, claiming variously that he had been exposed to asbestos during his work on a World War
II vessel, while working as a pipe welder, and while toiling in a shipyard—
and, from those trusts, had already pocketed as much as $700,000.80
C. Mapping: Where Fraudulent Claims Are Apt to Be Found
The above inventory suggests that two very different areas of the tort
litigation ecosystem are particularly beset with fraudulent claims. The first
overrepresented area is the auto accident realm, and in particular, the softtissue auto accident realm, where many injury victims are asserting relatively
small claims (of roughly $2,000 to $6,000) for minor injuries—like sprains,
strains, contusions, and whiplash—that are either wholly fabricated, substantially exaggerated, or that predate the accident at issue.81 Empirical evidence bears this out: a 1995 RAND report concluded that “59% of the costs
76. Peggy L. Ableman, A Case Study from a Judicial Perspective: How Fairness and Integrity in Asbestos Tort Litigation Can Be Undermined by Lack of Access to Bankruptcy Claims, 88
Tul. L. Rev. 1185, 1192 (2014).
77. No. CV-01-442750 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl., Cuyahoga Cnty., Feb. 7, 2007); see also
Kananian v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 878 N.E.2d 34 (Ohio 2007) (unpublished table decision)
(showing appeal being denied review).
78. Lee Blanton Ziffer, Bankruptcy Trusts and Asbestos Litigation, Am. Bar Ass’n (June
11, 2012), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/products/articles/spring2012bankruptcy-trusts-asbestos-litigation.html [https://perma.cc/CRF4-3ZSV].
79. Id.
80. Daniel Fisher, Double-Dippers, Forbes (Sept. 4, 2006), http://www.forbes.com/
free_forbes/2006/0904/136.html [https://perma.cc/X68L-39CR]; McCarty, supra note 36, at
B1; Kimberley A. Strassel, Commentary, Trusts Busted, Wall St. J. (Dec. 5, 2006, 12:01 AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116527814374340591 [https://perma.cc/P5UR-58HG].
Kananian’s estate subsequently filed a legal malpractice action alleging that its firm, Brayton
Purcell LLP, “submitted the claim forms with actual or constructive knowledge that the claims
were not grounded in fact and were fraudulent in nature.” Kananian v. Brayton Purcell, LLP,
No. 1:07 CV 3188, 2008 WL 926061, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 3, 2008). For additional examples
of double dipping, see H.R. Rep. No. 112-687, at 12–13 (2012).
81. See Carroll et al., supra note 7, at 10, 18.
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submitted in support of soft injury [auto accident] claims is excess,”82 while
a Massachusetts study found that “[f]or claims that involve only stains [sic]
or sprains, only 46.8 per cent were judged apparently valid.”83 This is not
trivial. As noted above, most tort cases are auto cases, and of auto claims,
soft-tissue claims eclipse claims for “hard” injuries in certain states.84 The
second overrepresented area is the mass tort realm. There, owing to oversubscription, some victims are asserting relatively large claims for relatively serious injuries—such as heart damage and lung disease—that are either
nonexistent, grossly exaggerated, or (once again) unrelated to the instant
defendant’s conduct.85
Seemingly from opposite ends of the claim continuum, the two claim
types are actually strikingly similar, and their similarities yield some tentative generalizations concerning where fraudulent claiming is most apt to
proliferate. Specifically, fraudulent claiming is apt to proliferate when: (1)
injuries are hard to discern, (2) specific causation is contestable, (3) defendants have a diminished incentive or capacity to scrutinize claims prior to
payment, (4) claim rates are unusually high, and (5) restraints generally imposed by the contingency fee are relaxed or altogether inoperative.
First, both the soft-tissue auto cases and the heart and lung claims that
have vexed the mass tort world present similar (and similarly challenging)
questions of injury verification. In the former, soft-tissue injuries do not
show up on x-rays, impeding efforts to say for sure whether an asserted
impairment is real or fake.86 In the latter, meanwhile, some damage can (at
least theoretically) be proven with x-rays or echocardiograms.87 But reliably
interpreting these scans has proved difficult, generating frequent disputes as
to whether a given impairment does or does not exist.88 The generalizable
82. See id. at 22–23; see also Ins. Research Council, Fraud 1996, supra note 40, at 3
(concluding that “claims involving sprain and strain injuries” are “associated with the . . .
appearance of fraud and buildup”).
83. Herbert I. Weisberg & Richard A. Derrig, Fraud and Automobile Insurance: A Report
on Bodily Injury Liability Claims in Massachusetts, 9 J. Ins. Reg. 497, 537 (1991).
84. Carroll & Abrahamse, supra note 8, at 246 (reporting that a sample of 9,689 California auto claims included 2,755 claims for “hard injuries” as against 6,934 claims for “soft
injuries”); id. at 237 (offering a ratio of the relative frequency of claims for soft and hard
injuries in various states).
85. See supra text accompanying notes 54–63.
86. As insurance executives lamented more than a half-century ago: “No one can say that
some ‘whiplash’ claims are not genuine. This is the sad part of our plight for there appears to
be no absolutely sure way of separating the fake from the real.” E. A. Cowie, The Economics of
“Whiplash,” in The Continuing Revolt Against “Whiplash” 35, 35 (James D. Ghiardi ed.,
1964); accord Carroll et al., supra note 7, at 10 (“Soft injuries . . . are not usually objectively
verifiable; hence, they present an opportunity to exaggerate their existence or seriousness.”).
87. There are exceptions. For example, breast implant litigation involved certain impossible-to-verify complaints, exacerbating the above difficulties. See generally Marcia Angell,
Science on Trial: The Clash of Medical Evidence and the Law in the Breast Implant
Case (1996).
88. This was true of asbestosis, where, as leading expert Dr. John Parker explained, the
diagnosis “is in the eye, the retina, and the brain of the person classifying the film who reaches
the ultimate decision, and there is disagreement between readers.” Joint Appendix at 1132,
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takeaway is that it is easier to manufacture or exaggerate a claim if the defendant cannot disprove the injury’s existence or its severity. Ambiguous diagnoses facilitate deception.
Second and relatedly, in both the soft-tissue and mass tort realms, specific causation is often contestable and unclear. Because soft-tissue injuries
are not visible, it is difficult to establish not only whether an injury was
sustained but also when it was sustained. In particular, it is nearly impossible
to say whether the claimant’s asserted injury predated, postdated, or resulted
from the accident at issue. Raising the same concern, illnesses in the mass
tort realm often have complex and contestable etiologies.89 Thus, for example, many seeking fen-phen payments alleged mitral valve damage, even
though many Americans display some mitral valve irregularities absent fenphen exposure.90 Certain asbestos claimants sought compensation for lung
abnormalities that are relatively common conditions.91 And silica claimants
sought compensation for silicosis, though “[r]adiographic findings consistent with silicosis may be caused by a host of other diseases,” including tuberculosis, rheumatoid arthritis, lupus, and obesity.92 The upshot is that
uncertain specific causation fuels deception.93
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Peirce, No. 13-2235 (4th Cir. filed June 20, 2014) [hereinafter Peirce JA]
(testimony of Dr. John Parker). It was true of the heart disease, attributed to fen-phen, where
patients’ echocardiograms were very frequently “open to divergent interpretations.” Lenzner &
Maiello, supra note 59. And, it was true in Silica, where Judge Jack emphasized that “shadows”
on x-rays consistent with silicosis may or may not give rise to a positive diagnosis. In re Silica
Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 625, 630–31 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (quoting Dr. John
Parker).
89. See Richard A. Nagareda, Mass Torts in a World of Settlement 147–48
(2007) (“The latent diseases implicated in mass tort litigation typically are not ‘signature’
diseases in the sense of arising exclusively or overwhelmingly from the underlying product in
question.”).
90. See William H. Gaasch, Patient Education: Mitral Regurgitation (Beyond the Basics),
http://www.uptodate.com/contents/mitral-regurgitation-beyond-the-basics [https://perma.cc/
H7X7-WUAW] (reporting that up to 70 percent of adults have trivial mitral regurgitation,
while roughly 2 percent of adults have significant mitral regurgitation); Mitral Valve Regurgitation, Mayo Clinic, http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/mitral-valve-regurgitation/
symptoms-causes/dxc-20121850 [https://perma.cc/W2PB-DSQP] (listing fen-phen as just one
of many “risk factors” that “can increase your risk of mitral valve regurgitation”).
91. For example, pleural thickening may indicate an asbestos injury, but other causes
include tuberculosis, rib injury, infection, radiation therapy, or chemotherapy. See Asbestos
Litigation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 30–31 (2002) (statement
of Steve Kazan, Managing Partner, Kazan, McClain, Edises, Abrams, Fernandez, Lyons and
Farrise) (“[W]ell over 50 percent of the American adult population, if you took x-rays, would
demonstrate changes that meet the requirements today to justify an asbestos lawsuit. That
doesn’t mean they have changes in their lungs that have anything whatsoever to do with
asbestos.”).
92. In re Silica, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 592.
93. Lester Brickman and Gary Schwartz have made similar observations when discussing
workers’ compensation fraud and mass tort claims fraud, respectively. Brickman, Screenings,
supra note 20, at 1231 (observing that mass tort fraud is more common if a medical condition,
that exists in the population as a whole, can “be attributed” to a toxic substance, particularly if
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A third commonality between the soft-tissue injury and mass tort contexts is that, in both, defendants (or their insurers) have a reduced incentive
or capacity to scrutinize claims. Most of the time, defendants demand particularized evidence to support a plaintiff’s claim, minimizing the plaintiff’s
capacity to fabricate facts or exaggerate injuries.94 But soft-tissue auto and
mass tort claims stand as exceptions to the rule. As noted, soft-tissue claims
tend to be small, often resolved for a few thousand dollars. Facing such nuisance-value demands, insurers would be foolish to fund full investigations
into each claim’s validity—and traditionally most insurers haven’t.95 Meanwhile, the mass tort context tends to feature sizable payouts. But the sheer
number of claims may overwhelm a defendant’s limited investigatory resources.96 Illustrating this challenge, Judge Hodges in the Garlock litigation
found that, prior to declaring bankruptcy, the asbestos company had been
inundated with some 20,000 claims, many of which were highly dubious.
Still, believing that settling would be cheaper than fighting, Garlock had for
years resolved these cases “in groups of large numbers . . . without real analysis of the ‘liability’ to any individual claimant.”97 Similarly, in fen-phen,
after some 50,000 claimants opted out of the class action settlement, Wyeth
settled scores of claims while “hardly paus[ing] to consider the strength of
individual cases.”98
Fourth, the auto and mass tort realms are distinctive in that both display
abnormally high rates of claiming. In most areas of the tort law ecosystem,
only a very small fraction of those accidentally injured seek third-party compensation.99 Mass tort and auto accident claims, however, are again exceptional. Whether due to publicity, pervasive attorney advertising focused on
the condition is “not capable of objective verification”); Schwartz, supra note 20, at 994 (discussing the dubious “bad-back” claims that inundated California’s workers’ compensation system in the early 1990s and noting that these suspicious claims were complicated by the fact
that “back pain occurs for all kinds of reasons” and is “difficult to corroborate or verify”).
94. See Carroll & Abrahamse, supra note 8, at 233–34 (noting that most injuries “attract
attention from claims agents”).
95. See id. at 234 (“[B]ecause [soft-tissue injuries] are often not costly . . . claims based
on them may not attract close attention or generate demands for verification. Hence, they
present an opportunity to pursue a claim for a nonexistent injury.”). Note, though, that this
may be changing. In the 1990s, some insurers, fed up with perceived abuse surrounding softtissue claims, began to refuse to tender reasonable settlements. For more on those efforts, see
infra text accompanying note 172.
96. See Stephen J. Carroll et al., Asbestos Litigation 23 (2005) (discussing this
dynamic). Alternatively, if claims are paid after a global settlement is reached, the defendant,
with its exposure now circumscribed, will have little interest in policing the fund’s division.
97. In re Garlock Sealing Techs., Inc., 504 B.R. 71, 87 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2014).
98. Frankel, supra note 59, at 96.
99. Overall, only about 10 percent of Americans seek redress when accidentally injured,
and only about 2 percent of injury victims actually file suit. Deborah R. Hensler et al.,
Compensation for Accidental Injury in the United States 122 fig.5.2 (1991). Within
some areas, most notably medical malpractice, that proportion is lower still. See, e.g., David M.
Studdert et al., Negligent Care and Malpractice Claiming Behavior in Utah and Colorado, 38
Med. Care 250, 255 (2000).
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these areas (which may “normalize” the act of claiming or educate the public
about compensatory opportunities), or lawyers’ less stringent screening of
these cases (as explained below), mass tort and auto injury cases feature
unusually high rates of claim initiation.100
Fifth and finally, soft-tissue auto and mass tort cases are similar because
they are brought in contexts where the typical restraints imposed by the
contingency fee are either wholly inoperative or substantially relaxed. This,
too, is critically important.
Most personal injury lawyers are paid via contingency fees. As such,
lawyers are paid—and also typically reimbursed for out-of-pocket expenses—if and only if the case is won. This gives lawyers a strong incentive
to rigorously evaluate cases prior to acceptance. And consistent with expectations, evidence shows that in most areas of practice, plaintiffs’ attorneys
are choosy. They vet cases carefully and reject most would-be claimants who
seek their services.101 This screening typically serves as a formidable check on
fraudulent claiming.102
There are, however, two corners of the personal injury marketplace that
upend typical screening patterns. The first is the soft-tissue auto accident
realm, where my past research on settlement mills—high-volume, heavyadvertising law firms—shows that some lawyers are not particularly selective.103 Settlement mill lawyers operate a volume business and process mostly
low-dollar, soft-tissue car wreck cases on an assembly line. In the words of
one lawyer, they “stack ‘em deep and settle ‘em cheap.”104 Or, in the words
of another, there is an incentive to “get whatever you can because there’s
such a volume . . . even if you’re getting $1,000 on 500 cases, that’s half a
million dollars.”105 Cognizant that they are investing very little (whether

100. For comparatively high rates of claiming in mass torts, see Thomas E. Willging,
Mass Tort Problems & Proposals 20 (1999). For auto accidents, see Hensler et al., supra
note 99, at 119–20, which reports that roughly half of those injured in car wrecks attempt to
claim third-party compensation, compared to roughly 3 percent of those injured in nonwork,
non-motor-vehicle accidents. (Recognize, Hensler’s study did not parse the claiming behavior
of those with “soft” versus “hard” injuries; nor did it distinguish between those who were
tortiously versus nontortiously injured.)
101. See, e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, Risks, Reputations, and Rewards 67–68, 71–76
(2004) (finding, in a survey of Wisconsin contingent fee practitioners, that respondents accepted approximately 34 percent of potential clients).
102. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingency Fee Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the Civil Justice
System, 81 Judicature 22, 27 (1997) (reported that plaintiffs’ lawyers pointed to “lack of
liability” as the dominant reason for claim rejection).
103. Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 805,
834–35 (2011) [hereinafter Engstrom, Sunlight]; Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1485, 1499, 1522–23 (2009).
104. Telephone Interview with J.K. (May 15, 2008).
105. Telephone Interview with G.V. (Apr. 7, 2008).
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measured in time, effort, or out-of-pocket investment) in a claim’s development, settlement mill lawyers engage in only the most cursory of pre-retention reviews, and, not surprisingly, represent at least some claimants with
dubious entitlements to relief.106
The mass tort realm similarly deviates from the typical model. There,
once the mass tort has reached maturity, any additional client added to the
lawyer’s inventory is essentially all upside, since the marginal client poses
little if any risk, demands little in the way of out-of-pocket investment, offers
the possibility of a substantial fee, and—because defendants often feel more
“pressure” to settle when up against a lawyer with a “volume of cases”—
might even strengthen the lawyer’s hand in settlement negotiations.107 In
such an environment, lawyers, again, have little reason to be selective, and,
instead, what Judge Jack Weinstein calls the “vacuum cleaner” effect takes
hold: many firms “suck up good and bad cases, hoping that they can settle
in gross.”108
***
The takeaway of all this is that one who scours the tort law landscape for
specious claim activity is unlikely to see much of this activity in traditional
areas of tort practice, such as premises liability, medical malpractice, or oneoff product liability lawsuits, particularly if the plaintiff is complaining of a
signature disease or a visible, traumatic, “bright blood” injury. In those
cases, the lawyer—paid on a contingency fee and investing her own time and
money in the case’s development—has a powerful incentive to screen prior
to initiation; the defendant will typically scrutinize the claim prior to settlement; and, because the injury is visible, there is little chance it is fabricated
or that it actually predated or postdated the accident at issue.
In contrast, the areas of the tort ecosystem most apt to contain high
levels of spurious activity are those areas where restraints generally imposed
by the contingency fee are substantially relaxed or wholly inoperative, claim
rates are abnormally high, defendants have a reduced incentive or capacity
to investigate claims, specific causation is uncertain, and where it is difficult
to know whether the claimed impairment is real or imagined. If concerned
about fraudulent claiming, it is there that defendants, insurers, judges, and
policymakers ought to train their collective gaze.
106. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with T.R. (Apr. 16, 2008) (“A lot of these people aren’t
hurt. . . . [Y]ou should have screened the malingerers from the people who had legitimate
injuries.”); see also Engstrom, Sunlight, supra note 103, at 834–85 (discussing the fraud problem and concluding, “there are indications that settlement mills may, more often than most,
blur ethical boundaries and bend to the temptations of fraud”).
107. See Francis E. McGovern, The Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1721,
1732 (2002).
108. Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 469,
494–95 (1994); accord Keith N. Hylton, Asbestos and Mass Torts with Fraudulent Victims, 37
Sw. U. L. Rev. 575, 586 (2008) (highlighting “The Fraud Problem” in aggregate litigation and
explaining the various reasons why “the class action lawyer has an incentive to include fraudulent victims in the class”).
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II. RICO’s Rise, Retrenchment, and Recent Use as
a Retaliatory Tool
Part I offered an inventory and typology of fraudulent claims. Part II
now pivots to consider RICO. Below, I provide historical background on the
statute and also show that, traditionally, civil RICO has been used by plaintiffs’ lawyers against corporate entities, while corporate entities have decried
RICO as a source of vexatious litigation. I then offer two case studies to
show that corporate defendants have recently turned the tables and have
started deploying RICO as a retaliatory tool.
A. Background on Civil RICO
Congress enacted RICO as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970.109 At the time Congress enacted the statute, organized crime—what
J. Edgar Hoover called “the personification of every lawless evil”—was seen
as a problem spinning out of control, and legislators warned that such activity threatened to “destroy the social, political, economic, and moral heart of
our Nation.”110 Further, Congress was influenced by a sense that traditional
criminal laws—which nibbled at the edges of organized crime by prosecuting various individuals one-by-one—were woefully insufficient. Instead, a
“new approach[ ]” was needed.111 Pursuant to this new approach, prosecutors were to attack not just mobsters themselves, but, instead and more
broadly, the economic base through which “professional, full-time gangsters, hoodlums, mobsters and racketeers” operated.112
So directed, RICO had (and has) three key provisions. First, the statute
defines “racketeering activity.” So defined, “racketeering activity” includes a
wide array of offenses, ranging from murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson,
and extortion, to other more generalized and malleable predicates, including
embezzlement, obstruction of justice, mail fraud, and wire fraud.113 Second,
the statute targets certain repetitive or institutionalized racketeering activities. Specifically, the statute makes it unlawful to: (1) invest income derived
from a “pattern” of racketeering activity in any enterprise engaged in interstate commerce; (2) acquire or maintain control of such an enterprise
109. Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, 84 Stat. 922, 941–48 (1970) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 1505, 1961–68, 2516–17 (2012)).
110. For the Hoover quotation, see 113 Cong. Rec. 17,997 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Roman L. Hruska upon the introduction of S. 2048 and S. 2049). For the “moral heart” quotation, see Organized Crime Control: Hearings on S. 30 and Related Proposals Relating to the
Control of Organized Crime in the U.S. Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
91st Cong 86 (1970) (statement of Sen. John L. McClellan).
111. S. Rep. No. 91-617, at 79 (1969).
112. Oversight on Civil RICO Suits: Hearings on Oversight on Civil RICO Suits Brought
Under 18 U.S.C. 1964(c) Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 7 (1986) [hereinafter
RICO Oversight Hearings] (statement of Hon. Roman L. Hruska).
113. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2012). At enactment, only thirty crimes were identified, while
today, roughly 150 crimes qualify. Pamela Bucy Pierson, RICO Trends: From Gangsters to Class
Actions, 65 S.C. L. Rev. 213, 217 (2013).
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through a “pattern” of racketeering activity; (3) conduct or participate in the
conduct of such an enterprise’s affairs through a “pattern” of racketeering
activity; or (4) conspire to engage in any of the foregoing activities.114 Third
and finally, the statute enforces these prohibitions with far-reaching criminal
and civil penalties. Criminal penalties include significant jail time (of up to
twenty years), stiff fines, and the forfeiture of ill-gotten gains.115 On the civil
side, RICO entitles “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by
reason of a [RICO] violation” to treble damages, litigation expenses, and
attorneys’ fees.116 Modeled on our antitrust laws and added at the eleventh
hour, this treble damages provision was intended to compensate the victims
of organized crime and also to augment scarce prosecutorial resources by
inducing private plaintiffs to root out nefarious conduct.117
There is no doubt that Congress created RICO chiefly to combat organized crime.118 Nor is there doubt that, as so directed, RICO has had tremendous success: the precipitous drop in organized crime over the past four
decades stands as a powerful testament to the statute’s effectiveness.119 By its
terms, though, RICO sweeps much further. And the Act’s capacious and
malleable language, coupled with its offer of treble damages and attorneys’
fees, has long been a site of bitter controversy.
B. The Controversial Rise of Civil RICO
The power of RICO’s civil liability provision wasn’t fully appreciated
during the statute’s first decade. In the early 1980s, however, plaintiffs’ lawyers “discovered” the statute and started to use it against a wide array of
non-organized-crime defendants essentially for garden-variety fraud.120 By
the late 1980s, these civil RICO lawsuits had been initiated in myriad situations, including landlord-tenant disputes, domestic relations skirmishes, and
intrachurch conflicts.121 And RICO suits had also been lodged against many
legitimate businesses, including such American mainstays as Merrill Lynch,
114. 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
115. Id. § 1963.
116. Id. § 1964(c).
117. For the provision’s purpose, see Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 487–88,
493 (1985). For RICO’s antitrust law lineage, see S. Rep. No. 91-617, at 80–81 (1969). For the
fact that the provision was an eleventh-hour addition, see the statement of Stephen S. Trott in
RICO Oversight Hearings, supra note 112, at 123.
118. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 245 (1989) (“Organized crime was without a doubt Congress’ major target . . . .”).
119. Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Racketeering Made Simple(r), in The RICO Racket 1, 11 (Gary
L. McDowell ed., 1989) (“RICO has achieved spectacular success in direct assaults on organized crime, particularly in the 1980s.”).
120. Michael Goldsmith, Judicial Immunity for White-Collar Crime: The Ironic Demise of
Civil RICO, 30 Harv. J. Legis. 1, 1–2 (1993) (offering this history).
121. Motion to Leave to File a Brief and Brief for the Alliance of American Insurers et al.
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Sedima, 473 U.S. 479 (No. 84-648), 1985 WL
669655, at *9 [hereinafter Brief of American Insurers] (collecting citations).
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American Express, Citibank, Wells Fargo, Allstate, State Farm, Boeing, and
GM.122
Unsurprisingly, the business community did not much like its new role
on the receiving end of civil RICO and, throughout the period, business
groups responded by assailing these filings as, variously, “a tool for harassment,” a “perversion” of RICO’s purpose, and, most ominously, a “means
of waging ‘legal terrorism.’ ”123 Channeling this discontent, corporate interests adopted a two-prong strategy to tame this assertedly now-too-powerful
tool. First, they filed a series of lawsuits, some of which ultimately made
their way to the U.S. Supreme Court, advocating a narrow interpretation of
the statute; essentially, they sought a ruling that, properly construed, RICO
penalizes only traditional mobster activity.124 Second, they took the fight to
Congress, where, throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, corporatebacked legislation to restrict civil RICO was periodically considered.125
This campaign, however, paid only modest dividends. As a result of the
business community’s intense efforts, Congress and the Supreme Court did
ultimately impose some new restrictions on civil RICO, including a bar on
suits alleging fraud “in the purchase or sale of securities,” a limit on liability
for certain professionals, and the imposition of demanding proximate cause
and standing requirements.126 But these restrictions stopped miles short of
the encompassing constraints the corporate community initially sought. Indeed, reflecting that these restrictions still leave plenty of room for RICO to
operate, today, civil RICO filings are down a peg from their heyday of the
mid-to-late 1980s, but, with roughly 600 to 900 RICO lawsuits filed annually, they remain at healthy levels.127
122. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America,
H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. 229 (No. 87-1252), 1988 WL 1025665, at *4 n.9 [hereinafter Brief of Chamber] (identifying defendants); Brief of American Insurers, supra note 121, at *2–3 (same).
123. Brief for the American Federation of Labor & Congress of Industrial Organizations
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. 229 (No. 87-1252), 1988 WL
1025675, at *1 (describing RICO as a “tool for harassment”); Brief of American Insurers, supra
note 121, at *2 (describing certain RICO filings as a “perversion”); Brief of Amicus Curiae the
Washington Legal Foundation in Support of Respondents, H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. 229 (No. 871252), 1988 WL 1025683, at *10 [hereinafter Brief of WLF] (describing the filings as facilitating “legal terrorism”).
124. E.g., Brief of Chamber, supra note 122, at *4–5 (“[T]he Chamber and its members
believe that legitimate enterprises should not be subject to RICO liability . . . .”).
125. Howard Kurtz, Businesses Fight RICO Antifraud Law, Wash. Post, Oct. 16, 1985, at
A21 (describing corporations’ legislative efforts “to make triple damage suits nearly impossible”); see, e.g., RICO Amendments Act of 1991, H.R. Rep. No. 102-312 (1991).
126. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 109 Stat. 737, 758 (codified in
relevant part at 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012)) (describing the securities exemption, which includes exceptions); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 183–84 (1993) (discussing limits on
certain professionals’ liability); Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)
(delineating the proximate cause requirement); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,
496 (1985) (discussing standing requirements).
127. In the 1980s, it was widely reported that federal courts received more than 1,000
filings per year. See RICO Reform Act of 1989: Hearings on H.R. 1046 Before the Subcomm. on
Crime, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 449 (1989) (statement of Robert L. Chiesa,
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C. RICO as a Retaliatory Tool
Above, I described how traditionally (though controversially), plaintiffs’
lawyers used civil RICO as a sword against corporate entities. In the words
of Public Citizen, a consumer rights advocacy group, civil RICO has been
“an indispensable consumer-protection statute.”128 Corporate entities, on
the other hand, have traditionally decried the statute as a source of vexatious
litigation, or as one commentator put it, part of “the liability-broadening,
deep-pocket-picking trend in American law.”129
Below, I show that these traditional battle lines are now in flux. In a
remarkable turnaround, corporate entities are now harnessing civil RICO,
the tool they once despised. And they are using this weapon, once dubbed
the “Darling of [the] Plaintiffs’ Bar,” as a bludgeon against those who initiate suits.130 Below, I offer two recent, and successful, examples of RICO’s
retaliatory use.
1. Feld Entertainment, Inc. v. ASPCA
The Feld case involved an extraordinary fourteen-year odyssey that pitted some of the nation’s foremost animal rights groups against Feld Entertainment, owner of the Ringling Brothers and Barnum & Bailey Circus,
“the greatest show on earth.” The lawsuit began on July 11, 2000, when a
handful of animal rights nonprofits sued Feld in federal court. The suit alleged that Ringling Brothers’ treatment of its Asian elephants—and specifically, the circus’s use of bullhooks and prolonged chaining—violated the
Endangered Species Act (ESA).131 Of course, though, lawsuits need a plaintiff, that plaintiff must have Article III standing, and elephants do not qualify. This is where the trouble began.
To overcome this obstacle, the animal rights groups enlisted Tom Rider
to join their cause. A former “barn man,” Rider worked for Ringling Brothers from 1997 to 1999, during which time he cared for several of the circus’s
Chairman, RICO Coordinating Committee, representing the American Bar Association). For
contemporary estimates, see Pamela Bucy Pierson, RICO, Corruption and White-Collar Crime,
85 Temp. L. Rev. 523, 544 (2013).
128. RICO Reform: Hearings on H.R. 2517, H.R. 2943, H.R. 4892, H.R. 5290, H.R. 5391,
and H.R. 5445 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong.
904 (1986) (statement of Priscilla Budeiri, Staff Attorney, Public Citizen’s Congress Watch;
Shirley Yates; Donna Millsaps; and Pamela Gilbert, Staff Attorney, U.S. Public Interest Research Group); accord id. at 936 (statement of Priscilla Budeiri, Staff Attorney, Public Citizen’s
Congress Watch) (celebrating civil RICO as a tool that “facilitate[s] victims’ suits filed to redress the harm they suffered”).
129. L. Gordon Crovitz, RICO: The Legalized Extortion and Shakedown Racket, in The
RICO Racket, supra note 119, at 15, 29. For more on these battle lines, see David Lauter &
Fred Strasser, Holding Pattern: Civil RICO, Nat’l L.J., Dec. 30, 1985–Jan. 6, 1986, at S-9.
130. Weissman, supra note 24.
131. Am. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Entm’t, Inc., 677 F. Supp.
2d 55 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d, 659 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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allegedly mistreated elephants.132 In joining the suit (and ticking off Lujan’s
three jurisdictional requirements), Rider alleged that he had suffered an aesthetic injury based on his exposure to the mistreated elephants, that he left
his job at the circus because of the mistreatment, and that he would “like to
visit the elephants, but cannot do so without being injured from seeing the
animals and detecting their mistreatment.”133
In anchoring their suit to the testimony of Tom Rider, however, the
animal rights groups gravely erred. After years of discovery, one visit to the
D.C. Circuit, and a six-week bench trial during which several plaintiffs abandoned their claims to relief, the court ultimately dismissed the suit in late
2009 when Judge Emmet Sullivan ruled that Rider was essentially fabricating
his testimony.134 Indeed, in an opinion that identified dozens of inconsistencies between Rider’s words and documented actions, Judge Sullivan concluded that Rider “failed to prove either a strong and personal attachment to
the seven elephants at issue or that [Feld’s] treatment of those elephants
caused . . . aesthetic or emotional injury.”135 Without a representative who
had suffered a cognizable injury-in-fact, any hope plaintiffs had to prevail
on the merits quickly evaporated.
From this point for the animal rights groups, things went from bad to
worse. In the course of his 2009 decision, Judge Sullivan not only identified
numerous apparent fabrications, but also noted that over the course of the
litigation, Rider had received cash and other benefits from the animal rights
activists—benefits about which the groups had been “less than forthcoming.”136 Subsequently, these payments—of roughly $190,000—took center
stage.137 Zeroing in on these monies, Feld initiated a civil RICO action
against the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
132. As a “barn man,” Rider was tasked with keeping the elephants fed and watered,
cleaning up after them, and generally “watching over them.” Id. at 58.
133. Id. at 67–70. Lujan teaches that the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of Article
III standing is: (1) a “concrete and particularized” injury in fact (2) that is fairly traceable to
the defendant’s conduct and (3) that is capable of judicial redress. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
134. Am. Soc’y, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 55–62 (detailing the case’s procedural history). Specifically, the court ruled “that Mr. Rider is essentially a paid plaintiff and fact witness who is not
credible, and therefore affords no weight to his testimony.” Id. at 67. For the fact that several
plaintiffs abandoned their claims during trial, see id. at 66 n.10.
135. Id. at 67, 72.
136. Id. at 72, 82; see also Animal Welfare Inst. v. Feld Entm’t, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6
(D.D.C. 2013) (“Rider, the organizational plaintiffs, and plaintiffs’ counsel sought to conceal
the nature, extent and purpose of the payments . . . during the litigation . . . .”).
137. Feld alleged that these payments totaled over $190,000, plus noncash compensation,
including a van, hotel room, cell phone use, a video camera, and laptop. First Amended Complaint of Feld Entertainment, Inc. para. 21, Feld Entm’t, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals, 873 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 1:07-CV-01532), 2010 WL
2519285 [hereinafter First Am. Compl.]. For their part, the animal rights groups insisted that
these payments were either earned (for a time, Rider worked as a security guard protecting one
of the plaintiffs) or were intended to defray Rider’s expenses while he advocated on behalf of
humane treatment for elephants. Memorandum and Points of Authorities in Support of Motion of Defendants to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 8–9, Feld, 873 F. Supp. 2d 288
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(ASPCA), the Animal Welfare Institute, and the Humane Society of the
United States and their counsel, among others.138 Identifying over 1,300
predicate acts of bribery, mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and
obstruction of justice, Feld’s RICO action alleged, among other things, that
plaintiffs and their counsel “knew that the factual assertions underlying
Rider’s claims . . . were false,” paid Rider for his fabricated testimony, and
“sought to conceal the payments” by providing false or evasive answers in
interrogatories and depositions.139 Using these mechanisms, Feld claimed,
the animal rights groups sought to “unjustly enrich themselves”140 and deprive the company of $20 million, which it spent defending “itself from a
case with no real plaintiff.”141
After surviving a motion to dismiss, Feld’s retaliatory RICO suit was
ultimately settled when the ASPCA offered up $9.3 million in 2012, and the
Humane Society and other animal rights groups agreed to pay a combined
$15.75 million two years later.142 At the time the latter settlement was announced, the Wall Street Journal applauded it as a “cautionary tale about the
consequences of making an allegation in federal court that you have trouble
backing up,” while Kenneth Feld, Chairman and CEO of Feld Entertainment, declared: “We hope this settlement payment, and the various court
decisions that found against these animal rights activists and their attorneys,
will deter individuals and organizations from bringing frivolous litigation
like this in the future.”143
2. CSX Transportation v. Peirce
The second exemplar, this time involving oversubscription, is rooted in
the fading days of asbestos litigation. The so-called “magic mineral,” asbestos is responsible for the deaths of more than a quarter-million Americans.144 It has also been the catalyst for a seemingly endless tide of litigation.
(No. 1:07-CV-01532). In addition, the animal rights groups insisted that the payments had
been openly disclosed, a point at least partially supported by the evidence. Id.
138. See First Am. Compl., supra note 137.
139. Feld, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 302–03. In addition to RICO, Feld also asserted claims under
the Virginia Conspiracy Act and for common law abuse of process, malicious prosecution,
maintenance, and champerty. Id. at 300. The RICO action was actually initiated prior to the
bench trial on August 28, 2007, but was stayed pending a final judgment on the ESA action. Id.
at 304. Before that, Feld had sought to bring its RICO claim as a counterclaim to the ESA
action. Id. at 303.
140. Id. at 302.
141. Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion of Defendants to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 14, Feld, 873 F. Supp. 2d 288 (No. 1:07-CV-01532).
142. Jacob Gershman, Animal Rights Group Pays Circus Producer Millions to Settle Suit,
Wall St. J. (May 15, 2014, 3:21 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/05/15/animal-rightsgroups-pay-circus-producer-millions-to-settle-suit/ (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
143. Id.
144. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
Colum. L. Rev. 1343, 1385 (1995) (“[E]stimates as high as an additional 250,000 to 500,000
deaths from asbestos exposure have been responsibly made.”).
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Asbestos litigation began nearly half a century ago when individual
plaintiffs, alongside their imaginative and gutsy lawyers, notched their first
hard-fought and well-deserved victories against asbestos manufacturers.145
As years ticked by, however, the litigation lost much of its original Davidversus-Goliath appeal. By the 1990s, professional screening companies, hired
by plaintiffs’ firms and performing x-rays in hotel rooms, union halls, and
parking lots, were rounding up plaintiffs by the thousands. Partly owing to
these recruitment efforts, suits initiated by asymptomatic claimants started
to eclipse suits by claimants with obvious impairments. Then, as adverse
judgments and settlements plunged the clearly culpable asbestos manufacturers into bankruptcy (a fate that has, so far, met nearly 100 corporations),
plaintiffs started targeting ever-more-peripherally-involved players.146 Indeed, by 2002, then-prominent Mississippi plaintiffs’ lawyer Richard Scruggs
wryly described the litigation as the “endless search for a solvent
bystander.”147
These dynamics came to a head in the CSX litigation. Beginning in the
mid-1990s, the Pennsylvania law firm Robert Peirce & Associates began filing thousands of Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) claims against CSX
Transportation, one of the nation’s largest railroad companies.148 These suits
alleged that the firm’s clients, former railroad workers, were injured when
they were exposed to asbestos while working for CSX. Adding to CSX’s
woes, most of the suits were initiated in West Virginia—a state that, at the
time, used particularly liberal aggregation procedures to speed asbestos cases
to settlement.149 Coupled with the sheer volume of claims then facing the
company, these procedures induced CSX to settle incoming FELA claims in
a routinized manner, apparently without subjecting the plaintiffs’ demands
to particularized scrutiny. In CSX’s words, the company “had neither the
ability nor the incentive to conduct an extensive examination of each
claim.”150
145. See generally Paul Brodeur, Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos Industry
on Trial (1985).
146. For the bankruptcy figure, see GAO, Trust Study, supra note 68, at 2. For additional
context, see generally Carroll et al., supra note 96; Patrick M. Hanlon & Anne Smetak,
Asbestos Changes, 62 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 525 (2007).
147. Scruggs continued: “Most of the companies that were culpable in promoting the sale
of asbestos-containing products have been held accountable and most of them have gone
bankrupt. Now, the companies that are peripherally related to the bankrupt defendants are
being seized . . . .” Medical Monitoring and Asbestos Litigation—A Discussion with Richard
Scruggs and Victor Schwartz, Mealey’s Litig. Rep.: Asbestos, Mar. 1, 2002, at 5–6.
148. Third Amended Complaint at para. 89, CSX Transp., Inc. v. Peirce, 974 F. Supp. 2d
927 (N.D. W. Va. 2013) (No. 5:05CV202), 2011 WL 9698685. FELA is essentially the railroad
version of workers’ compensation, though unlike workers’ compensation, liability hinges on
the employer’s negligence. Rich Lord, CSX Claims Racketeering in Law Firm Legal Tactics,
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, July 31, 2011, at A-1.
149. Hanlon & Geise, supra note 64, at 5 (discussing the state’s consolidation procedures).
150. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 8, CSX Transp., Inc. v. Gilkison, No. 09-2135 (4th Cir.
Dec. 30, 2010), 2010 WL 97462 [hereinafter CSX 4th Cir. Brief].
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In time, however, CSX came to believe that many of the claims it was
routinely compensating—or at least those claims coming from Robert Peirce
& Associates—were dubious. Specifically, CSX realized that nearly 99 percent of the Peirce firm’s claims were generated via mass screenings.151 Further, CSX learned that many of these claims were based on chest x-rays
taken by unlicensed x-ray technician James Corbitt, a convicted felon who
used an imaging device mounted to the back of his GMC Truck.152 Worse,
the chest x-rays were then typically read—and asbestosis was more-oftenthan-not diagnosed—by West Virginia radiologist, Dr. Ray Harron,153 the
very same doctor who had gained notoriety in 2005 when Judge Jack excoriated him for his lung diagnoses in the Silica MDL. (In that litigation, where
recall, Judge Jack concluded that plaintiffs’ claims were “manufactured for
money,” Dr. Harron was “involved in the diagnosis of approximately 6,350
Plaintiffs.”154) Further digging revealed that, for the Peirce firm, much as he
had in the Silica litigation, Dr. Harron made thousands of suspicious diagnoses (in some days reading literally all reviewed x-rays as positive for asbestosis) without ever ordering more powerful or reliable scans, conducting
physical exams, taking medical histories, or meeting the patients at issue.155
Unhappy with the above, CSX turned the tables—or, in the words of
one journalist, the “quarry . . . turned on the hunter.”156 In 2007, the company filed a civil RICO lawsuit against the Peirce firm—then “one of Pittsburgh’s most prominent trial law firms”—as well as Dr. Harron, several of
the firm’s attorneys, and its principal investigator.157 Relying on the RICO
predicates of wire and mail fraud, CSX’s suit alleged that the Peirce firm had
“orchestrated an asbestosis screening process deliberately intended to result
in false positive diagnoses and then knowingly prosecuted claims against
CSX[ ] with no basis in fact.”158 The firm “carried out this scheme,” CSX
151. See Peirce JA, supra note 88, at 899 (testimony of Louis A. Raimond).
152. Id. at 282–83 (testimony of James R. Corbitt, acknowledging his felonies and lack of
licensure). Corbitt took perhaps 16,000 x-rays for the Peirce firm and was paid some $1.8
million for his efforts. Id. at 881, 883.
153. Id. at 1320–21 (testimony of Robert N. Peirce, Jr. attesting to the firm’s utilization of
Dr. Harron); id. at 943 (testimony of Louis A. Raimond regarding Dr. Harron’s diagnostic
rate); id. at 1193–94 (testimony of Dr. John Parker).
154. In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 606, 635 (S.D. Tex. 2005); see also
id. 625–29, 637–40, 676. Specifically, Judge Jack described Dr. Harron’s diagnoses as a “distressing and disgraceful procedure [that] does not remotely resemble reasonable medical practice,” and she ultimately concluded that “Dr. Harron [found] evidence of the disease he was
currently being paid to find.” Id. at 638 (internal quotation marks omitted).
155. Peirce JA, supra note 88, at 1045–46 (testimony of Dr. Harron); CSX 4th Cir. Brief,
supra note 150, at 41.
156. Lord, supra note 148, at A-1.
157. Id. The Peirce firm was ultimately dropped as a defendant.
158. Amended Complaint at para. 3, CSX Transp., Inc. v. Peirce, 974 F. Supp. 2d 927
(N.D. W. Va. 2013) (No. 5:05CV202), 2007 WL 7074610 [hereinafter CSX Amended Complaint]. CSX first filed suit against defendants on December 22, 2005, alleging claims for fraud
and negligence. See Complaint, CSX Trans., Inc. v. Gilkison, No. 5:05cv202, 2009 WL 2357142
(N.D. W. Va. July 30, 2009). The RICO claim was added on July 5, 2007, after the court
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asserted, “by using an x-ray technician who produced low-quality films; having the x-rays read by a doctor [Dr. Harron] who provided positive reads at
an impossibly high rate; and then overwhelming CSX[ ] with thousands of
resulting claims.”159 According to CSX, all this caused the company “to expend substantial money and resources to defend and settle the deliberately
fabricated claims . . . that should never have been filed in the first place.”160
Following substantial procedural wrangling capped off by an eight-day
trial, on December 20, 2012, a jury in Wheeling, West Virginia essentially
agreed. After deliberating for less than three hours, the jury found that lawyers Robert Peirce Jr. and Louis Raimond, along with Dr. Ray Harron, had
indeed run afoul of civil RICO and awarded CSX $429,240 in damages.161
The following year, as permitted under the RICO statute, Judge Frederick
Stamp trebled the jury’s award.162 Peirce and the others appealed, but ultimately—with the appeal pending in the Fourth Circuit and the defendants’
obligation to reimburse CSX for its attorneys’ fees (estimated at nearly $10
million) unresolved—on November 6, 2014, the parties agreed to settle the
dispute, with the lawyers and Dr. Harron’s estate paying CSX a hefty $7.3
million.163
At the time, ATRA President, Tiger Joyce, praised CSX for pursuing the
case, stating “CSX deserves a great deal of credit for its courage in turning
the tables on these perpetrators of fraudulent asbestos litigation.”164 “This
successful RICO litigation,” Joyce declared, “now serves as a model for other
corporate defendants that have been plagued by such fraud for decades.”165
granted CSX leave to amend its complaint. See CSX Amended Complaint, supra, at paras.
89–95.
159. CSX 4th Cir. Brief, supra note 150, at 5–6.
160. CSX Amended Complaint, supra note 158, at para. 88.
161. Verdict at para. 6, Peirce, 974 F. Supp. 2d 927 (No. 5:05CV202), 2012 WL 6677272.
The jury exited the courtroom at 3:13 PM, and at 5:29 PM advised the court that it had
reached a verdict. Peirce JA, supra note 88, at 1626–28. As the text indicates, there was substantial wrangling. Over the course of three complaints, multiple summary judgment motions, and
one trip to the Fourth Circuit, the lawsuit narrowed considerably. Among other things, various defendants were dropped, and the trial focused not on the lawyers’ case-processing system
writ large, but rather on their handling of eleven particular claims. See Memorandum Opinion
and Order Confirming the Pronounced Rulings of This Court Relating to Lawyer Defendants’
Motions in Limine at para. 1, Peirce, 974 F. Supp. 2d 927 (No. 5:05CV202) (granting Motion
in Limine by defendants Robert N. Peirce, Jr., and Louis A. Raimond, which sought to preclude CSX from presenting further claims); cf. Rosenbaum, supra note 23, at 44 (emphasizing
that, at the end of the day, CSX proved the existence of “only eleven ‘baseless’ claims out of the
5,300 claims filed by the Peirce law firm over the course of eight years”).
162. Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting CSX’s Motion to Amend the Judgment
to Reflect Statutorily-Mandated Trebling of RICO Damages, Peirce, 974 F. Supp. 2d 927 (No.
5:05CV202).
163. See Peirce JA, supra note 88, at 1792–94 (reproducing CSX’s Motion for Attorneys’
Fees and Litigation Expenses, filed Jan. 21, 2013); 3 Defendants in Asbestos Fraud Conspiracy
Agree to $7.3 Million Settlement, Westlaw J. Asbestos, Nov. 21, 2014, at 4.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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III. Conventional Fraud-Fighting Mechanisms
In the 1980s, as civil RICO was used to target legitimate businesses and
business interests worked feverishly to curtail the statute, those in the corporate community frequently argued that RICO was not needed because it was
duplicative. In the words of the Chamber of Commerce in a 1989 brief,
“[t]here already exists adequate state and federal criminal laws,” both to
curb bad behavior and to provide victims adequate relief.166 Fast forward to
the present day, however, and some of those same interests have changed
their tune, as the turn toward RICO to fight fraudulent litigation is fueled,
quite explicitly, by assertions concerning the inadequacy of “conventional”
mechanisms.167
This begs a few questions. What mechanisms already exist to target
fraudulent filings? How do those mechanisms operate? And, when it comes
to the fraud problem, how do these mechanisms fare? It is these questions
Part III seeks to address. Section A catalogs the many formal and informal
ex ante mechanisms designed to identify and weed out specious claims prior
to the formal initiation of suit. Section B then identifies various procedural
mechanisms designed to extinguish dubious lawsuits early in the litigation
process. Then, Section C chronicles in somewhat greater detail the remedial
measures that are equipped—like RICO itself—to punish and deter the filing of fraudulent claims after such suits are initiated. Finally, Section D offers three insights we can draw from the foregoing exercise.
A. Ex Ante Mechanisms
Myriad ex ante mechanisms exist to identify and dispose of specious
claims even prior to the initiation of suit. Often informal and funded by
private parties (typically insurers), these mechanisms are especially prevalent
in the automobile sector. Thus, nearly all auto insurers use fraud-detection
software, which can analyze social networks, deploy predictive analytics, and
draw on public records to single out claims meriting more scrutiny.168 In
addition, many insurers strategically—and increasingly—utilize other
166. Brief of Chamber, supra note 122, at *5 n.10.
167. See Joyce, New Way, supra note 16.
168. Using this software, insurance companies can analyze social networks (finding, for
example, if various claimants all use the same home address or provide the same phone number), deploy predictive analytics (by, for instance, training a robot to spot red flags within
adjuster-written reports), and integrate data (by, for example, running the claimant’s name
and social security number through public databases to see if the claimant has filed for bankruptcy, has a criminal record, is the subject of an adverse judgment, or has “address change
velocity to indicate transient behavior”). Ruchi Verma & Sathyan Ramakrishna Mani, Using Analytics for Insurance Fraud Detection 3 (2013), http://www.the-digital-insurer.
com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/53-insurance-fraud-detection.pdf [https://perma.cc/NU6A6CUT]; accord Coal. Against Ins. Fraud, The State of Insurance Fraud Technology: A
Study of Insurer Use, Strategies and Plans for Anti-Fraud Technology 1 (2014) (reporting on a survey of forty-two insurers, which found that 95 percent of insurer-respondents
use antifraud technology).
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layered fraud-fighting mechanisms, including “paper reviews” (reviews of
the claimant’s medical records), index bureau checks (inquiries into the
claimant’s prior claims history), independent medical exams (physical exams by insurer-selected medical professionals), and, if warranted, referrals to
special investigative units (SIUs) specially trained to ferret out fraud.169
Starting in the 1990s, most insurers also started using computer programs—
including Colossus, Claims Outcome Advisor, and Claims IQ—to more rigorously evaluate bodily injury claims.170 Likened to Turbo Tax for auto accidents, these programs promise to minimize payout variance and improve
adjusters’ investigative questioning.171 Finally, some insurers—most prominently, Allstate—have started to play the long game, opting to fight softtissue claims through vigorous litigation, rather than tendering routinized
payments, as they had in the past.172
Some of these ex ante strategies have substantial drawbacks and have
drawn withering criticism.173 But if they are judged narrowly on whether
they help curtail payments on fraudulent claims, the scorecard seems positive. Most notably, there is evidence that insurers’ payments on claims displaying signs of fraud and exaggeration have dropped as a proportion of
claimed expenses. One study, for example, shows that, for claims with an
appearance of fraud, the recovery-to-claimed-economic-loss ratio is only
1.17 (meaning the claimant gets only $1.17 for each dollar of claimed economic loss), compared to the comparatively generous 1.59 for claims that
look “clean.”174
169. For more on these and other techniques, see Feinman, supra note 37, at 96–99, 106,
110–12, 179–83; Richard A. Derrig et al., Behavioral Factors and Lotteries Under No-Fault with
a Monetary Threshold: A Study of Massachusetts Automobile Claims, 61 J. Risk & Ins. 245,
267–72 (1994).
170. Jerry Guidera, “Colossus” at the Accident Scene—Insurers Use a Software Program to
Pay out Claims for Injuries, But Law Suits Claim It’s Misused, Wall St. J., Jan 2, 2003, at C1
(reporting that twelve of the top twenty auto insurers in North America used Colossus by
2002).
171. Tony Bartelme, Storm of Money: Insider Tells How Some Insurance Companies Rig the
System, Post & Courier (Dec. 2, 2012, 12:29 AM), http://www.postandcourier.com/article/
20121202/PC16/121209871 [https://perma.cc/3C36-T6QR]. For more on these systems, see
generally Mark Romano & J. Robert Hunter, Low Ball: An Insider’s Look at How Some
Insurers Can Manipulate Computerized Systems to Broadly Underpay Injury Claims
(2012).
172. See Michael Maiello, So Sue Us, Forbes (Feb. 7, 2000, 12:00 AM), http://
www.forbes.com/forbes/2000/0207/6503060a.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review)
(discussing Allstate).
173. See, e.g., Feinman, supra note 37, at 96–99 (raising objections); Romano & Hunter,
supra note 171, at 14–18 (charging that, though Colossus ostensibly targets variance, it really
seeks to reduce payouts, irrespective of claim legitimacy).
174. Richard A. Derrig et al., Auto Insurance Fraud: Measurements and Efforts to Combat
It, 9 Risk Mgmt. & Ins. Rev. 109, 122 (2006); see David S. Loughran, Deterring Fraud: The
Role of General Damage Awards in Automobile Insurance Settlements, 72 J. Risk & Ins. 551,
570–71 (2005) (presenting evidence “consistent with the hypothesis” that insurers decrease
general damages when special damages exceed their expected value); see also Ins. Research
Council, Fraud and Buildup in New York Auto Injury Insurance Claims 55–62 (2006)
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B. Extinguishing Dubious Suits Early On
After a claim is actually filed in court and formal litigation is underway,
additional procedures exist—and, indeed, increasingly exist—to flush out
dubious suits early in the litigation life cycle. In standard litigation, these
mechanisms take the form of heightened pleading standards (following the
Supreme Court’s rulings in Twombly and Iqbal), expanded use of summary
judgment (post-Celotex), and, under Daubert and its progeny, more rigorous standards for the admission of party-supported expert testimony. Indeed, it was a Daubert motion Judge Jack used to uncover fraud in the Silica
MDL, which brought that potentially costly litigation to an early end.175
Additional mechanisms have also sprung up around particular areas of
practice. For example, these days medical malpractice cases often must overcome the additional hurdles of certificate-of-merit requirements and professional screening panels.176 Anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuits against public
participation) legislation, enacted in some form in the majority of states,
imposes tough restrictions on lawsuits (such as those alleging defamation,
slander, and libel) that would “target[ ] the defendants’ lawful exercise of
free speech, petition, or association.”177 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), claims alleging fraud or mistake must be pled with special particularity in order “to safeguard defendants against spurious charges of
immoral and fraudulent behavior.”178 Enacted in 1995, the Private Securities

(same). Of course, it is difficult to say that observed payment patterns were caused by insurers’
use of the above antifraud strategies. Further, while deterrence theory would predict that
fraudulent filings will ultimately drop as the benefits of such filings diminish, there is not yet
evidence of a reduction in suspicious filings.
175. Brown, supra note 53, at 580.
176. In medical malpractice cases, roughly half of states impose an affidavit or certificateof-merit requirement, while approximately seventeen states demand that cases be heard by a
screening panel prior to trial. See Heather Morton, Medical Liability/Malpractice Merit Affidavits and Expert Witnesses, Nat’l Conference State Legislatures (June 24, 2014), http://
www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/medical-liability-malpractice-meritaffidavits-and-expert-witnesses.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZX2S-ZPKG]; Heather Morton, Medical Liability/Malpractice ADR and Screening Panels Statutes, Nat’l Conference State Legislatures (May 20, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/
medical-liability-malpractice-adr-and-screening-panels-statutes.aspx [https://perma.cc/
Q2GN-99X2].
177. Laura Lee Prather & Justice Jane Bland, Bullies Beware: Safeguarding Constitutional
Rights Through Anti-SLAPP in Texas, 47 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 725, 731, 734–36 (2015). Approximately thirty states have some type of anti-SLAPP legislation, which generally requires expedited dismissal and payment of attorneys’ fees if an action arises from protected petitioning,
unless the plaintiff can succeed in making out a prima facie case when put to an early and
onerous test. Id. (collecting citations).
178. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Makris, No. CIV.A. 01-5351, 2003 WL 924615, at
*4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2003) (quoting McHale v. NuEnergy Grp., No. CIV.A. 01-4111, 2002 WL
321797, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2002)).
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Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) subjects securities cases to stringent requirements.179 Finally, some jurisdictions’ local rules impose special pleading requirements on those asserting claims under civil RICO.180
Especially in recent years, mass tort claimants also face enhanced scrutiny. Lone Pine orders offer one example. Increasingly in use in mass tort
cases, Lone Pine orders require each allegedly impaired plaintiff to produce a
diagnostic report from his or her physician soon after filing.181 The order’s
purpose, as one court explained, is to “identify and cull potentially meritless
claims and streamline litigation in complex cases involving numerous claimants” as expeditiously as possible.182 Building on the Lone Pine concept, in
the World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation, Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein
developed a sophisticated database of claimants and their identified ailments.183 Through this database, the court was quickly able to discern that
“less than 25 percent of the claimants had suffered serious injury and that
almost a third suffered no injury at all.”184
Worried about junk science, other judges in mass torts have turned to
independent experts (specifically authorized by Federal Rule of Evidence 706
and state counterparts) and have tasked these experts with assessing claimants’ conditions.185 Thus, in one case involving sixty-five tire workers who
claimed to be suffering from asbestos injuries, the court appointed an independent expert to review all pertinent material. That expert found that
forty-two of the sixty-five plaintiffs “were found to be free of any condition
giving rise to a cause of action,” which streamlined the litigation considerably.186 Likewise, in the litigation over silicone-gel breast implants, transferee
179. For more on the PSLRA and its effect, see generally Stephen J. Choi & Robert B.
Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes During the First Decade After the
PSLRA, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1489 (2006).
180. See Darrel C. Menthe, Avoiding the Pitfalls of Pleading Civil RICO, Prac. Litigator,
May 2007, at 55, 56.
181. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 557 F. Supp. 2d 741, 743 (E.D. La. 2008) (suggesting that, in recent years, “Lone Pine orders have been routinely used by courts to manage
mass tort cases”); James P. Muehlberger & Boyd S. Hoekel, An Overview of Lone Pine Orders in
Toxic Tort Litigation, 71 Def. Couns. J. 366, 366, 368 (2004) (noting that the use of Lone Pine
orders “appears to be spreading” and that these orders “eliminate frivolous claims quickly”).
182. Baker v. Chevron USA, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-227, 2007 WL 315346, at *1 (S.D. Ohio
Jan. 30, 2007).
183. See Alvin K. Hellerstein et al., The 9/11 Litigation Database: A Recipe for Judicial
Management, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 653 (2013).
184. Id. at 659. Judge Eduardo C. Robreno, the transferee judge presiding over the asbestos product liability MDL, has also expanded on the Lone Pine concept in an effort to streamline this long-running litigation. For a detailed description of his efforts, see Eduardo C.
Robreno, The Federal Asbestos Product Liability Multidistrict Litigation (MDL-875): Black Hole
or New Paradigm?, 23 Widener L.J. 97, 137–38 (2013).
185. Most states have adopted provisions akin to Rule 706. Matthew Mall, Note, Derailing
the Gravy Train: A Three-Pronged Approach to End Fraud in Mass Tort Medical Diagnosing, 48
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2043, 2045 n.18 (2007) (compiling authority). For more on Rule 706,
see Willging, supra note 100, at 55–57.
186. Carl B. Rubin & Laura Ringenbach, The Use of Court Experts in Asbestos Litigation,
137 F.R.D. 35, 39 (1991).
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Judge Sam C. Pointer famously used Rule 706 to appoint a “National Science
Panel,” and the Panel’s conclusion that implants did not cause autoimmune
disease helped bring that sprawling litigation to its ultimate end.187
Going a step further, a handful of states have recently enacted “medical
criteria” laws specifically targeting one kind of mass tort: asbestos legislation.
Among other things, these laws impose substantial (and probably insuperable) burdens on lawyer-funded mass screenings and require plaintiffs to
make an early, credible prima facie showing of a genuine impairment.188
Other states have recently enacted legislation to crack down on double dipping; these new laws, among other things, require asbestos victims seeking
tort compensation to reveal to defendants all asbestos claims they have previously filed and all material pertaining thereto, under penalty of perjury.189
And, even without supporting legislation, several jurisdictions have adopted
standing Case Management Orders compelling the timely production of
such material.190
Last but not least, settlement funds and bankruptcy trusts increasingly
conduct audits to identify fraudulent filings.191 The importance and utility of
audits were on full display in the fen-phen litigation. There, once people
began to suspect that bogus claims were inundating the $3.75 billion settlement trust, Judge Harvey Bartle ordered an audit of all claims, ultimately
resulting in many denials.192 Similarly, in the asbestos context, audits of the
Manville Trust helped to identify ten diagnosing doctors with abnormally
high failure rates.193
187. Laura L. Hooper et al., Assessing Causation in Breast Implant Litigation: The Role of
Science Panels, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 2001, at 139, 179 n.211 (discussing the
Panel’s impact); Joseph Sanders, Science, Law, and the Expert Witness, Law & Contemp.
Probs., Winter 2009, at 63, 78 n.79 (same). This is not to suggest that the Panel’s appointment
was without controversy. For further context, see generally Peter J. Gross et al., Clearing Away
the Junk: Court-Appointed Experts, Scientifically Marginal Evidence, and the Silicone Gel Breast
Implant Litigation, 56 Food & Drug L.J. 227 (2001).
188. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. §§ 51-14-1 to -10 (2007); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-4901 to 4911 (2006); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 44-135-30 to -110 (2006); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
Ann. §§ 90.001 to .012 (West 2005). For more on these laws, see Hanlon & Geise, supra note
64, at 3–5.
189. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-782 (2015); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2307.951
to .954 (West 2013); Okla. Stat. tit. 76, §§ 8189 (2013); W. Va. Code Ann. §§ 55-7F-1 to -11
(2015); Wis. Stat. § 802.025 (2014). Similar bills have been introduced in a number of other
states, as well as in the U.S. House and Senate. Lester Brickman, Fraud and Abuse in Mesothelioma Litigation, 88 Tul. L. Rev. 1071, 1140–45 (2014) (detailing various efforts).
190. See Peggy L. Ableman, The Time Has Come for Courts to Respond to the Manipulation
of Exposure Evidence in Asbestos Cases, Mealey’s Litig. Rep.: Asbestos, Apr. 8, 2015, at 1, 7.
191. See GAO, Trust Study, supra note 68, at 22–23 (reporting that 98 percent of studied
asbestos trusts contained a provision requiring audits). For more on audits, see Hylton, supra
note 108, at 591.
192. Under the original settlement, the trust was allowed to audit no more than 15 percent of claims. See In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 226 F.R.D. 498, 505–07 (E.D. Pa. 2005);
Brickman, Screenings, supra note 20, at 1263–64.
193. Frederick C. Dunbar et al., Institutional Response to Tort System Breakdown: Asbestos Enters a New Phase 3–5, 3 n.6 (July 21, 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
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C. Ex Post Remedial Mechanisms
Finally, once a lawsuit is in full swing or even after it has been resolved,
there are a slew of mechanisms to penalize lawyers and litigants who have
submitted fraudulent claims. These include penalties pursuant to: Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 11 and 60(b)(3) (and state court counterparts), 28
U.S.C. § 1927 (and state court counterparts), courts’ inherent authority,
lawsuits for malicious prosecution, bar disciplinary proceedings, and criminal prosecution. Table 2 offers a brief synopsis. Then, each mechanism is
explored in more depth.
Table 2
Remedial Measures
Measures

Description

Federal Rules of Civil

Rule 11 – authorizes sanctions, subject to certain restrictions, if a lawyer or party files a

Procedure

frivolous claim or paper
Rule 60 – authorizes relief from judgment, subject to certain restrictions, upon the grounds of
perjury, misrepresentation, misconduct, or fraud

State Court Counterparts

Numerous states have provisions that mirror or mimic Rules 11 and 60.

28 U.S.C. § 1927

An attorney who unreasonably and vexatiously multiplies a proceeding in federal court may be
required to pay the excess costs that result from such conduct.
By statute, numerous states flip the American rule when the initiation or defense of an action,

State Counterparts

or part thereof, is frivolous, groundless, vexatious and/or conducted in bad faith.

Inherent Authority

Courts may impose a full range of penalties for bad faith litigation conduct.

Malicious Prosecution

This is a tort claim subject to strict limits, including that the (instant) plaintiff must show the

Lawsuit

original proceeding was initiated with malice and without probable cause, it was terminated in

Bar Disciplinary

Model Rule 1.2(d) – bars lawyers from counseling or assisting clients in the commission of a

Proceedings

crime or fraud

her favor, and she sustained an injury therefrom, despite her foregoing victory.

Model Rule 3.1 – forbids attorneys from initiating a proceeding unless there is a nonfrivolous
basis for doing so
Model Rule 3.3 – forbids attorneys from making material false statements to tribunals, failing
to correct false statements already made, or offering evidence that the lawyer knows to be
false
Model Rule 3.4 – forbids attorneys from falsifying evidence, counseling a witness to testify
falsely, or assisting with such testimony
Model Rule 4.1– forbids attorneys from knowingly making false statements of material fact or
law to a third person
Model Rule 8.4 – forbids attorneys from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation, or engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice
Criminal Prosecution

A number of state and federal criminal statutes are potentially implicated, including insurance
fraud, conspiracy, mail fraud, wire fraud, obstruction of justice, perjury, and criminal RICO.

Michigan Law Review). This process was aided by Judge Jack’s Silica order, as that order also
identified physicians with dubious diagnoses. Id. at 5–7.
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1. Rule 11
First, a complaint based on manufactured evidence can be sanctioned
under Rule 11. Applicable to nearly every paper filed in federal court, Rule
11 provides that by presenting a filing, an attorney certifies, to the best of his
or her knowledge, that the filing: (1) “is not being presented for any improper purpose,” (2) contains factual contentions that have evidentiary support (or, if specifically identified, are likely to have evidentiary support upon
further investigation), and (3) contains claims and contentions that “are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument” for the law’s extension, modification, or reversal.194 The Rule further specifies that “[i]f, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines
that Rule 11(b) has been violated,” it may impose appropriate sanctions on
the attorney, law firm, or party “responsible for the violation.”195
Of course, Rule 11 is subject to certain limits. Most notably, it (and its
many state court counterparts) applies only once a lawsuit is filed.196 Thus,
Rule 11 cannot penalize those who file false demands for payment (with an
auto insurer or trust administrator, say) without actually initiating suit. After its 1993 amendment, it includes a twenty-one-day safe harbor provision,
which softens some of its bite.197 Finally, though penalties can be hefty, it is
now clear that Rule 11’s primary purpose is to deter rather than to compensate.198 Consistent with that purpose, courts are advised to err on the side of
leniency and to impose the least severe sanction they can, sufficient to deter
misconduct.199
2. Rule 60
Next, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 authorizes relief from a final
judgment in limited circumstances. In particular, Rule 60(b)(3) authorizes
relief for “fraud . . . misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing
194. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Attorneys can also be sanctioned for advocating a position
after it becomes clear that the position is untenable. E.g., Turner v. Sungard Bus. Sys., 91 F.3d
1418, 1421–22 (11th Cir. 1996).
195. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1).
196. See Ali v. Tolbert, 636 F.3d 622, 329–30 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Lamboy-Ortiz v. OrtizVélez, 630 F.3d 228, 245 (1st Cir. 2010). Numerous states have provisions that mirror or
mimic Rule 11, in either its 1983 iteration or its current guise. See John B. Oakley, A Fresh
Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 Nev. L.J. 354, 382, 385–86 (2003) (compiling
authority).
197. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2) (providing that, when a party moves for sanctions, the party
against whom sanctions are sought has twenty-one days to withdraw or correct the challenged
paper without adverse consequences).
198. Id. 11(c)(4) (“A sanction imposed under this rule must be limited to what suffices to
deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.”).
199. William H. Fortune et al., Modern Litigation and Professional Responsibility Handbook 80 (2d ed. 2001). As such, monetary penalties are rarely imposed, and even
when imposed, are typically paid to the court, rather than to the aggrieved party, though an
exception can be made for “egregious violations.” Vairo, supra note 31, at 521–23.
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party”—but only if the moving party seeks relief within one year of the
court’s judgment.200 Additionally, Rule 60(d)(3) provides that in the case of
(subtly different and more serious) “fraud on the court,” a judgment can be
set aside at any time.201
When applying Rule 60, however, courts have proceeded cautiously. As
the Fifth Circuit has advised: “The provisions of this rule must be carefully
interpreted to preserve the delicate balance between the sanctity of final
judgments, expressed in the doctrine of res judicata, and the incessant command of the court’s conscience that justice be done in light of all the
facts.”202 Exhibiting this caution, courts have consistently ruled that the
moving party—the party seeking to open a judgment—carries a “heavy burden,” must prove the fraud’s existence by clear and convincing evidence, and
“must show not only that ‘the adverse party engaged in fraud or other misconduct, [but also] that his conduct prevented the moving party from fully
and fairly presenting his case.’ ”203 Furthermore, if the moving party cannot
show “fraud on the court,” Rule 60(b)(3)’s one-year time limit is exactingly
applied.204
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1927
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1927 offers a third mechanism to punish fraudulent
filings. Originally enacted in 1813 and substantially revised in 1980, the statute provides:
200. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), (c)(1). Though not described in detail here, other mechanisms are also potentially implicated. If a party engages in discovery abuse, Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 26(g), 30, and 37 authorize penalties. For certain pretrial misconduct, Rule
16(f) comes to the fore. If a party files a frivolous or unwarranted appeal, Rule 39, Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure 38, and 28 U.S.C. § 1912 come into play. Finally, courts may authorize
a range of sanctions for the spoliation or destruction of evidence. For more on these mechanisms, see generally David F. Herr & Nicole Narotzky, Sanctions in Civil Litigation: A Review of
Sanctions by Rule, Statute, and Inherent Power, SN009 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1741 (2007).
201. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3). Parsing the difference, one commentator explains that
[a] fraud on the court claim hinges on the conduct’s effect on the judicial process—the
fraud alleged must involve injury to more than a single litigant and must seriously affect
the integrity of the adjudication process. Examples include bribery of a judge, jury tampering, or hiring an attorney whose sole value to the case is the attorney’s intimate or
criminal relationship with the judge. These types of claims are distinguishable from fraud
between parties, which, even if involving perjury, do not constitute fraud on the court.

Hollee S. Temple, Raining on the Litigation Parade: Is It Time to Stop Litigant Abuse of the Fraud
on the Court Doctrine?, 39 U.S.F. L. Rev. 967, 974–75 (2005).
202. Bankers Mortg. Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir. 1970) (emphasis
added).
203. Kiburz v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 446 F. App’x 434, 436–37 (3d Cir. 2011)
(alteration in original) (quoting Stridiron v. Stridiron, 698 F.2d 204, 207 (3d Cir. 1983)); see
also Shepherd v. Am. Broad. Cos., 62 F.3d 1469, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (advising that the “clear
and convincing” requirement is “well-settled”).
204. 12 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice, § 60.65[2][a] (3d ed.
1997) (describing the one-year limit as “absolute”).
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Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the
United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in
any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to
satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably
incurred because of such conduct.205

Section 1927 is a formidable fraud-fighting instrument, even as compared to Rule 11. While Rule 11 depends on “a writing,” § 1927 broadly
encompasses any misconduct.206 In addition, while a Rule 11 motion must
be made before a case is over, § 1927 motions can be made postresolution.207
Finally, unlike Rule 11—which is aimed at deterrence rather than compensation—§ 1927 explicitly authorizes monetary penalties that flow to the
party aggrieved.208
Even so, § 1927 has limits. First, § 1927 applies only to attorneys; parties
or experts fall outside its parameters.209 Second, while § 1927 explicitly authorizes monetary sanctions, this sanction is limited to “excess costs” incurred as a consequence of the misconduct—and calculating precisely which
costs are “excess” sometimes proves difficult.210 Third, in keeping with Congress’s explicit command that the provision should “in no way . . . dampen
the legitimate zeal of an attorney in representing his client,” courts have long
held that § 1927 ought to be strictly construed and have typically predicated
the imposition of sanctions on a showing of intent, recklessness, or bad
faith.211 Finally, § 1927’s reach is circumscribed. Applicable only to federal
actions, it does not sanction state court conduct or the filing of fraudulent
claims outside official tribunals. As Table 2 indicates, however, numerous
states have enacted similar statutory provisions that authorize or direct
judges to award attorneys’ fees to the aggrieved party upon a finding that
litigation was frivolous, groundless, vexatious, or not initiated in good faith
(or some combination thereof).212

205. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012).
206. Vairo, supra note 31, at 761 (drawing this distinction).
207. Id. at 762 (collecting authority).
208. Id. at 760.
209. Gregory P. Joseph, Sanctions: The Federal Law of Litigation Abuse
§ 21(C)(1) (5th ed. 2013) (discussing this limit).
210. Id. § 24(B). Indeed, in the Silica litigation, Judge Jack imposed sanctions pursuant to
§ 1927, but partly because of this “excess” requirement, the sanctions’ dollar value ($8,250)
bordered on the trivial. See In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 676–79 (S.D.
Tex. 2005).
211. H.R. Rep. No. 96-1234, at 8 (1980) (Conf. Rep.); accord 2 Alba Conte, Attorney
Fee Awards § 7:58, at 407 (3d ed. 2004).
212. E.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 128.5(a) (West 2015) (“Every trial court may order a
party, the party’s attorney, or both to pay any reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees,
incurred by another party as a result of bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous . . . .”); see
also John W. Wade, On Frivolous Litigation: A Study of Tort Liability and Procedural Sanctions,
14 Hofstra L. Rev. 433, 457–68 (1986) (compiling state authority).
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4. Inherent Authority
Next, both state and federal judges have “inherent authority” to punish
those who file fraudulent claims.213 This inherent sanctioning power is, in
one commentator’s words, “staggeringly broad.”214 A “consummate gap-filler,” a court’s inherent authority can be used to target not just lawyers, but
all those complicit in the vexatious litigation effort.215 Judges can use their
inherent authority to sanction actors for the full run of litigation abuse. And
they can impose a wide range of penalties, including everything from awarding attorneys’ fees, to entering a default judgment, to enjoining further litigation, to vacating a past judgment, to reprimanding or even disbarring
offending counsel.216
Still, there are limits. Once again, the ability to sanction depends on the
actual initiation of suit; thus, claims just submitted to insurers, funds, or
trusts aren’t covered. In addition, because this authority is “shielded from
direct democratic controls,” the Supreme Court has held that lower courts
must exercise their inherent authority “with restraint and discretion.”217 Following that command, courts typically impose sanctions pursuant to their
inherent authority only when an actor’s conduct is egregious and no other
adequate basis for sanctions exists.218
5. Malicious Prosecution
A fifth mechanism litigants can use to penalize filing fraudulent claims
is the common law tort variously called “malicious prosecution,” “malicious
civil prosecution,” or “wrongful use of civil proceedings.”219 Subject to onerous requirements because, it is said, a freewheeling civil action would chill
litigation, wrongfully curtail court access, and—potentially even worse—
trigger adversarial combat without end, a malicious prosecution action can
be initiated only if a party satisfies at least four requirements.220 The court
must find:
213. See Joseph, supra note 209, § 1(E). According to the Supreme Court, federal courts’
inherent powers are those which “are necessary to the exercise of all others.” United States v.
Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
214. Joseph, supra note 209, § 1(E).
215. Gregory P. Joseph, Rule 11 Is Only the Beginning, A.B.A. J., May 1988, at 62, 64.
216. Joseph, supra note 209, §§ 1(E), 28(A) (collecting sources).
217. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980).
218. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991) (“[W]hen there is badfaith conduct in the course of litigation that could be adequately sanctioned under the Rules,
the court ordinarily should rely on the Rules rather than the inherent power.”); Shepherd v.
Am. Broad. Cos., 62 F.3d 1469, 1472–73 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Martin v. Brown, 63 F.3d 1252,
1265 (3d Cir. 1995).
219. Wade, supra note 212, at 437–38.
220. See, e.g., Babb v. Superior Court, 479 P.2d 379, 382–83 (Cal. 1971) (“[M]alicious
prosecution is a cause of action not favored by the law . . . . The additional risk [of liability] . . .
may deter poor plaintiffs from asserting bona fide claims.”); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 8 N.E.2d
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(1) the proceeding at issue was initiated without probable cause;
(2) the proceeding was terminated in favor of the defendant (although
there may be an exception if the plaintiff’s victory was obtained by
fraud);
(3) the proceeding was initiated with “malice” (which exists, it is commonly said, when a plaintiff files a suit he does not believe is meritorious); and
(4) the proceeding injured the defendant, despite his foregoing victory.221

Seeking to further curtail the action, a large minority of states impose a fifth
prerequisite—namely, that the defendant (now seeking relief via the tort
system) must show he suffered some special injury as a result of the initial
proceeding, beyond the fact that the suit’s defense was costly or burdensome.222 Lastly, many states top off the above requirements with an additional hurdle: a statute of limitations of only one year.223
For a party who can clear the above obstacles, though, these suits have
several advantages. They can be initiated for actions that originated in either
state or federal court and against the original plaintiff, his attorney, or both,
assuming adequate malice.224 And, unlike some remedial measures, successful malicious prosecution actions can come with sizable awards, including
punitive and noneconomic damages.225 At the same time, however, the party
must file and litigate a collateral action, which can be costly.
6. Bar Disciplinary Activity
A sixth remedial mechanism is the bar disciplinary system. A lawyer
who assists a client in filing a manufactured claim almost certainly violates
at least one of a several Model Rules of Professional Conduct (as set forth
above in Table 2), and, of course, lawyers who violate their states’ rules of
conduct are subject to professional discipline.226
668, 670 (Ill. 1937) (noting that malicious prosecution suits are subject to exacting requirements because “courts should be open to litigants for the settlement of their rights without
fear of prosecution”); Penwag Property Co. v. Landau, 388 A.2d 1265, 1266 (N.J. 1978) (per
curiam) (“Malicious prosecution . . . is not a favored cause of action because of the policy that
people should not be inhibited in seeking redress in the courts.”).
221. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 676 cmt. b (Am. Law Inst. 1977); accord W.
Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 120 (5th ed. 1984); Wade, supra note
212, at 437–50.
222. See Keeton et al., supra note 221, § 120, at 890–92. Where this requirement is
imposed, it is said to “virtually abrogate[ ] the use of this theory.” Jerome M. Janzer, Comment, Countersuits to Legal and Medical Malpractice Actions: Any Chance for Success?, 65 Marq.
L. Rev. 93, 116 (1981).
223. See von Bulow ex rel. Auersperg v. von Bulow, 657 F. Supp. 1134, 1144 & n.7
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
224. Wade, supra note 212, at 446.
225. See id. at 444.
226. All states save California have rules of professional conduct fashioned after the Model
Rules. For detail, see Charts Comparing Professional Conduct Rules, Am. Bar Ass’n, http://
www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/policy/charts.html [https://
perma.cc/8EFZ-RL2R].
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Bar disciplinary sanctions offer, at least theoretically, a potent and sensible tool to penalize attorneys who assist in the filing of fraudulent claims:
The system can punish lawyers even for out-of-court conduct. Disciplinary
tribunals, which determine whether any Rules have been violated, are often
comprised of specialists. As such, they come with the efficiency, uniformity,
and quality advantages generally thought to accompany specialized courts.227
Bar prosecutors should theoretically learn of relevant misconduct, as lawyers
and judges are duty-bound to report serious abuses to “appropriate
authorit[ies].”228 And adjudicators can impose stiff penalties (including disbarment) but, unlike in criminal cases, they need not be persuaded beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Yet, for all those advantages, this layer of the regulatory architecture has
serious limitations. While we might debate why disciplinary committees
have seemingly stood by, even in the face of serious attorney wrongdoing—
the evidence that they’ve done so is quite plain.229 Illustrating this lassitude,
though a grievance was filed concerning the Baron & Budd deposition-preparation memo discussed above, disciplinary counsel in Texas reportedly
“brushed off the grievance, apparently accepting the law firm’s unsworn
227. See Lawrence Baum, Specializing the Courts 32–33 (2011) (dubbing increased
efficiency, quality, and uniformity the “neutral virtues” of judicial specialization).
228. See Model Code of Judicial Conduct R. 2.15 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2011) (obligating
judges to report conduct that “raises a substantial question regarding the lawyer’s honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness” to “the appropriate authority”); Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct
R. 8.3 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2008) (same for lawyers).
229. What explains this? A partial answer is that bar counsel might not learn of lawyers’
transgressions. Detection is tricky because, though (as noted) judges and lawyers are formally
obligated to alert authorities when they come across certain unethical conduct, in reality,
many shirk on their whistle-blowing responsibilities. This leaves ex-clients to file most grievances. See Deborah L. Rhode & Alice Woolley, Comparative Perspectives on Lawyer Regulation:
An Agenda for Reform in the United States and Canada, 80 Fordham L. Rev. 2761, 2766 (2012)
(reporting that lawyers and judges account for only “10 percent of the complaints to disciplinary bodies”). But ex-clients, who may be complicit in lodging fraudulent filings, are, in this
instance, particularly unlikely to act. Part of the answer, too, is that, perhaps out of respect for
a (kind of) coordinate branch of government, bar counsel tends to defer to courts whenever
in-court conduct is at issue. Because some frauds involve in-court activity, this deference takes
a constellation of conduct off the table. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers § 110 cmt. b (Am. Law Inst. 2000) (“Most bar disciplinary agencies rely on the
courts in which litigation occurs to deal with abuse.”).
Further, in many of these cases, proof is difficult. In particular, many Model Rules predicate liability on the lawyer’s actual knowledge of fraud. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct
R. 1.0(f) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2016) (defining “known” and “knowingly”). Yet, some lawyers in the
business of generating dubious claims carefully compartmentalize responsibility (between xray technicians, diagnosing physicians, and paralegals, say), which makes it difficult to prove
that any given lawyer had requisite knowledge. See Brown, supra note 53, at 610 (calling compartmentalization an “effective ‘getaway car’ ”). Finally, it is worth noting that disciplinary
committees’ apparent inactivity in this context is not particularly exceptional. A common refrain is that the disciplinary system is generally too slow to bring serious charges and impose
stiff penalties. Thus, what we are bemoaning is potentially not an aberration—but rather the
rule. See Rhode & Woolley, supra, at 2767 (reporting that “[o]nly about 3 percent of cases
brought to disciplinary authorities result in public sanctions”).
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statements at face value and not conducting an independent factual investigation.”230 No lawyer suffered severe penalties in the wake of the Silica debacle.231 And though in fen-phen, Judge Harvey Bartle forwarded to the New
York bar his finding that certain firms had engaged in “highly questionable”
diagnostic practices, no formal charges were filed.232
7. Criminal Prosecution
Last but not least, those who assert fraudulent claims are subject to
criminal prosecution, whether for perjury, obstruction of justice, conspiracy, bribery, mail fraud, wire fraud, or insurance fraud—and whether by
state or federal authorities.233 Criminal proceedings offer several obvious advantages over other available remedies. Namely, penalties are steeper, public
prosecution underscores the gravity of the offense, and prosecutors, with
prosecutorial discretion, are publicly accountable. Beyond that, a criminal
conviction may estop the insured from contesting the fraud in a subsequent
civil action, generating judicial efficiencies.234 Restitution is possible, as most
states, as well as the federal government, have laws under which sentencing
courts can compel felons to compensate the victims of their crimes.235 Finally, the prospect of prison time can induce the cooperation of otherwise
reluctant witnesses who can, in turn, help to reveal the full extent of specious activity.
On the other hand, there are limits. The “beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard carries substantial problems of proof. Reliant on state or federal
prosecutors, victims cannot personally get the wheels of justice to turn. And
state and federal prosecutors may be reluctant to become embroiled in
230. Cramton, supra note 65, at 179 n.16, 187 (“A referral by a Dallas County judge to
Texas disciplinary authorities resulted in a letter to Fred Baron stating that bar counsel had
dismissed a grievance against him ‘since it does not state, on its face, a violation of a disciplinary rule.’ ” (footnote omitted)). Some ethicists have defended disciplinary counsel’s restraint,
maintaining that the memo, considered in context, was wholly defensible. See, e.g., W. William
Hodes, The Professional Duty to Horseshed Witnesses—Zealously, Within the Bounds of the Law,
30 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1343 (1999).
231. Carroll et al., supra note 63, at 18 (“In the end, only one of the plaintiffs’ firms
involved in the silica litigation ended up paying a penalty . . . . And the sanction levied against
that firm was small.”); accord Choctaw, Inc. v. Campbell-Cherry-Harrison-Davis & Dove, 965
So. 2d 1041 (Miss. 2007) (declining to impose sanctions against a plaintiffs’ firm involved in
the Silica litigation).
232. Trust Amends Suit Against New York Doctor, Adding RICO Claims, Mealey’s Litig.
Rep.: Fen-Phen/Redux, Aug. 12, 2004, at 9.
233. Notably, many states’ conspiracy statutes specifically make the filing of a fraudulent
action a criminal offense. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 182(a)(3) (2016) (rendering it a criminal offense to conspire to “[f]alsely to move or maintain any suit, action, or proceeding”).
234. See Gray v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 708 F.2d 243, 246 (6th Cir. 1983).
235. Guy E. Burnette, Jr., Practice Tips: Defending Against Insurance Fraud, Brief, Summer 1989, at 43, 47 (discussing restitution). In addition, more than half of states authorize
additional civil or administrative fines if a defendant is convicted of defrauding an insurer. For
more on these fines, see Ins. Research Council, Fighting Fraud in the Insurance Industry 37 (2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter IRC, Fighting Fraud].
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seemingly “private skirmishes.” Indeed, this last point has become a rallying
cry for those advocating for retaliatory RICO, as ATRA’s president has complained that state and federal officials have mostly “ignore[d] fraud perpetrated by the lawsuit industry.”236
Yet, it’s not clear that, these days, such assertions ring true.237 Granted,
traditionally, there have been relatively few criminal prosecutions for fraudulent claiming activity. In recent years, however, states have substantially
stepped up their enforcement activities. Cognizant of the complexity of
fraud prosecutions, nearly all states have created dedicated fraud bureaus to
assist with—or, in some states, quarterback—detection, investigation, and
prosecution efforts. (Only eight states had such bureaus in 1990.238) In recent years, numerous states have amended their formal law to make the filing of false insurance claims a felony. (Previously, such convictions were met
with a mere slap on the wrist.239) And, to help insurers overcome their longstanding reluctance to refer suspicious claims to public authorities, the majority of states now make such referrals compulsory.240 Perhaps as a
consequence, fraud referrals are up, and criminal convictions are also
sharply on the rise.241
236. Joyce, New Way, supra note 16; accord Brickman, Screenings, supra note 20, at
1228–29, 1313–14 (lamenting that mass tort fraud has been mostly “prosecution-less”).
237. Granted, we cannot begin to know if there is “enough” prosecutorial activity without
a sense of the numerator or denominator—just how many prosecutions there are, as against
the total amount of fraudulent claiming. Currently, we know neither with any precision.
238. Coal. Against Ins. Fraud, A Statistical Study of State Insurance Fraud Bureaus 6 (2001), http://www.insurancefraud.org/downloads/fb_study.pdf [https://perma.cc/
AH7B-Y3ZS]. Funding for fraud bureaus increased 47 percent from 1998 to 2000. Id.
239. As of 2008, forty-eight states made the filing of a false claim with an insurer a felony,
up from thirty-five states in 1999. Compare Aviva Abramovsky, An Unholy Alliance: Perceptions
of Influence in Insurance Fraud Prosecutions and the Need for Real Safeguards, 98 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 363, 364 n.2 (2008), with Hoyt et al., supra note 14, at 433–34.
240. Abramovsky, supra note 239, at 378–79; see Fla. Ins. Research Ctr., supra note 28,
at 122, 180 (noting that, historically, “many insurance companies” were “hesitant” to refer
fraud cases for criminal prosecution).
241. See Coal. Against Ins. Fraud, supra note 238, at 5 (“Total convictions from fraud
bureau investigations were 2,123 in 2000, more than double the total in 1995.”); Kevin M.
McCarty, Fla. Office of Ins. Regulation, Report on Review of the Data Call Pursuant to House Bill 119—Motor Vehicle Personal Injury Protection (PIP) Insurance
35 (2015) (reporting that, from 2008 to 2013, convictions for no-fault auto fraud in Florida
more than doubled); Abramovsky, supra note 239, at 379 (discussing referrals). Tellingly, some
of the fraud discussed above has been successfully prosecuted. Richard Mark Swimm of soda
pop slip-and-fall fame was sentenced to a prison term of ten years. State v. Swimm, 328 S.E.2d
307, 308 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985), aff’d as modified, 340 S.E.2d 65 (N.C. 1986). In the wake of the
diet drug debacle, as the fen-phen settlement trust was beset by dubious claims, indictments
flew and convictions followed. See, e.g., Lenzner & Maiello, supra note 59. In September 2012,
for example, Dr. Abdur Razzak Tai, an Orlando cardiologist who reviewed the echocardiograms of more than 1,100 claimants and falsely certified that the tests showed compensable
heart damage, was convicted of thirteen separate counts of mail and wire fraud and, at age
seventy-nine, was sentenced to six years in prison. Fen-Phen Fraud Doctor Convicted, Fed.
Bureau of Investigation (Sept. 14, 2012), http://www.fbi.gov/philadelphia/press-releases/
2012/fen-phen-fraud-doctor-convicted [https://perma.cc/8ARE-ZWZ9]. And bogus auto
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D. Concluding Thoughts on Conventional Mechanisms
In light of the assertion that RICO is warranted because conventional
anti-fraud mechanisms are insufficient, I have inventoried the various tools
already in place to deter and punish fraudulent filings. This investigation
revealed that numerous tools do exist, and they take a dizzying array of
forms. Some are formal, others informal. Some target lawyers, others litigants. Some are ex ante, others ex post. Some are paradigmatically public,
while others are private, and still others (notably, bar disciplinary proceedings) straddle the space in between. Some measures—such as a Daubert review that disallows dubious expert testimony—seek to subtly deter
suspicious filings. Other measures, such as sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927, malicious prosecution lawsuits, and bar disciplinary proceedings, focus quite explicitly on punishing egregious activity.
Beyond showing the expansive scope and varied nature of the current
regulatory regime, the foregoing exercise surfaces three important insights
that ought to inform future analyses.
The first insight is that the past ten or twenty years have witnessed a
surge in anti-fraud activity. Insurers are doing more: whereas in 1989 it was
said that “insurers have assumed an ostrich-like position, burying their
heads in the sand by discounting fraudulent claims as a somewhat insignificant problem to be generally disregarded,”242 these days, the vast majority of
property and casualty insurers are investing heavily in the creation and
maintenance of layered and sophisticated fraud-fighting systems.243 Legislators have acted: between 1988 and 1999, forty-three states enacted 124 new
antifraud statutes—and since 2004, more than a dozen states have enacted
another round of antifraud legislation specifically to curb asbestos claims.244
Courts are involved: especially in the mass tort realm, judges are experimenting with numerous new procedures to snuff out fraudulent filings, including mandating audits, appointing independent experts, and issuing Lone
Pine orders. And finally, prosecutors, long resistant to spending too much
time or effort punishing fraudulent filings, have by all accounts grown “increasingly aggressive” and secured a number of high-profile convictions.245
claims have also been aggressively targeted—in recent years, the FBI has investigated and
brought down numerous staged-car-wreck rings all across the United States. See Robert W.
Emerson, Insurance Claims Fraud Problems and Remedies, 46 U. Miami L. Rev. 907, 918 n.39
(1992). Indeed, federal authorities have prominently prosecuted a number of auto-accidentfraud rings under criminal RICO. Id. at 937.
242. Burnette, supra note 235, at 43.
243. See IRC, Fighting Fraud, supra note 235, at 5 (reporting that insurers’ spending on
fraud control more than tripled between 1992 and 1996); Lesch & Byars, supra note 37, at 418
(reporting that, of 150 surveyed insurers, 98 percent had fraud control programs by 1997, up
from 50 percent in 1983).
244. See Mark A. Behrens, What’s New in Asbestos Litigation?, 28 Rev. Litig. 501, 505–06
(2009) (discussing asbestos-specific legislation); Hoyt et al., supra note 14, at 428 (cataloging
the statutes enacted between 1988 and 1999).
245. Dornstein, supra note 13, at 331. For successes, see supra note 241.
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Moreover, although evidence is limited, it appears that many of these
efforts are working.246 If we focus, for example, on asbestos litigation (which
has been the site of so much controversy), we see that within the past decade
claim volumes have plummeted.247 And even those who have been sharply
critical of asbestos litigation in the past acknowledge that “[m]ass medical
screenings are now in abeyance,”248 and “the litigation is re-focused on people with mesothelioma . . . and other serious conditions.”249 Thus, to the
extent there was a wave of fraud in the 1990s and early 2000s, it appears that
the wave has crested, and the tide has turned.
Second, the above analysis reveals that most fraud-fighting mechanisms
only operate once a lawsuit is actually initiated. This means that, to the extent gaps continue to exist in the multifaceted regulatory architecture, they
are far more likely to exist when it comes to unfiled, rather than filed,
claims. Whether in state or federal court, the act of formally initiating a
lawsuit invites an additional, searching layer of scrutiny.
Third, the above analysis reveals that courts and policymakers have long
struggled with how to respond to improper filings. They have long sought to
strike the proper balance between implicitly condoning malicious filings and
going too far in the other direction—which would inevitably discourage
honest litigants from seeking justice, erode the finality of judgments, and
open the floodgates to retaliatory litigation, theoretically without end. So
far, in striking this balance, courts have erred on the side of restraint.
Whether permitting tort actions for malicious prosecution; meting out sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, or their inherent authority; or
setting aside final judgments pursuant to Rule 60, courts have, again and
again, proceeded cautiously. They have, repeatedly and in different contexts,
imposed sanctions only sparingly and subject to careful safeguards. And they
have been especially cautious when sanctions are sought after-the-fact and by
the targeted party’s adversary or former adversary, rather than, say, a neutral
prosecutor. This suggests that permitting an unbridled retaliatory RICO action would (for better or worse) represent a stark departure from the delicate balance that’s been constructed and cultivated over centuries.

246. Indeed, they are arguably working too well and creating too many obstacles to impede the initiation and prosecution of even meritorious suits. As noted supra note 25, however, a discussion of other mechanisms’ drawbacks falls outside the scope of this Article.
247. Elise Gelinas, Asbestos Fraud Should Lead to Fairness: Why Congress Should Enact the
Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act, 69 Md. L. Rev. 162, 189 (2009) (“Since 2001, large
defendant companies have reported an 80% reduction in asbestos filings . . . .”).
248. 3 Tod I. Zuckerman, Interview with Professor Lester Brickman, in Environmental
Insurance Litigation: Law and Practice app. 26A (2d ed. 2016).
249. Behrens, supra note 244, at 502; accord Hanlon & Geise, supra note 64, at 7 (stating,
in 2007, that “[c]ertainly any asbestos defendant that compares the state of the litigation today
with 2001 or 2002 must be astonished at the sea change that has taken place”).
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IV. Problems with RICO’s Rise
On one level, the simple question this Article aims to address is
whether—or when—retaliatory RICO suits should be added to the above
menu. Admittedly, the argument that fraudulent litigation does as a textual
matter give rise to RICO liability is straightforward and uncontroversial.
Mail and wire fraud are RICO’s most common predicates, and the elements
of mail and wire fraud are (1) a scheme to defraud another of money or
property and (2) the use of the mails or wires for the purpose of executing
the scheme.250 Thus, if one litigant seeks to defraud another litigant and uses
the mail or wires to do so, the mail or wire fraud statutes are presumably
tripped.251 Further, each mailing or phone call can count toward RICO’s
“pattern” requirement; a RICO injury to one’s “business or property” exists
whenever money is lost; and to constitute an “enterprise,” one needs just a
lawyer and client. This means that even a single fraudulent lawsuit can, theoretically, give rise to RICO liability.252
Yet, mindful of RICO’s elasticity, courts have tended to do more than
rotely recite the above requirements when applying the statute. Explicitly or
implicitly, courts have routinely, and in my view correctly, considered the
broader policy implications of particular statutory interpretations.253 Following their lead, to determine whether aggrieved litigants like Feld or CSX
should be able to bring RICO suits against their adversaries, we must consider the potential drawbacks of such litigation. Below, I identify three main
problems. The first implicates both fit and federalism: if left unchecked, retaliatory RICO suits threaten to distort other carefully tailored federal and
state remedies. The second involves overdeterrence: because of the risk of
error in application, such suits are bound to chill even socially desirable
litigation conduct. The third and final problem involves collateral consequences: unbridled retaliatory RICO suits are apt to impose costs on courts,
the legal profession, and the broader civil litigation environment.
250. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012); Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1954).
251. See Parrish, supra note 26, at 343 (“[E]very time an insurance company pays a claim
which is grounded in the dishonesty of either the insured or one who victimized the insured a
mail fraud occurs.”).
252. Accord Fiebach, supra note 23, at 1319 (recognizing that, without some court-imposed limit, many “commonplace aspects of litigation,” such as filing “an unsuccessful lawsuit,” could expose a lawyer to RICO liability, given the breadth of the statue’s language).
253. See DirecTV, Inc. v. Lewis, No. 03-CV-6241-CJS-JWF, 2005 WL 1006030, at *8
(W.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2005) (explaining that courts have rejected certain interpretations of the
mail fraud statute on “policy grounds”); infra notes 260–261 (offering myriad examples). In
bringing criminal RICO charges, the Department of Justice has kept a similarly tight rein on
the statute’s use. No U.S. Attorney’s Office can file a RICO complaint without the Criminal
Division’s prior approval, and the Division has made clear that it will not approve “every
proposed RICO charge that meets” RICO’s “technical requirements.” In particular, the Division has emphasized that it “will not approve ‘imaginative’ prosecutions” that stray “from the
congressional purpose of the RICO statute.” 1 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Department of
Justice Manual §§ 9-110.200 (3d ed. 2016).
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A. Distortion of Existing Remedies
The first problem with retaliatory RICO is that such actions threaten to
distort narrowly tailored remedies carefully crafted by courts, state legislatures, and Congress.254 Here, recall that Part III revealed that, across different
systems and over many years, courts have imposed liability for litigationrelated conduct only warily, subject to careful safeguards and stringent
limitations.255
Beyond that, courts and legislatures have also fashioned additional safeguards to shield practitioners and parties from liability for past litigation
conduct, including the judicial privilege (which insulates parties from liability for certain acts and statements related to judicial proceedings),256 the Noerr-Pennington doctrine (which generally immunizes “those who petition
government for redress”),257 and anti-SLAPP statutes (which restrict lawsuits
that would chill the exercise of certain constitutional rights).258
All of these protections are, at bottom, similar. All are rooted in the
desire to guarantee open access to the courts, promote zealous advocacy, and
protect the finality of judgments. All are grounded in the belief that afterthe-fact liability for litigation conduct would undercut those core values.
And, all reflect a considered judgment that those values are sufficiently precious that their protection justifies leaving even serious wrongs “unredressed.”259 Granted, for complicated reasons, no existing safeguard
necessarily rules out the prospect of retaliatory RICO liability.260 Nevertheless, to broadly authorize retaliatory RICO suits is to chip away at the principles on which various time-honored doctrines are based.
254. Business interests raised this same concern in the mid-1980s when they were on the
receiving end of civil RICO. E.g., Brief for the National Association of Manufacturers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989) (No.
87-1252), 1988 WL 1025679, at *3 (complaining that, to permit broad use of the “private
treble-damages provision” threatens to “distort[ ] . . . other . . . remedies that Congress and
the courts have carefully formulated”).
255. See supra notes 194–218 and accompanying text.
256. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335 (1983); Judith Kilpatrick, Regulating the Litigation Immunity: New Power and a Breath of Fresh Air for the Attorney Discipline System, 24 Ariz.
St. L.J. 1069 (1992).
257. Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 56 (1993).
258. For more on anti-SLAPP statutes, see supra note 177 and accompanying text.
259. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 345 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.
1949)); Fiebach, supra note 23, at 1314 (recognizing that the judicial privilege is premised
upon the “need to encourage forceful and zealous advocacy free of any exposure to possible
liability”).
260. Applied to retaliatory RICO, the judicial privilege runs into two impediments: (1)
courts have been reluctant to extend the privilege to restrict statutory (and especially federal
statutory) causes of action, and (2) many states hold that the privilege does not protect petitions containing deliberate misrepresentations. See, e.g., Steffes v. Stepan Co., 144 F.3d 1070,
1074 (7th Cir. 1998); U.S. Gen., Inc. v. Schroeder, 400 F. Supp. 713, 717 (E.D. Wis. 1975). But
cf. Sellers v. Gen. Motors Corp., 590 F. Supp. 502 (E.D. Pa. 1984). Likewise, courts have held
that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine does not protect “sham” litigation—namely suits that
were, from their inception, objectively baseless and intended to abuse the judicial process. Cf.
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RICO’s strength in comparison to traditional remedies also raises a federalism concern. This concern arises because litigants will have strong incentives to bring federal RICO suits (rather than state malicious prosecution
actions, say), as long as they are broadly permissible, and particularly as long
as they offer litigants greater rewards than traditional remedies, while requiring them to jump through comparatively fewer hoops. Even state court
litigants will be tempted to head to federal court to complain about litigation misconduct—sometimes even before the state court action is complete—impinging upon state prerogatives and raising serious questions of
comity.261
B. Overdeterrence
Relatedly, because RICO is a “sledgehammer,” there is a risk that the
prospect of RICO liability will dampen attorney advocacy and chill the initiation of valid, as well as invalid, claims. Overdeterrence is likely because the
risk of error in RICO’s application means that law-abiding plaintiffs and
counsel will sometimes face RICO suits (if not, often, actual RICO liability).
And this possibility, however remote, will reduce, however marginally, the
expected value of lawsuits.262 A reduction in expected value will, in turn,
limit case initiation and affect case prosecution. Or, as a federal court has
concluded: “If any litigant’s or attorney’s pleading . . . could lead to drastic
RICO liability in a private right of action, litigants might hesitate to avail
themselves of the courts and available legal remedies or be unable to find
representation to help vindicate their rights.”263
When it comes to the risk that retaliatory RICO will affect litigation
conduct, we need not merely speculate. Past experience from the 1983
United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1123–24 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per
curiam). Finally, anti-SLAPP statutes offer no shelter because, as a creature of state law, antiSLAPP legislation cannot encumber a federal cause of action. E.g., In re Bah, 321 B.R. 41, 46
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005).
261. See, e.g., Jackson v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 731 F.3d 556, 568 (6th Cir.
2013) (rejecting plaintiffs’ interpretation of RICO because it would result in a broad “redistribution of power” between the state and federal systems); Curtis & Assocs., P.C. v. Law Offices
of David M. Bushman, Esq., 758 F. Supp. 2d 153, 173–74 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (dismissing a retaliatory RICO action because, inter alia, “allowing the federal RICO statute to usurp underlying
legitimate state court litigation as proposed by plaintiffs here would inappropriately bypass the
state tribunal where the action is pending and which properly controls that proceeding”), aff’d
sub nom. Curtis v. Law Offices of David M. Bushman, Esq., 443 F. App’x 582 (2d Cir. 2011).
262. Cf. Bone, supra note 31, at 589 (discussing this dynamic in the Rule 11 context);
Charles M. Yablon, The Good, the Bad, and the Frivolous Case: An Essay on Probability and Rule
11, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 65, 97 (1996) (same, while noting that “the more stringent the sanction,
the greater the percentage of potentially successful cases that will never be filed”). For a classic
discussion of how “excessive damage awards” influence behavior, see John E. Calfee & Richard
Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 Va. L. Rev. 965,
986 (1984).
263. Curtis & Assocs., 758 F. Supp. 2d at 173; see also Yablon, supra note 262, at 68 (noting, in the context of Rule 11, that “the Holy Grail of policymakers in this area, a rule that will
deter frivolous litigation without inhibiting meritorious cases, is simply not attainable”).
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amendments to Rule 11 provides instructive empirical support. In 1983, the
Advisory Committee substantially expanded Rule 11 by, among other
things, making sanctions mandatory rather than discretionary and clarifying
courts’ authority to impose a wide range of penalties, including costs and
attorneys’ fees.264 Yet, it’s fair to say that the effort backfired. Though the
1983 amendments did, as intended, promote prefiling investigations and
certainly generated a raft of filings, the 1983 version of the Rule had numerous unintended consequences, leading to its 1993 revision.265
Of the various unintended consequences, the 1983 rule’s “chilling effect” was of particular concern. Namely, despite reformers’ clear intent that
the amended Rule 11 not “chill an attorney’s enthusiasm or creativity in
pursuing factual or legal theories,”266 some evidence suggests that the
amendment did just that.267 Indeed, the most comprehensive study of the
amended Rule 11—a survey of over 3,000 federal litigators sponsored by the
American Judicature Society—found that 20.5 percent of plaintiffs’ lawyers
reported that fear of Rule 11 liability caused them to withhold asserting a
particular claim or defense that they thought had merit.268 Unleashing retaliatory RICO can be expected to have the same, or an even greater, dampening effect.269
Beyond that, if broadly permitted, retaliatory RICO suits will affect not
just the way cases are litigated—but also which cases are brought. Here, once
again, Rule 11 serves as a cautionary tale. The 1983 amendments were intended to target only frivolous filings; the Rule-writers did not mean to stifle
meritorious suits.270 But evidence suggests that the amendments nevertheless
induced lawyers to decline even some cases that they thought were
meritorious.271
264. Georgene Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 589, 597 (1998)
(summarizing changes).
265. For increased investigations, see Lawrence C. Marshall et al., The Use and Impact of
Rule 11, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 943, 960, 964 (1992); Vairo, supra note 264, at 621–23. From 1983
to 1993, a whopping 7,000 sanctions decisions were reported; because many decisions are not
published, that number likely represents the tip of the iceberg. Id. at 625–26.
266. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (discussing this intent with respect to the 1983 amendment).
267. Danielle Kie Hart, Still Chilling After All These Years: Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and Its Impact on Federal Civil Rights Plaintiffs After the 1993 Amendments, 37
Val. U. L. Rev. 1, 23 (2002).
268. Marshall et al., supra note 265, at 961–63.
269. This is no small thing. In order for our adversarial system to function properly, “the
parties must be somewhat equally capable of producing their cases.” William B. Rubenstein,
The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 1865, 1873 (2002). If one side’s
advocate is systematically hobbled or restrained, while the other side’s advocate is unimpeded,
that mismatch might well, over time, affect the direction and evolution of substantive law.
270. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (describing the Advisory Committee’s intent).
271. For example, a 1992 survey conducted in the Eastern District of Washington reported
that a fear of unjustified Rule 11 sanctions caused 15 percent of lawyers to decline taking an
even meritorious case. Gerald F. Hess, Rule 11 Practice in Federal and State Court: An Empirical
Comparative Study, 75 Marq. L. Rev. 313, 337 (1992); cf. David B. Owens, Civil Rights Foe or
Frivolous Litigation Enabler? An Empirical Study of Rule 11 Practice Under the 1983 and 1993
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To be sure, some might think this extra caution is, on balance, beneficial. (It is bound to cut down on litigation, and the “litigation explosion”
trope is well entrenched.) But for reasons explained below—even apart from
the serious constitutional and other concerns with limiting court access—
curtailing the initiation of tort claims is potentially undesirable.272
To see why, we can place tort claims into one of four boxes, based on
whether the tort claim is valid or invalid and whether it is satisfied or unsatisfied (i.e., whether the plaintiff recovers or not). Further, referencing Table
3 below, we can (arguably) stipulate that, as a society, the goal should be to
get claims in the boxes that are gray (where claims are resolved in a manner
consonant with their merit) and avoid the boxes that are white (where
claims are resolved in a manner that is inconsistent with their merit).273 We
don’t, in other words, want good claims to go unpaid, and we similarly don’t
want bad claims to be compensated.
Table 3
Claim Validity and Success
Valid

Invalid

CLAIM SATISFIED

Box 1: Valid Claims – Satisfied

Box 3: Invalid Claims – Satisfied

(Claim results in compensation for

(True Positive)

(False Positive)

CLAIM UNSATISFIED

Box 2: Valid Claims – Unsatisfied

Box 4: Invalid Claims – Unsatisfied

(Either claim is lost or claim is never

(False Negative)

(True Negative)

plaintiff)

initiated)

If broadly permitted, retaliatory RICO would predictably shuttle invalid
claims from Box 3 down to Box 4, which is salutatory. Troublingly, however,
it would also predictably shuttle valid claims from Box 1 down to Box 2,
Versions (June 7, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Michigan Law Review)
(offering empirical analysis, which might be interpreted to complicate the conventional story
that the 1983 amendments chilled litigation).
272. In terms of constitutional questions, it bears note that the majority of state constitutions have “open courts” provisions, arguably undermined by retaliatory RICO suits. See John
M. Johnson & G. Edward Cassady III, Frivolous Lawsuits and Defensive Responses to Them—
What Relief Is Available?, 36 Ala. L. Rev. 927, 928 n.8 (1985) (compiling provisions).
273. The matrix is inspired from the matrices set forth in Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice
Cost Too Much?, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 2073, 2077 (2002), and Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know
Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—And Why Not?, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1147, 1170 (1992). It is also important to note that some may quarrel with the stipulation,
offered above, that society’s goal should be to resolve claims in a manner consonant with their
merit, recognizing that gaps in available data make it hard to say what level of litigation is truly
optimal from a social welfare perspective. See Valerie P. Hans, Business on Trial: The
Civil Jury and Corporate Responsibility 56 (2000) (“Current empirical data cannot really
address the question of how many lawsuits are optimal. Answering the question depends on
the litigation rate’s impact on the range of functions of the civil justice system, including
compensation, deterrence, and the promotion of safety.”).
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which is problematic. Indeed, adding to Box 2 seems doubly problematic
because empirical research suggests that, of the various boxes, Box 2 is currently the most densely populated. The tort liability system, in the aggregate,
contains more false negatives (individuals entitled to compensation who do
not obtain that compensation) as compared to false positives (individuals
who receive compensation, even for nonmeritorious claims).274
These shifts set up a classic cost-benefit tradeoff. And, of course, to truly
weigh relevant costs and benefits we need to know much more: we need a
better idea of how many claims are in each category, and we also need a
better sense of the size and social cost and utility of the claims themselves. In
addition, it is not enough to recognize that RICO would move claims in and
out of current categories; we need more information on flow rates—i.e.,
how many valid versus invalid claims would be suppressed? Still, given the
Rule 11 experience, it seems very likely that retaliatory RICO would chill the
initiation of even meritorious suits, and it is important to recognize that this
chilling could be socially undesirable.
C. Additional Costs
Finally, beyond the problems above, to green-light retaliatory RICO is
apt to unleash several collateral harms. Namely, it would encourage costly
satellite litigation, undermine attorney civility, and erode the finality of
judgments.
1. Satellite Litigation
First, retaliatory RICO is bound to engender wasteful satellite litigation.
Here again, the Rule 11 experience is edifying. Rule 11’s 1983 amendments
274. For statistics, see McGovern, supra note 54. Scholars have long viewed this low rate of
claiming as the tort system’s biggest shortcoming. See, e.g., Paul C. Weiler et al., A Measure of Malpractice: Medical Injury, Malpractice Litigation, and Patient Compensation 76 (1993) (discussing false positives and false negatives and concluding, in a rigorous
study of medical malpractice litigation, “we found several times as many seriously disabled
patients who received no legal redress for their injury as innocent doctors who bore the burden of defending against unwarranted malpractice claims”); Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort
Crisis—Too Few Claims, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 443, 447 (1987) (“The real tort crisis is . . . a crisis of
underclaiming rather than overclaiming. The tort system does not encourage fraud or display
excessive generosity but fails to compensate needy, deserving victims.”); Saks, supra note 273,
at 1226 (“The system’s greatest error is that an enormous number of persons who have been
negligently injured will not receive the compensation that would be due them if they exercised
their right to claim and had been able to find a lawyer willing to represent them.”). The above
information is, admittedly, contrary to popular perception. But, as Professors Haltom and
McCann explain, the gulf between reality and perception makes sense, as Box 2 is populated by
the dog that didn’t bark: “When the wronged choose to lump injuries, compensation or atonement foregone is almost always a very private decision.” Haltom & McCann, supra note 13, at
84. On the other hand, “[s]ecuring a lawyer or filing suit is a . . . public action, about which the
press and reformers are even more likely to hear.” Id. In addition, as Professor Saks points out:
“[T]he two types of errors are asymmetrical. False positive errors will have repeated opportunities to be caught and removed from the system without payment. On the other hand, false
negative errors are unlikely ever to be corrected.” Saks, supra note 273, at 1196.
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sought to tame excessive litigation. But soon after they took effect, it became
clear that they did the opposite—the amendments actually engendered “a
new industry of Rule 11 motion practice adding to cost and delay.”275 Indeed, with some irony given this Article’s focus, some noted that, by the late
1980s, “Rule 11 replaced civil RICO actions as the cottage industry of the
litigation bar.”276 A broad embrace of retaliatory RICO could result in much
the same. Indeed, because, unlike Rule 11, retaliatory RICO actions are filed
as entirely new lawsuits, sometimes in entirely different courts, and often
before judges unfamiliar with the underlying litigation, it seems that, if
broadly permitted, RICO suits might impose even higher collateral costs.
2. Undermine Attorney Civility
Next, retaliatory RICO suits threaten to undermine attorney civility.
Again, the Rule 11 experience is instructive. It is widely believed that the
1983 version of Rule 11 “exacerbated contentious behavior between counsel.”277 Or, in Judge Jack Weinstein’s words, Rule 11 “infuse[d] our court
proceedings with a spirit of meanness and intolerance as parties seek to litigate ancillary questions of lawyers’ conduct having little to do with the merits of the cases.”278 In fact, at least one respected authority concluded that a
“decline in civility” was the most significant change wrought by the Rule’s
revision.279
If broadly permitted, retaliatory RICO would likely cause a similar deterioration. True, the risk is perhaps lower, because even if civil RICO is embraced to ATRA’s liking, RICO claims are still likely to be much less
common than Rule 11 filings were back in their prime. But, it’s also true
that, compared to the bazooka that is RICO, Rule 11 is barely a BB gun. (As
of 1992, when complaints about Rule 11 reached a crescendo, the median
sanction was a paltry $2,500.280) If retaliatory RICO claims become anything
275. Paul D. Carrington & Andrew Wasson, A Reflection on Rulemaking: The Rule 11 Experience, 37 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 563, 566 (2004); see also William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited,
101 Harv. L. Rev. 1013, 1017–18 (1988) (“Rule 11 has added substantially to the volume of
motions in the district courts and appeals in the circuit courts. This activity leads to waste and
delay.”).
276. Vairo, supra note 264, at 625 (citing Michael Bates, The Rule 11 Debate, 4 Years Later,
Nat’l L.J., Oct. 12, 1987, at 3).
277. Letter from Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to Robert E. Keeton, Chairman, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure (May 1, 1992),
reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 523 (1993). Notably, the Federal Judicial Center reported in 1991
that a majority (50.3 percent) of surveyed federal judges believed that the amended Rule 11
promoted unnecessarily contentious behavior by counsel. Elizabeth C. Wiggins et al., The Federal Judicial Center’s Study of Rule 11, FJC Directions, Nov. 1991, at 3, 33. Lawyers perceived
this as well. The best survey of Rule 11 found that 64 percent of litigator-respondents believed
that the amended Rule 11 impaired civility. Marshall et al., supra note 265, at 964.
278. Jack B. Weinstein, Procedural Reform as a Surrogate for Substantive Law Revision, 59
Brook. L. Rev. 827, 836 (1993).
279. Vairo, supra note 264, at 628.
280. Marshall et al., supra note 265, at 957. Indeed, 44.6 percent of monetary sanctions
involved $1,500 or less. Id.
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even approaching commonplace, the prospect of RICO filings will exacerbate incivility within the civil justice system.
3. Erode the Finality of Judgments
Lastly, as the earlier discussion of Rule 60 motions and malicious prosecution actions suggests, courts have long stressed the importance of finality—and, in both the civil and criminal contexts, have taken pains to prevent
parties from rehashing a matter that has been addressed and resolved.281
They draw this line because, they say, to do otherwise would create a risk of
inconsistent judgments, squander scarce judicial resources, undermine the
concept of repose, encourage sandbagging (by reducing litigants’ incentives
to catch and correct errors on a timely basis), and ultimately, subvert the
rule of law.282 One last problem with retaliatory RICO suits, then, is that
such suits threaten to undermine judicial finality. Or, as the First Circuit
noted while affirming the dismissal of a retaliatory RICO complaint: “In
essence, simply by alleging that defendants’ litigation stance in the state
court case was ‘fraudulent,’ plaintiff is insisting upon a right to relitigate that
entire case in federal court . . . . The RICO statute obviously was not meant
to endorse any such occurrence.”283
V. A Path Forward: Restraint and Equality
The above discussion suggests that unfettered retaliatory RICO actions
come with substantial risks and would pose substantial costs. These suits are
apt to intrude upon state prerogatives and undermine our bedrock commitment to open court access. They are bound to overdeter and, in so doing,
chill the initiation—and stymie the prosecution—of even meritorious suits.
And, they are destined to impose collateral harms, in that they would engender wasteful litigation, exacerbate incivility, and undermine the finality of
judgments. I submit that those are the primary costs, or likely costs, of
opening the floodgates to retaliatory RICO.
281. The drive for finality undergirds res judicata and collateral estoppel—and can also be
seen elsewhere including, for instance, in criminal courts’ reluctance to reopen guilty pleas and
their relative impatience with habeas claims. For a classic discussion, see Henry J. Friendly, Is
Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 149–50
(1970). For finality in the civil context, see David L. Shapiro, Civil Procedure: Preclusion
in Civil Actions 16–17 (2001).
282. See Andrew Chongseh Kim, Beyond Finality: How Making Criminal Judgments Less
Final Can Further the “Interests of Finality,” 2013 Utah L. Rev. 561, 563, 568–75 (discussing
the conventionally articulated “instrumental benefits to society” thought to come from finality
in the criminal-law context).
283. Gabovitch v. Shear, No. 95-1055, 1995 WL 697319, at *3 (1st Cir. Nov. 21, 1995) (per
curiam); see also Curtis & Assocs., P.C. v. Law Offices of David M. Bushman, Esq., 758 F.
Supp. 2d 153, 173 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (dismissing plaintiff’s RICO suit because to countenance
the suit “would lead to absurd results” because “if routine litigation activities . . . [are] a
violation of RICO, then almost every state or federal action could lead to corollary federal
RICO actions”), aff’d sub nom. Curtis v. Law Offices of David M. Bushman, Esq., 443 F. App’x
582 (2d Cir. 2011).
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But even all this does not mean that retaliatory RICO actions are never
justified. Part I shows that, although it’s wickedly hard to quantify, the problem of fraud in civil litigation is all too real. Identifying witness tampering as
a specific act constituting a RICO predicate, the RICO statute itself impliedly
supports the notion that prior litigation activity can, at least sometimes, give
rise to RICO liability.284 More broadly, our civil justice system cannot be
permitted to become a sanctuary for those who would use it to carry out
their own nefarious schemes.
Given these competing considerations, courts should permit retaliatory
RICO actions—but only cautiously. As they do, they ought to proceed
against a backdrop of restraint and equality.
A. Restraint
Restraint is needed to minimize the various risks above—and also because the imposition of retaliatory RICO liability forces courts to walk two
very fine and treacherous lines. One marks the gray and murky demarcation
between permissible and impermissible advocacy. Our civil justice system
tolerates (and often extols) a great deal of aggression, obfuscation, and exaggeration—and, like it or not, lawyers are paid not to “uncover the truth,”
but to represent clients. In this setting, the line between acceptably zealous,
partisan advocacy and “unacceptable fraud by outright lying” often blurs.285
Similarly, RICO suits force courts to draw a line separating suits that are
merely nonmeritorious from those that are truly tainted. But this line drawing, too, is fraught, especially after-the-fact, with the benefit of hindsight,
once witnesses’ recollections dim and tensions run high.
Exhibiting appropriate restraint, courts should permit retaliatory RICO
suits where the challenged conduct involved a large, far-flung, and orchestrated scheme to commit fraud in the pursuit (or defense) of numerous
claims. They should, however, disallow retaliatory RICO actions if the only
fraudulent conduct involved routine litigation activity, particularly if that
activity pertained to the litigation (or defense) of a single claim.
Applying these principles, the Feld case was a poor vehicle for RICO,
while CSX stands as a reasonable application of this potent weapon. In Feld,
the complained-of conduct involved unexceptional (even if unlawful) litigation activity.286 Confronted with this activity, the defendant could have filed
284. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (2012) (defining racketeering activity as including an act
under 18 U.S.C. § 1512, which outlaws witness tampering); see also id. § 1961(1)(D) (defining
racketeering activity as including “any offense involving fraud connected with a case under
title 11 (except a case under section 157 of this title)”).
285. State v. Marks, 758 So. 2d 1131, 1136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); see also Miller, supra
note 14, at 361 (“[T]he line between proper and improper advocacy is, as it has always been,
obscure and context dependent.”).
286. Recall, one of Feld’s central complaints was that Thomas Rider was a paid fact witness. Yet, that is not altogether exceptional. Cf. Paul M. Barrett, Chevron Calls Star Witness: A
Bribe-Taking Former Judge, BloombergBusinessweek (Oct. 24, 2013, 1:56 PM), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-10-24/chevron-calls-star-witness-a-bribe-taking-former-judge [https://perma.cc/3RX7-656E ] (noting that Chevron’s star witness in its retaliatory
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motions for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, and if necessary, could have
sought a range of penalties (including costs and attorneys’ fees), pursuant to
the court’s inherent authority. Section 28 U.S.C. § 1927 was also available,
and indeed, penalties pursuant to § 1927 were ultimately imposed.287 A malicious prosecution lawsuit was also a possibility, and it too was tried,
though it fizzled because the original plaintiffs’ claims failed for want of
standing (and, thus, jurisdiction), rather than on the merits.288 Beyond that,
because it appears that Tom Rider committed perjury, referral to a U.S. Attorney’s office for criminal prosecution was probably in order. And in light
of lawyers’ suspected assistance in the scheme, Judge Sullivan and Feld’s lawyers were also, it appears, duty bound to refer counsel to the D.C. Bar. Feld,
in other words, had myriad conventional weapons at its disposal. Given the
breadth and apparent sufficiency of these conventional mechanisms, a follow-on RICO action was not warranted. On the other hand, in CSX—where
the fraud was apparently long-standing, far-flung, and involved numerous
actors manufacturing myriad claims, in some instances, outside formal,
traditional judicial processes—a retaliatory RICO case was, in my mind,
justified.
This proposed line drawing has doctrinal support: in recent years, a
number of courts have held that garden-variety litigation activity—including filing or prosecuting a single questionable claim—cannot give rise to
RICO liability.289 But courts have endorsed retaliatory RICO suits when the
RICO suit against Steven Donziger was former Ecuadorian judge Alberto Guerra—and that,
by Chevron’s own admission, the company paid “the disgraced ex-jurist tens of thousands of
dollars in a deal for his testimony”).
287. Judge Sullivan sanctioned attorney Katherine Meyer and her law firm pursuant to
§ 1927 upon a finding that, back in 2004, Meyer helped to prepare a false interrogatory response. Animal Welfare Inst. v. Feld Entm’t, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 2d 1, 20 (D.D.C. 2013).
288. Feld Entm’t, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 873 F. Supp.
2d 288, 332 (D.D.C. 2012) (“Because the termination of the ESA Action as to Rider and API
did not reflect on the merits of the underlying litigation, it was not favorable in the legal sense
required to support an allegation for malicious prosecution.”).
289. See, e.g., Drobny v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 929 F. Supp. 2d 839, 848 (N.D. Ill.
2013) (“[F]iling and prosecuting a complaint is not considered . . . a predicate act under
RICO.” (quoting Carthan-Ragland v. Standard Bank & Tr., No. 11 C 5864, 2012 WL 1658244,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2012))); Nolan v. Galaxy Sci. Corp., 269 F. Supp. 2d 635, 643 (E.D. Pa.
2003) (rejecting the notion that “the filing of litigation documents known to contain falsehoods constitute[s] predicate acts under RICO”); Auburn Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Andrus, 9 F. Supp.
2d 1291, 1297 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (holding that “engaging in [allegedly fraudulent] litigation . . .
does not constitute mail fraud for purposes of supporting a RICO claim”); Nakahara v. Bal,
No. 97 Civ.2027(DLC), 1998 WL 35123, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 1998) (holding that the filing
of fraudulent documents in litigation “fail[s] as a matter of law to establish the requisite predicate acts for purposes of their asserted RICO claim”); von Bulow ex rel. Auersperg v. von
Bulow, 657 F. Supp. 1134, 1143 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding “a malicious prosecution claim may
not serve as the basis for a federal RICO cause of action”); accord Curtis & Assocs., P.C. v. Law
Offices of David M. Bushman, Esq., 758 F. Supp. 2d 153, 172 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A]llegations
that the state court litigation is frivolous, fraudulent, or baseless—essentially claims of malicious prosecution—without more, cannot constitute a viable RICO predicate act.”), aff’d sub
nom. Curtis v. Law Offices of David M. Bushman, Esq., 443 F. App’x 582 (2d Cir. 2011);
Kashelkar v. Rubin & Rothman, 97 F. Supp. 2d 383, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Garden-variety
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complained-of conduct involves a large, far-flung, and orchestrated
scheme.290 Then, beyond this doctrinal support, the above line drawing is
supported by RICO’s statutory language and is also prudent as a matter of
policy.
For starters, the delineation is faithful to the RICO statute itself. Most
notably, the statute explicitly predicates liability on the existence of a “pattern” of racketeering.291 In determining whether this pattern requirement is
satisfied, duration is important.292 But courts insist that it’s not enough to
ask how long the fraud lasted; we must also consider how broadly it reached,
including “the number and variety of predicate acts . . . the number of victims, the presence of separate schemes and the occurrence of distinct injuries.”293 RICO’s pattern requirement is not comfortably satisfied by
duplicitous conduct in the litigation of a single case, where (as in Feld, for
example) there is only an isolated scheme, in one court, with a particular,
discrete goal centered on harming one victim or entity.294 But it may be
satisfied (as in CSX, say) when the scheme implicates a number of actors
fabricating numerous claims over a lengthy period.
Two canons of statutory construction also support the proposed interpretation. First, if retaliatory RICO suits based on illegal conduct in the
course of litigating a single claim are permitted, many will (like Feld) focus
pleading errors and the filing of routine motions do not constitute RICO predicate acts. To
hold otherwise would turn every state court lawsuit into a predicate for a subsequent federal
RICO action.”); Auto Collection Inc. v. Pinkow, No. 7847/09, 2011 WL 4821628, at *5 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Oct. 7, 2011) (dismissing a RICO claim as “merely artfully pleaded claims for malicious prosecution”). But see St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 224 F.3d 425, 443–44
(5th Cir. 2000) (reversing judgment against an insurer in its retaliatory RICO claim, predicated on a claimant’s allegedly staged electrocution).
290. See, e.g., United States v. Eisen, 974 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1992) (endorsing a criminal
RICO action premised on litigation activities where the defendants engaged in an extensive
and broad scheme); Garlock Sealing Techs., LLC v. Simon Greenstone Panatier Bartlett, No.
3:14-cv-116, 2015 WL 5148732, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 2, 2015) (noting that, while it is true
that “some courts have declined to find that routine litigation activities can serve as predicate
acts,” a RICO claim can be asserted where the defendant is “accused of committing rampant
fraud over the course of several years and in numerous venues”); Warnock v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., No. 5:08cv01-DCB-JMR, 2008 WL 4594129, at *7–8 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 14, 2008)
(denying a motion to dismiss a RICO action because defendants were allegedly “involved in a
larger scheme to defraud multiple people”); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rosenfield, 683
F. Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (finding that a RICO action was proper, where the defendants
were involved in the filing of numerous fraudulent auto claims over a lengthy period); see also
Curtis & Assocs., 758 F. Supp. 2d at 176 (explaining this distinction).
291. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
292. As the Supreme Court has explained: “Predicate acts extending over a few weeks or
months and threatening no future criminal conduct do not satisfy this requirement: Congress
was concerned in RICO with long-term criminal conduct.” H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492
U.S. 229, 242 (1989).
293. Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge Merch. Servs., Inc., 20 F.3d 771, 780 (7th Cir. 1994); see
also Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Stone, 998 F.2d 1534, 1543–44 (10th Cir. 1993).
294. See Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1266–67 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that misconduct while litigating one lawsuit lacked sufficient continuity to satisfy RICO’s
pattern requirement).
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mostly on an opposing party’s prior perjury. But this is problematic because
there is no civil action for perjury; RICO’s expansive definition of “racketeering activity” contains no reference to 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (the federal statute that makes perjury a criminal offense); and under the canon expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, courts should not read in a predicate that Congress
opted to exclude.295 Meanwhile, a second canon of statutory construction
concerns the balance of federal-state power. Known as “the clear statement
principle,” this canon counsels that federal statutes, unless they are clear,
ought to be construed to respect state sovereignty.296 This is relevant because, as noted, the unrestricted use of retaliatory RICO would permit a
disappointed and defeated state court litigant to bring an action in federal
court to rehash the reasons for his or her defeat.297 Yet, the RICO statute
provides no clear indication that Congress meant to authorize such intrusive
oversight.
Finally, the suggested approach—permitting retaliatory RICO suits only
where the challenged conduct affects multiple claims and extends far beyond
routine litigation misconduct—is prudent as a matter of policy. Most critically, the delineation is sensible because it reserves RICO to target fraud
where fraud is most apt to be found—where, in other words, RICO’s use
would be narrowly tailored to serve beneficial ends. Part I revealed that there
is little reason to believe that the tort system is generally awash in fraudulent
filings. At the same time, Part I showed that there are two areas of the personal injury environment where fraudulent claims are likely to fester: softtissue auto claims and mass torts, where oversubscription poses a real concern. In both contexts, fraudulent conduct very frequently involves large,
far-flung, and orchestrated schemes, so retaliatory RICO suits, even under
my restrictions, would be permissible.298
295. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest
for Neutral Reasoning, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 13 (2005) (describing the “expressio unius maxim,
under which the inclusion of one term or concept in text suggests the exclusion of . . . alternative terms and concepts not mentioned”).
296. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971), superseded by statute, Firearms
Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104(b), 100 Stat. 449, 459 (1986). Notably,
ATRA made this same argument back when it advocated a narrow construction of civil RICO.
Brief of the American Tort Reform Association & Health Insurance Association of America as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents Leonard Belleza et al., Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494
(2000) (No. 98-1480), 1999 WL 728352, at *10 (“If Congress had intended to enact a statutory
scheme that would, in effect, largely displace an area of law that has been left to the States, one
would find evidence of that intent. . . . There is no such meaningful evidence in the statute or
RICO’s legislative history.”).
297. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
298. Many of the most egregious examples of auto accident claims fraud are not one-offs,
but rather, involve large rings, typically comprised of chiropractors, physicians, claims brokers,
and lawyers who work in tandem. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Makris, No.
CIV.A. 01-5351, 2003 WL 924615, at *1–4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2003) (describing a large auto
accident fraud ring, involving a law firm, two attorneys, a physician, and a chiropractor, who
all allegedly worked together); McCarty, supra note 241, at 36–37 (discussing large auto accident rings successfully targeted in Florida, including one associated with fraudulent billings in
excess of $18 million); see also Tribune Co. v. Purcigliotti, 869 F. Supp. 1076, 1084 (S.D.N.Y.
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Further, to the extent retaliatory RICO targets mostly soft-tissue auto
and mass tort claims, there are two additional benefits. The first benefit
stems from the fact that many of these soft-tissue auto and mass tort claims
(against auto insurers, asbestos trusts, or settlement funds, say) never ripen
into lawsuits.299 Meanwhile, Part III teaches us that unfiled claims are precisely those that the current system is least able to police; whether in state or
federal court, Part III reveals, the act of formally initiating a lawsuit invites
an additional, searching layer of scrutiny.300 This means that layering RICO
onto the existing regulatory regime to assure the integrity of litigated lawsuits risks being overkill. But layering on extra protection when it comes to
unfiled claims may well make sense.
Second, to the extent retaliatory RICO targets mostly the soft-tissue
auto and mass tort contexts, the overdeterrence problem identified above is
somewhat mitigated.301 This is because (as discussed in Part I), unlike most
areas of the tort system, which are characterized by pervasive under-claiming, the auto accident and mass tort realms display unusually high rates of
claiming.302 Thus, to the extent RICO is narrowly targeted on these areas, a
reduction in claiming rates is less worrisome.
B. Equality
The second touchstone that ought to guide retaliatory RICO’s use is
equality. To the extent RICO claims for litigation-related conduct (broadly
construed) are permitted, courts, commentators, and policymakers ought to
take great care not to employ a double standard, subjecting plaintiffs and
their lawyers to harsh penalties for manufacturing claims but only slapping
the proverbial wrists of defendants or defendants’ counsel, who might take
similarly egregious steps to defeat a plaintiff’s genuine entitlement to
recovery.
1994) (discussing a workers’ compensation fraud ring, allegedly responsible for 600 bogus
filings, involving “three unions, a law firm and a doctor”), aff’d sub nom. Tribune Co. v.
Abiola, 66 F.3d 12 (2d Cir. 1995). Similarly, mass tort fraud typically includes examples like
that seen in CSX, where a law firm works with complicit x-ray technicians and physicians to
generate numerous fabricated filings. See Brown, supra note 53, at 602 (observing that a hallmark of oversubscription is that “multiple participants work[ ] together to generate specious
claims in large volumes”).
299. Cf. Ins. Research Council, Injuries in Auto Accidents: An Analysis of Auto
Insurance Claims 71–73 & figs.6-15 & 6-16 (1999) (reporting that in 1997 lawsuits were
filed to resolve only roughly 16 percent of bodily injury auto claims in tort states and also
reporting that a minority of even represented auto claimants file lawsuits); Elizabeth
Sprinkel, Attorney Involvement in Auto Injury Claims 26 (1988) (reporting that in 1986
88.4 percent of households that asserted auto claims saw their claims settled without a lawsuit
ever filed).
300. Perhaps reflecting the efficacy of these external screens, lawyers themselves report
that, if a lawsuit is filed, they are less willing to engage in duplicitous conduct. See Hinshaw &
Alberts, supra note 51, at 125, 128, 130, 132 (reporting results of a survey of 734 practicing
lawyers).
301. See supra notes 262–274 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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To this point, I have focused on the fraudulent initiation of claims. This
makes sense: fraudulent claim initiation has captured the public’s imagination and has been the site of nearly all recent controversy and criticism. But
plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ lawyers have no monopoly on egregious or deceptive
conduct. To the contrary, there is scant reason to believe that plaintiffs abuse
the legal system any more frequently or egregiously than their defense-side
counterparts.303
Fraud is defined as “[a]n intentional perversion of truth for the purpose
of inducing another in reliance upon it to part with some valuable thing
belonging to him or to surrender a legal right.”304 As such, a plaintiff’s perversion of truth that wrongfully induces payment stands on equal footing to
a defendant’s perversion of truth that wrongfully induces the plaintiff to
relinquish a legal right or to accept an inadequate settlement.305 If it is wrong
for a plaintiff to lie in order to receive payment, it is equally wrong for a
defendant to lie in order to avoid or minimize payment. Operationalizing
this concept, though plaintiffs’ egregious acts ought to be taken seriously,
egregious acts must be taken just as seriously when orchestrated by those on
the opposite side of the “v.”
This is important because, in the past, some plaintiffs have filed retaliatory RICO suits against defendants and insurers for their shady conduct in
the resolution or litigation of claims. For example, in Newman v. General
Motors Corp., five years after a jury found GM liable for injuries a New
Jersey man suffered in a car crash, his estate filed a RICO claim accusing the
carmaker of withholding evidence which “fraudulently deprived” the estate
“of a viable claim for punitive damages.”306 Likewise, in the late 1990s, it
came out that, while defending itself against scores of related product liability cases involving Benlate, DuPont had destroyed and concealed critical evidence about the fungicide’s risks.307 Thereafter, a raft of plaintiffs who had
303. Potts v. Imlay, 4 N.J.L. 330, 333 (Sup. Ct. 1816) (“[S]urely all experience teaches us
that the plea of the defendant is not less frequently false than the claim of the plaintiff.”);
Jonathan K. Van Patten & Robert E. Willard, The Limits of Advocacy: A Proposal for the Tort of
Malicious Defense in Civil Litigation, 35 Hastings L.J. 891, 895 (1984) (“Under current conditions, false and baseless defenses affect the litigants and the court system no less than false and
baseless suits and, as a practical matter, may be even more pervasive.”); see, e.g., David
Halperin, Discovery Abuse: How Defendants in Products Liability Lawsuits Hide and Destroy
Evidence, Public Citizen (July 1997), http://www.citizen.org/congress/article_redirect.cfm
?ID=918 [https://perma.cc/WQY2-NW73] (compiling abuses).
304. Fraud, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979); see also Fraud, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining fraud as “[a] knowing misrepresentation or knowing concealment of a material fact made to induce another to act to his or her detriment.”).
305. See United States v. Porcelli, 865 F.2d 1352, 1359–62 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that a
fraudulent scheme to deprive a victim of a “chose in action” is cognizable under the mail
fraud statute).
306. Plaintiff-Appellee’s Brief at 3–8, Newman v. General Motors Corp., 228 F. App’x 245
(3d Cir. 2007) (No. 06-2473); see also Sellers v. General Motors Corp., 590 F. Supp. 502, 503
(E.D. Pa. 1984) (asserting RICO claim against GM for its allegedly “illegal conduct . . . in
securing a jury verdict”).
307. See, e.g., Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 431 F.3d 353, 357
(9th Cir. 2005); Fla. Evergreen Foliage v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d
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previously settled with DuPont filed RICO suits, alleging that they wouldn’t
have settled their product liability suits—or, at least would have held out for
higher payments—if DuPont had disclosed, rather than withheld, various
damning documents.308 Or in 2015, class plaintiffs filed a RICO suit against
GM and the law firm King & Spalding, claiming, in part, that the two entities “suppressed and withheld information” from past courts and litigants
concerning GM’s ignition switch defect, leading, as above, to settlements for
artificially reduced sums.309
With limited exceptions, however, RICO suits initiated by aggrieved
plaintiffs against corporate defendants for their allegedly wrongful litigation
tactics have failed to gain much traction.310 Indeed, some courts have summarily dismissed RICO suits based on a defendant’s prior litigation activity,
seemingly out of hand. In one court’s words:
If serving and filing an answer or a motion by any defendant in a federal
action could be considered obstruction of justice, this Court would be
flooded with motions to amend complaints by plaintiffs seeking to add
RICO claims based upon mail fraud and obstruction of justice as soon as
an answer was served. Such an interpretation of the RICO statute is
untenable.311

Now, it is far too soon to say that courts have been uneven in their
application of retaliatory RICO. There has only been a smattering of suits,
and the suits that have arisen have involved such varied fact patterns as to
1271, 1283 (S.D. Fla. 2001), aff’d sub nom. Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours &
Co., 341 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2003); Kawamata Farms, Inc. v. United Agri Prods., 948 P.2d
1055, 1082–83 (Haw. 1997).
308. Living Designs, 431 F.3d at 358 (noting plaintiffs’ allegation that “they would have
requested more money or refused to settle had they known about the concealed data” (quoting
Matsuura v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 73 P.3d 687, 691 (Haw. 2003))).
309. Second Amended Consolidated Complaint at para. 1081, In re Gen. Motors LLC
Ignition Switch Litig., No. 14-MD-2543 (JMF) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2016), 2015 WL 4988264;
see also id. ¶¶ 1086, 1023, 1034–80. Also in 2015, the plaintiffs’ firm Simon Greenstone Panatier Bartlett, PC, facing a retaliatory RICO suit for its alleged misdeeds while initiating asbestos
claims, filed a RICO counterclaim against Garlock for its alleged misdeeds in the defense of
those actions. This counterclaim contended that Garlock “knowingly withheld evidence of the
dangers of Garlock’s products, and Garlock’s knowledge of those dangers, in order to depress
verdicts and settlements.” Press Release, Simon Greenstone Panatier Bartlett, PC, Simon
Greenstone Files RICO Counterclaim Against Garlock Sealing Technologies (Nov. 16, 2015),
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/simon-greenstone-files-rico-counterclaim-againstgarlock-sealing-technologies-300179642.html [https://perma.cc/6823-XDHP].
310. See, e.g., Averbach v. Rival Mfg. Co., 809 F.2d 1016 (3d Cir. 1987) (rejecting the
plaintiffs’ claim that the manufacturer’s false answers to interrogatories in a prior product
liability lawsuit gave rise to RICO liability). A limited exception came in the Ninth Circuit in
the Benlate litigation. There, the district court had held that plaintiffs could not state a claim
under § 1962(c), but the Ninth Circuit reversed and effectively revived the claim. Living Designs, 431 F.3d at 356, 364–65. Likewise, Newman survived initial skirmishes, 228 F. App’x 245,
only to be extinguished with GM’s bankruptcy, Newman v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 02-135
(KSH) (D.N.J. June 16, 2009).
311. Gunn v. Palmieri, No. 87 CV 1418, 1989 WL 119519, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1989),
aff’d, 904 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1990).
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defeat any apples-to-apples comparisons. But again looking back, most studies suggest that judges’ impositions of Rule 11 sanctions were biased. Especially when the souped-up 1983 version of Rule 11 was in effect, plaintiffs
were more often the target of sanctions motions than their defense-side
counterparts,312 and judges imposed sanctions on plaintiffs at unusually high
rates.313 Absorbing that lesson, to the extent retaliatory RICO actions are
permitted, courts should take extraordinary care to ensure that RICO is
fairly and equitably applied.314
Conclusion
On one level, this Article’s aim has been quite narrow. Responding to
recent, prominent calls that RICO ought to be sharpened into a retaliatory
tool—and prominent test cases, including Feld and CSX, where retaliatory
RICO claims resulted in multimillion-dollar payouts—I seek to offer courts,
litigants, and policymakers guidance as they chart a path forward. Above, I
contend that the unbridled use of retaliatory RICO carries substantial danger for federal-state relations, open court access, the legal profession, and the
civil justice system writ large. Drawing primarily on our past (mostly unsatisfactory) experience sharpening Rule 11, I have flagged where the largest
pitfalls lie, while offering a prescription that is practical, sensible, in keeping
with the statute’s plain language, and supported by the clear weight of
authority.
On another level, though, this Article’s aim has been different and substantially more ambitious. This Article seeks to highlight the problem of
fraud in the tort litigation environment—a problem that is often discussed
and frequently lamented but rarely studied and poorly understood. This Article offers the most comprehensive evaluation of the fraud problem undertaken to date. Still, numerous empirical, theoretical, and conceptual
questions about fraud’s prevalence and persistence remain. These questions
are profoundly important—and, though it is tempting to avert one’s gaze
from the unseemly underbelly of the tort system, obtaining accurate answers
to those questions ought to be a high priority, for the tort system’s defenders
and critics alike.

312. See Hess, supra note 271, at 338; Marshall et al., supra note 265, at 952–54.
313. See Marshall et al., supra note 265, at 953–54; Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical
Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 200 (1988). To be sure, any conclusion concerning judicial bias in the
imposition of sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 must be somewhat caveated, as it would be proper
for judges to disproportionately sanction plaintiffs if, as compared to defendants, plaintiffs
engaged in more litigation abuse. For reasons explained above, however, we lack data concerning the relative incidence of abuse.
314. There is, in fact, an argument that retaliatory RICO actions are more proper when
they are initiated by aggrieved former plaintiffs against misbehaving defendants (as opposed to
vice versa). Namely, the theoretically available tort of malicious prosecution arguably renders
defendant v. plaintiff retaliatory RICO actions superfluous. But, for the defrauded former
plaintiff, except in New Hampshire, there is no tort of malicious defense. See generally Aranson
v. Schroeder, 671 A.2d 1023, 1028–29 (N.H. 1995); Van Patten & Willard, supra note 303.

